Philosophy of Mind Commons^™

The Non-Apprehension Of Selfhood And Metaphysical Freedom, Christopher Rinderle

LSU Master's Theses

In this work I take on one of the most axiomatic assumptions humans possess. The sense of self is embedded so deeply inside each one of us that to question it seems utterly ridiculous. Fortunately, I do not outright reject the notion of selfhood. I investigate what it is and is not through multiple angles – ancient and contemporary – which leads to investigations of free will and responsibility.

In the first chapter, I discuss the Buddhist anātman or non-self. I argue that the historical Buddha did not endorse the idea that the self must be overcome through enlightenment – …

Down The Misinformation Rabbit Hole: Falling Or Jumping In?, Alex Siebenmorgen

Philosophy Undergraduate Honors Theses

The primary goal of this paper is to determine in which cases, if any, an individual is culpable for adopting, expressing, or acting upon a misinformed belief. To determine this, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms by which individuals select beliefs and the biases or mistakes that lead them to adopt false ones. I will compare and evaluate the views of Neil Levy and Dan Kahan, who offer opposing viewpoints on the source of misinformed beliefs. I will also consider the attempts to model belief adoption and expression through signaling theory. Finally, I will propose a particular standard to …

Mental Disorders, The Positivity Effect, And Questions Of Identity And Responsibility, Liam Jones

Pitzer Senior Theses

In order to judge how behavior caused by the positivity effect should be considered, comparisons were made between the positivity effect and two mental disorders. These disorders, Tourette’s syndrome and psychopathy, were selected due to their extreme differences in what Strawsonian attitudes they inspire and how they are perceived relative to disordered patients’ will. Disorder-affected behavior of Tourette’s patients inspires the objective attitude and is seen as a condition affecting an individual’s will, while disorder-affected behavior of psychopaths inspires the interpersonal attitude and is seen as a character trait. Relevant distinctions between psychopathy and Tourette’s syndrome were found to include …

The Reliable Revisionist, Caitlyn Schaffer

Philosophy: Student Scholarship & Creative Works

The present text explores how the topic of head and heart is much more complicated than one would expect, according to Paul Henne and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong, contributors of Neuroexistentialism. “Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality” aims at figuring out the problem of which moral judgments we can trust, judgments from one’s head (revisionism) or judgments from one’s heart (conservatism). My hypothesis suggests the opposite of the authors, I believe that if you are a revisionist, your first order intuitions are reliable. After setting the framework, I make three main arguments. (A.) If you are able to self-correct then you can identify errors …

Against The Received Wisdom: Why The Criminal Justice System Should Give Kids A Break, Stephen J. Morse

All Faculty Scholarship

Professor Gideon Yaffe’s recent, intricately argued book, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility, argues against the nearly uniform position in both law and scholarship that the criminal justice system should give juveniles a break not because on average they have different capacities relevant to responsibility than adults, but because juveniles have little say about the criminal law, primarily because they do not have a vote. For Professor Yaffe, age has political rather than behavioral significance. The book has many excellent general analyses about responsibility, but all are in aid of the central thesis about …

Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung

Animal Sentience

The difference between a cod and a lizard is not just a quantitative one. The recognition of qualitative differences between species does not imply a moral ranking. Our species’ special abilities to shape the earth mean we have a special responsibility for ensuring a liveable future for all organisms, human and non-human.

Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness, Uta Maria Juergens

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman attack the idea that humans are unique and therefore superior to nonhuman beings. They call on humankind to use their “intellect to change [their] actions.” I am in full accord with their line of thought, which differentiates uniqueness from superiority and enjoins humans to take responsible action. I suggest, however, that humans are unique with regard to cognitive fluidity. The same conclusions can be reached via another argument based on human uniqueness.

Interpreting, Stephanie Jo Kent

Doctoral Dissertations

What do community interpreting for the Deaf in western societies, conference interpreting for the European Parliament, and language brokering in international management have in common? Academic research and professional training have historically emphasized the linguistic and cognitive challenges of interpreting, neglecting or ignoring the social aspects that structure communication. All forms of interpreting are inherently social; they involve relationships among at least three people and two languages. The contexts explored here, American Sign Language/English interpreting and spoken language interpreting within the European Parliament, show that simultaneous interpreting involves attitudes, norms and values about intercultural communication that overemphasize information and discount …

Neuroscience And The Future Of Personhood And Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

All Faculty Scholarship

This is a chapter in a book, Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change, edited by Jeffrey Rosen and Benjamin Wittes and published by Brookings. It considers whether likely advances in neuroscience will fundamentally alter our conceptions of human agency, of what it means to be a person, and of responsibility for action. I argue that neuroscience poses no such radical threat now and in the immediate future and it is unlikely ever to pose such a threat unless it or other sciences decisively resolve the mind-body problem. I suggest that until that happens, neuroscience might contribute to the reform of …

Responsible Believing, Miriam S. Mccormick

Philosophy Faculty Publications

In most of our decisions as parents or educators concerning how we should talk to children about difficult subjects, the question turns to what degree we should withhold the truth, how much information we should provide, or what details are appropriate. We, as adults, know the answer to the child's question, and the difficulty arises in figuring out what to convey and how. Questions about death and the afterlife are not like this. We - and by "we;' I mean especially educated adults of the Western world - are often as confused about what we should believe about these matters …

Personality Disorders And Moral Responsibility, Mike W. Martin

Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

In “Personality Disorders: Moral or Medical Kinds—or Both?” Peter Zachar and Nancy Nyquist Potter (2010) reject any general dichotomy between morality and mental health, and specifically between character vices and personality disorders. In doing so, they provide a nuanced and illuminating discussion that connects Aristotelian virtue ethics to a multidimensional understanding of personality disorders. I share their conviction that dissolving morality–health dichotomies is the starting point for any plausible understanding of human beings (Martin 2006), but I register some qualms about their discussion of responsibility.

Are We Responsible For Our Emotions And Moods?, Michael Schleifer, Miriam S. Mccormick

Philosophy Faculty Publications

The short answer to the question in the title of this paper is "yes." Our thesis is that we are indeed responsible for our emotions and moods. We want to help children understand that just as they are responsible for what they do and say, or omit to do or say (along with the consequences of these acts), so are they responsible for much of their affective life. What remains is to explain what we mean by "responsibility," "emotions," and "moods."