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Articles 1 - 30 of 172
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind
Radical Botany: Plants And Speculative Fiction [Table Of Contents], Natania Meeker, Antónia Szabari
Radical Botany: Plants And Speculative Fiction [Table Of Contents], Natania Meeker, Antónia Szabari
Literature
No abstract provided.
On Unifying Declarative Memory, Thomas Ames
On Unifying Declarative Memory, Thomas Ames
Theses
The distinction between episodic and semantic declarative memory systems, as introduced by Tulving (1972, updated in 1984, 1991), was a revolutionary approach to human memory. While the distinction is now widely endorsed in the study of memory, there are debates about what constitutes each system’s domain, how each system is used, how each system functions, and the phenomenal experiences associated with the functioning of each system. On the basis of clinical studies and insights from conditions affecting memory, this paper argues that the episodic/semantic distinction can be reframed as a result of a unified declarative memory system. In this view, …
A New Catechism For The Digital Age, Bruce D. Baker
A New Catechism For The Digital Age, Bruce D. Baker
SPU Works
Preaching and teaching in our digital age demands theological reflection to answer challenging questions raised by exponential technologies. Can an AI become conscious? Is AI intelligent, really? Can a robot sin? Can we program morality? Can we upload our minds? Is transhumanism a technical possibility? Do we need to rethink eschatology? In this paper I hope to contribute to a constructive dialog. I suggest this catechism format as a means to support the need of the Church to teach sound theological doctrine with respect to these challenging questions. By no means do I wish to imply that this catechism is …
In Search Of Psychiatric Kinds: Natural Kinds And Natural Classification In Psychiatry, Nicholas Slothouber
In Search Of Psychiatric Kinds: Natural Kinds And Natural Classification In Psychiatry, Nicholas Slothouber
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
In recent years both philosophers and scientists have asked whether or not our current kinds of mental disorder—e.g., schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder—are natural kinds; and, moreover, whether or not the search for natural kinds of mental disorder is a realistic desideratum for psychiatry. In this dissertation I clarify the sense in which a kind can be said to be “natural” or “real” and argue that, despite a few notable exceptions, kinds of mental disorder cannot be considered natural kinds. Furthermore, I contend that psychopathological phenomena do not cluster together into kinds in the way that paradigmatic natural kinds (e.g., chemical …
The Next Page Of Yoga Anatomy: An Anatomical Lens On Selected Yoga Asanas, Viana Chau
The Next Page Of Yoga Anatomy: An Anatomical Lens On Selected Yoga Asanas, Viana Chau
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection
Yoga has become a widely-recognized form of physical activity as well as an effective therapeutic intervention. It is a self-discipling way of life, taking advantage of the powerful effects from the combination of breathing exercises (pranayama), physical postures (asanas), and meditation on calming the nervous system and balancing the mind, body, and spirit. However, over time, the contemporary definition of yoga, especially in the United States, has decreased the emphasis on the religious spirituality component and increased the emphasis on physical activity. Although one may argue that this is not the traditional yoga, this change not only breaks down the …
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddying The Waters, Lynne U. Sneddon, Javier Lopez-Luna, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Amanda D. Currie, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddying The Waters, Lynne U. Sneddon, Javier Lopez-Luna, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Amanda D. Currie, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Lynne Sneddon, PhD
Recent empirical studies have reported evidence that many aquatic species, including fish, cephalopods and crustaceans, have the capacity for nociception and pain, and that their welfare should be taken into consideration. Some sceptics, rejecting the precautionary principle, have denied that any study demonstrates pain or other aspects of sentience in fish. This target article discusses some of the scientific shortcomings of these critiques through a detailed analysis of a study exploring nociception and analgesia in larval zebrafish.
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Lynne Sneddon, PhD
The majority of commentaries are supportive of our position on the scepticism that muddies the waters surrounding fish pain and sentience. There is substantial empirical evidence for pain in fish. Animals’ experience of pain cannot be compared to artificial intelligence (AI) because AI can only mimic responses to nociceptive input on the basis of human observations and programming. Accepting that fish are sentient would not be detrimental to the industries reliant on fish. A more proactive discussion between scientists and stakeholders is needed to improve fish welfare for the benefit of all.
Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach
Anthropomorphic Denial Of Fish Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach
Lynne Sneddon, PhD
Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not …
Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin
Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin
Bernard Rollin, PhD
The topics explored by Marino are definitive, and should work well to lay to rest forever the widespread belief that chickens have no personality, are unintelligent, or in any other way lack a mental life.
Far More To Sheep Than Meets The Casual Eye, Bernard Rollin
Far More To Sheep Than Meets The Casual Eye, Bernard Rollin
Bernard Rollin, PhD
Marino & Merskin’s survey of the cognitive and social capacities of sheep is an eye-opener about the individuality and emotionality of this most maligned of all farm animals. My own eyes had already been opened by an adopted orphaned lamb, so much more like a dog as a companion animal than the mindless robot I had been conditioned to expect. I am morally certain that Marino & Merskin’s survey will have a similar effect on readers open to changing their minds.
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Bernard Rollin, PhD
Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Bernard Rollin, PhD
Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.
Human Superiority?, Bernard Rollin
Human Superiority?, Bernard Rollin
Bernard Rollin, PhD
Like Charles Darwin and George Romanes, I am quite willing to use anecdotal information as a source of knowledge about animal behavior. There are many more people observing nonhuman animals than there are people conducting controlled experiments, and we can thereby learn that behaviors we think are unique to humans are shared by other animals. From a strictly biological point of view, it makes no sense to speak of “human superiority.” One species of animal can be superior to another only in terms of survival and niche occupation. As moral concern for animals increases across the world, claims of human …
Thinking About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
Thinking About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
Lori Marino, PhD
This response focuses on three major conceptual threads that run through the peer commentary on my target article: (1) how the use of chickens influences our views of them, (2) whether education is effective, and (3) what components of chicken psychology are most relevant to understanding who chickens are.
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
Lori Marino, PhD
The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Lori Marino, PhD
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.
The Inconvenient Truth About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
The Inconvenient Truth About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
Lori Marino, PhD
Original Abstract: Domestic chickens are members of an order, Aves, which has been the focus of a revolution in our understanding of neuroanatomical, cognitive, and social complexity. Some birds are now known to be on a par with many mammals in their intelligence, emotional sophistication, and social interaction. Yet views of chickens have largely remained unrevised in light of this new evidence. In this paper, I examine the data on cognition, emotions, personality, and sociality in chickens, exploring such areas as self-awareness, cognitive bias, social learning and self-control, and comparing their abilities with other birds and other vertebrates, particularly …
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Lori Marino, PhD
Domestic sheep (Ovis aries) are among the earliest animals domesticated for human use. They are consumed worldwide as mutton, hogget, and lamb, kept as wool and milk producers, and used extensively in scientific research. The popular stereotype is that sheep are docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid, but a review of the research on their behavior, affect, cognition, and personality reveals that they are complex, individualistic, and social.
Debunking Human Prejudice And Blindness, Peter J. Li
Debunking Human Prejudice And Blindness, Peter J. Li
Peter J. Li, PhD
Human prejudice and blindness to animal suffering are shocking. Despite their differences in culture, politics, and religious beliefs, humans have one thing in common. They see nonhuman animals as inferior and have since time immemorial assumed a dominant position in an asymmetrical human-animal relationship. When it comes to human-animal relations, there is no “clash of civilizations.” Human prejudice and blindness are predicated on “common sense assumptions” about the natural world and nonhuman animals in particular. Marino & Merskin’s review is part of the growing effort to debunk the assumptions that have shaped human actions so as to end the injustice …
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
Robert C. Jones, PhD
The precautionary principle regarding animal sentience is often used in decision-making about human actions that may cause harm to nonhuman animals. Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle requiring two pragmatic rules for its implementation. I support Birch's proposal but offer a cautionary note about relying on precautionary principles if one's ultimate goal is to emancipate animals from human domination.
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Robert C. Jones, PhD
Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, & 2017d). I explore the larger practical moral contexts within which these debates take place and argue that denials of animal sentience are really moral canards.
The Person And The Self As Social Accomplishment, Leslie Irvine
The Person And The Self As Social Accomplishment, Leslie Irvine
Leslie Irvine, PhD
Rowlands (2016) presents a compelling argument for extending personhood to nonhuman animals. Sociological conceptions of the person also do not require that animals meet the elusive standard of self-awareness. Sociological ideas on selfhood support the claims about pre-reflective awareness and extend the requisite experiences to animals.
Animal Pain And The Social Role Of Science, Leslie Irvine
Animal Pain And The Social Role Of Science, Leslie Irvine
Leslie Irvine, PhD
Assuming that all animals are sentient would mean ending their use in most scientific research. This does not necessarily imply an unscientific or anti-scientific stance. Examining the social role of science reveals its considerable investment in preserving the status quo, including the continued use of animal subjects. From this perspective, the use of animal subjects is a custom that science could move beyond, rather than a methodological requirement that it must defend.
The Reliable Revisionist, Caitlyn Schaffer
The Reliable Revisionist, Caitlyn Schaffer
Philosophy: Student Scholarship & Creative Works
The present text explores how the topic of head and heart is much more complicated than one would expect, according to Paul Henne and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong, contributors of Neuroexistentialism. “Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality” aims at figuring out the problem of which moral judgments we can trust, judgments from one’s head (revisionism) or judgments from one’s heart (conservatism). My hypothesis suggests the opposite of the authors, I believe that if you are a revisionist, your first order intuitions are reliable. After setting the framework, I make three main arguments. (A.) If you are able to self-correct then you can identify errors …
Mentality And Fundamentality, Christopher D. Brown
Mentality And Fundamentality, Christopher D. Brown
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Extant well-considered problems with physicalism primarily come from two sources: philosophers of mind arguing that subjective experience does not fit into a physicalist world-picture, and metaphysicians trying to figure out the particular commitments of the view. I examine the thesis of physicalism in order to produce a clearer notion of the physical and to help straighten out physicalism’s entailments, while simultaneously providing a strategy for physicalists to sidestep well known anti-physicalist arguments concerning consciousness. This involves both a critical and a positive effort: on the critical side, I expose an issue with a popular way of understanding physicalism called “via …
Some Non-Human Languages Of Thought, Nicolas J. Porot
Some Non-Human Languages Of Thought, Nicolas J. Porot
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
What might we learn if we take seriously the possibility of non-human Languages of Thought (LoT)? A LoT is a combinatorial set of mental representations. And, since mental representations and rules of combination vary in kind, there are many possible LoTs. Simple LoTs might lack familiar features of the putative human LoT, such as object representations, recursively defined rules of combination, sentential connectives, or predicate-argument structure. The most familiar arguments for the existence of LoTs, such as those from productivity, systematicity, concept learning, and perceptual computation, all fail when applied to non-human animals. But recent empirical evidence motivates attributing LoTs …
Theorizing About The Self In Panpsychism And The Extended Mind Using The Dao De Jing (道德經) And Zhuangzi (莊子), Ryan Lemasters
Theorizing About The Self In Panpsychism And The Extended Mind Using The Dao De Jing (道德經) And Zhuangzi (莊子), Ryan Lemasters
The Hilltop Review
In this paper, I begin by briefly showing how the problem of self has been understood and approached historically in Western philosophy. I follow this by focusing on some of the recent literature in the philosophy of mind that suggests that the self is extended, meaning it is not solely located within the boundaries of the brain (Clark and Chalmers 1998). It will be evident that this is in conflict with the traditional Western understanding of the self. Since it seems to be the case that there are strong arguments for endorsing the view that the self is extended (to …
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
Jennifer Mather, PhD
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can make some progress. In the Umwelt or perceptual world of an octopus, what the lateralized monocular eyes perceive is not color but the plane of polarization of light. Information is processed by a bilateral brain but manipulation is done by a radially symmetrical set of eight arms. Octopuses do not self-monitor by vision. Their skin pattern system, used for excellent camouflage, is open loop. The output of the motor system of the eight arms is organized at several levels — brain, …
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
A Risk Assessment And Phylogenetic Approach, Culum Brown
Culum Brown, PhD
The precautionary principal is often invoked when talking about the evidence of sentience in animals, largely because we can never be certain what any animal is thinking or feeling. Birch (2017) offers a preliminary framework for the use of the precautionary principal for animal sentience combining an epistemic rule with a decision rule. I extend this framework by adding an evolutionary phylogentic approach which spreads the burden of proof across broad taxonomic groups and a risk assessment component which magnifies the likely impact by the number of animals involved.
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Culum Brown, PhD
The majority of commentaries are supportive of our position on the scepticism that muddies the waters surrounding fish pain and sentience. There is substantial empirical evidence for pain in fish. Animals’ experience of pain cannot be compared to artificial intelligence (AI) because AI can only mimic responses to nociceptive input on the basis of human observations and programming. Accepting that fish are sentient would not be detrimental to the industries reliant on fish. A more proactive discussion between scientists and stakeholders is needed to improve fish welfare for the benefit of all.