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Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Science
Wittgenstein On Miscalculation And The Foundations Of Mathematics, Samuel J. Wheeler
Wittgenstein On Miscalculation And The Foundations Of Mathematics, Samuel J. Wheeler
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein notes that he has 'not yet made the role of miscalculating clear' and that 'the role of the proposition: "I must have miscalculated"...is really the key to an understanding of the "foundations" of mathematics.' In this paper, I hope to get clear on how this is the case. First, I will explain Wittgenstein's understanding of a 'foundation' for mathematics. Then, by showing how the proposition 'I must have miscalculated' differentiates mathematics from the physical sciences, we will see how this proposition is the key to understanding the foundations of mathematics.
The Function Of Boundary Conditions In The Physical Sciences, Julia R. S. Bursten
The Function Of Boundary Conditions In The Physical Sciences, Julia R. S. Bursten
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Early philosophical accounts of explanation mistook the function of boundary conditions for that of contingent facts. I diagnose where this misunderstanding arose and establish that it persists. I disambiguate between two uses of the term “boundary conditions” and argue that boundary conditions are explanatory via their roles as components of models. Using case studies from fluid mechanics and the physics of waves, I articulate four explanatory functions for boundary conditions in physics: specifying the scope of a model, enabling stable descriptions of phenomena in a model, generating descriptions of novel phenomena, and connecting models from differing theoretical backgrounds.
Thinking Reasonably About Indeterministic Choice Beliefs, Andrew Kissel
Thinking Reasonably About Indeterministic Choice Beliefs, Andrew Kissel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Recent research suggests that, regardless of the truth of libertarianism about free will, there appears to be a widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons that the choices of free agents are not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs. In this paper, I propose a new class of debunking explanation for this belief which I call ‘reasons-based accounts’ (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of extant approaches to debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several alternatives, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Pluralistic Perspectives On Logic: An Introduction, Colin R. Caret, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Pluralistic Perspectives On Logic: An Introduction, Colin R. Caret, Teresa Kouri Kissel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
(First paragraph) Logical pluralism is the view that there are distinct, but equally good logics. Recent years have witnessed a sharp upswing of interest in this view, resulting in an impressive literature. We only expect this trend to continue in the future. More than one commentator has, however, expressed exasperation at the view: what can it mean to be a pluralist about logic of all things? [see, e.g., Eklund (2017); Goddu (2002); Keefe (2014)]. In this introduction, we aim to set out the basic pluralist position, identify some issues over which pluralists disagree amongst themselves, and highlight the topics at …
The World Was His Garden, Anne-Taylor Cahill
The World Was His Garden, Anne-Taylor Cahill
Philosophy Faculty Publications
The article focuses on botanist, David Fairchild and museum, Fairchild Tropical Botanic Gardens located in Coral Gables, Florida.
Ecological Laws And Their Promise Of Explanations, Viorel Pâslaru
Ecological Laws And Their Promise Of Explanations, Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Marcel Weber (1999) argued that the principle of competitive exclusion is a law of ecology that could explain phenomena (1) by direct application, or (2) by describing default states. Since he did not offer an account of explanation by direct application of laws, I offer an interpretation of explanation by direct application of laws based on a proposal by Elgin and Sober (2002). I show that in both cases it is the descriptions of mechanisms that explain phenomena, and not the laws. Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan (2004) argued Malthus’ Law of Exponential Growth is the first law of ecology, …
Scientific Fictionalism And The Problem Of Inconsistency In Nietzsche, Justin Remhof
Scientific Fictionalism And The Problem Of Inconsistency In Nietzsche, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In this article, I begin to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism in order to make headway toward resolving a central interpretive issue in his epistemology. For Nietzsche knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, this is a result of his puzzling view that truths are somehow false. I argue that Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims are falsifications because he embraces a scientific fictionalist view according to which inexact representations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is not inconsistent.
Causal And Mechanistic Explanations, And A Lesson From Ecology, Viorel Pâslaru
Causal And Mechanistic Explanations, And A Lesson From Ecology, Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Jani Raerinne and Lindley Darden argue that causal claims are not sufficiently explanatory, and causal talk should be replaced with mechanistic talk. I examine several examples from ecological research, two of which rely on causal models and structural equation modeling, to show that the assertions of Raerinne and of Darden have to be reconsidered.
Naturalism, Causality, And Nietzsche's Conception Of Science, Justin Remhof
Naturalism, Causality, And Nietzsche's Conception Of Science, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
There is a disagreement over how to understand Nietzsche’s view of science. According to what I call the Negative View, Nietzsche thinks science should be reconceived or superseded by another discourse, such as art, because it is nihilistic. By contrast, what I call the Positive View holds that Nietzsche does not think science is nihilistic, so he denies that it should be reinterpreted or overcome. Interestingly, defenders of each position can appeal to Nietzsche’s understanding of naturalism to support their interpretation. I argue that Nietzsche embraces a social constructivist conception of causality that renders his naturalism incompatible with the views …
Nietzsche On Objects, Justin Remhof
Nietzsche On Objects, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Nietzsche was persistently concerned with what an object is and how different views of objects lead to different views of facts, causality, personhood, substance, truth, mathematics and logic, and even nihilism. Yet his treatment of objects is incredibly puzzling. In many passages, he assumes that objects such as trees and leaves, tables and chairs, and dogs and cats are just ordinary entities of experience. In other places, he reports that objects do not exist. Elsewhere he claims that objects exist, but as mere bundles of forces. And sometimes he proposes that we bring all objects into existence. Nietzsche’s writings, then, …
Dividing Nature By The Joints, Chad Wiener
Dividing Nature By The Joints, Chad Wiener
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Most scholars of Aristotle’s biology have accepted the view of D. M. Balme and Pierre Pellegrin that the History of Animals is devoid of any systematic classification of animals. I challenge this reading. I show that Aristotle can produce a taxonomy of animals kinds that are found in the essences of atomic species, or, to borrow from Plato, divide nature by the joints. I start from Aristotle’s positive views of division stated in APo. II.13–14 and how they imply a taxonomic order of a genus. I then develop my interpretation of how Aristotle can divide nature by the joints in …
The Mechanistic Approach Of 'The Theory Of Island Biogeography' And Its Current Relevance, Viorel Pâslaru
The Mechanistic Approach Of 'The Theory Of Island Biogeography' And Its Current Relevance, Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of contributions to the mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson (1993), I argue that …
Conceptions Of Mechanisms And Insensitivity Of Causation, Viorel Pâslaru
Conceptions Of Mechanisms And Insensitivity Of Causation, Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have developed in opposition to the nomological approach to explanation. It is less emphasized, however, that these conceptions have also developed as alternatives to the causal perspective on explanation. In this paper, I argue that despite their distancing from the topic of causation, the mechanistic conceptions need to incorporate in their definitions of mechanisms the notion of insensitivity of causal relations that was examined by Woodward (2006).
Evolution And The Second Law Of Thermodynamics: Effectively Communicating To Non-Technicians, Alexander Schreiber, Steven Gimbel
Evolution And The Second Law Of Thermodynamics: Effectively Communicating To Non-Technicians, Alexander Schreiber, Steven Gimbel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Given the degree of disbelief in the theory of evolution by the wider public, scientists need to develop a collection of clear explanations and metaphors that demonstrate the working of the theory and the flaws in antievolutionist arguments. This paper presents tools of this sort for countering the anti-evolutionist claim that evolutionary mechanisms are inconsistent with the second law of thermodynamics. Images are provided to replace the traditional misunderstanding of the law, i.e., “everything always gets more disordered over time,” with a more clear sense of the way in which entropy tends to increase allowing a thermally isolated system access …
Ecological Explanation Between Manipulation And Mechanism Description, Viorel Pâslaru
Ecological Explanation Between Manipulation And Mechanism Description, Viorel Pâslaru
Philosophy Faculty Publications
James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfiesWoodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible.
Invariance: A Tale Of Intellectual Migration, Steven Gimbel
Invariance: A Tale Of Intellectual Migration, Steven Gimbel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
The plotline of the standard story told about the development of intellectual history at the end of the 19th/turn of the 20th century follows the move from absolutism to perspectivalism. The narrative takes us, on the one hand, from the scientism of late Enlightenment writers like Voltaire, Mill, D’Alebert, and Comte and the historical determinism of Hegel, all of which were based upon a universal picture of rationality, to, on the other hand, the relativistic physics of Einstein, the perspectival art of Picasso, and the individualism of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard leading to the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger to and …
An Intervening Cause Counterexample To Railton’S Dnp Model Of Explanation, Stuart Gluck, Steven Gimbel
An Intervening Cause Counterexample To Railton’S Dnp Model Of Explanation, Stuart Gluck, Steven Gimbel
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Peter Railton (1978) has introduced the influential deductive-nomological-probabilistic (DNP) model of explanation which is the culmination of a tradition of formal, nonpragmatic accounts of scientific explanation. The other models in this tradition have been shown to be susceptiblet o a class of counterexamplesin volvingi nterveningc auses which speak against their sufficiency. This treatment has never been extended to the DNP model; we contend that the usual form of these counterexamples is ineffective in this case. However, we develop below a new version which overcomes these difficulties. Thus we claim that all of the models in this tradition, DNP included, have …
Scientific Discipline And The Origins Of Race: A Foucaultian Reading Of The History Of Biology, Ladelle Mcwhorter
Scientific Discipline And The Origins Of Race: A Foucaultian Reading Of The History Of Biology, Ladelle Mcwhorter
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Foucault's "power-knowledge" is a controversial concept. Brought into English-speaking theoretical circles less than two decades ago, its meaning and range of applicability are still in dispute. While no one denies that some fields of social scientific knowledge (such as criminology) intersect institutionally with mechanisms of power, these intersections do not seem, to many, to constitute any essential relation of "mutual reinforcement" between knowledge and power. If, in rare cases, politics and scientific research are admitted to be mutually constitutive, the results of their mingling are typically dismissed as propaganda or pseudo-science. A few thinkers are willing to allow the entirety …