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A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer Jan 2024

A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer

Comparative Philosophy

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately …


Mexica Monism And Daoist Ethics In The Philosophy Of Gloria Anzaldúa, Saraliza Anzaldúa Jan 2023

Mexica Monism And Daoist Ethics In The Philosophy Of Gloria Anzaldúa, Saraliza Anzaldúa

Comparative Philosophy

Critical scholarship regarding the philosophy of Gloria Anzaldúa has proliferated in recent decades, especially in the fields of feminist theory, phenomenology, and epistemology. However, there is little analysis of the metaphysics which undergird their work and make possible their views on identity, experience, and community politics. First, this article will explore the significance of Anzaldúa’s ‘nos/otras’ and its relation to Mexica (Aztec) monistic metaphysics. Such a concept resists an us/them construction of the world because it situates the other as us: the Spanish word for ‘we’ is ‘nosotros’ and holds the ‘other/otros’ as its …


Objectivity, Dagfinn Føllesdal Jan 2020

Objectivity, Dagfinn Føllesdal

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


On What Is Real In Nāgārjuna’S “Middle Way”, Richard H. Jones Jan 2020

On What Is Real In Nāgārjuna’S “Middle Way”, Richard H. Jones

Comparative Philosophy

It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also shows that he accepts a "that-ness" (tattva) to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final analysis of things. How Nāgārjuna’s positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed.


Yi-Jing Integral (Yi): A New Natural And Cosmic Ba-Gua, Harry Donkers Aug 2019

Yi-Jing Integral (Yi): A New Natural And Cosmic Ba-Gua, Harry Donkers

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper we elaborate on the neo-Confucian interpretation of the Yi-Jing system. Based on a further exploration of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity of Zhou Dunyi, we develop a cosmological-anthropological model in constructive engagement with Western thoughts and views on systems and on the universe. The vital energy (qi) and the pattern (li) play central roles in this model and also in the interpretation of the images and forces of the trigrams. This leads to a comparative model, based on a quadrant system with four perspectives: naturality, rationality, humanity and morality. This model fits …


Sino-African Philosophy: A Re-“Constructive Engagement”, Paul A. Dottin Jan 2019

Sino-African Philosophy: A Re-“Constructive Engagement”, Paul A. Dottin

Comparative Philosophy

“Constructive-Engagement” is a meta-philosophical and meta-methodological “strategy” suggested by Chinese and comparative philosophy scholar Bo Mou for analyzing and enriching philosophical exchange. In this paper, I will use this strategy towards an end, on a scale, and with a topic not attempted before. I will use it as a “template” for redesigning a poorly developing area of cross-cultural comparison I call Sino-African reflective studies (SARS). My goal in this work-in-progress is to design a plan for reconstituting SARS as Sino-African philosophy (SAP), an inclusive yet coherent field of research and innovation unified through organizing principles. I will design the overhaul …


Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones Jul 2018

Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones

Comparative Philosophy

Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, his ideas on “two truths” and language, and his general method of arguing are presented clearly by him and can be stated without paradox. That the dialetheists today can restate his beliefs in paradoxical ways does not mean that Nāgārjuna argued that way; in fact, their restatements misrepresent and undercut his arguments.


Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul Jul 2017

Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul

Comparative Philosophy

Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, MMK) Chapter 2 (MMK/2) contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and …


Vol 8 No 2 Editor's Words, Bo Mou Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Editor's Words, Bo Mou

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 2 Contents Page Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 2 Information Page Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 2 Cover Page Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


The Perspective And Perspective-Transcending Dimensions Of Consciousness And Its Double-Aboutness Character: Bridging Searle And Zhuang Zi, Bo Mou Jan 2017

The Perspective And Perspective-Transcending Dimensions Of Consciousness And Its Double-Aboutness Character: Bridging Searle And Zhuang Zi, Bo Mou

Comparative Philosophy

What I intend to do here are closely related three things. First, in response to Searle’s “reply” comments on my previous article “Searle, Zhuang Zi, and Transcendental Perspectivism”, I will clarify and further elaborate one of the central points concerning the “perspective” dimension and “perspective-transcending” dimension of consciousness there. Second, more substantially, I will strengthen my point by explaining the “double-aboutness” character of consciousness which is intrinsically related to the foregoing two dimensions of consciousness concerning its “hooking-up-to-objects” capacity; through a semantic-ascent strategy, I will also explain how the point has substantial theoretic implications for exploring the issue of how …


Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom Jan 2017

Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom

Comparative Philosophy

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity …


Searle’S Master Insight And The Non-Dual Solution Of The Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems Of Consciousness, Robert E. Allinson Jan 2017

Searle’S Master Insight And The Non-Dual Solution Of The Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems Of Consciousness, Robert E. Allinson

Comparative Philosophy

The Platform Sutra, which dates back to the seventh century C.E., is one of the classic documents of Chinese philosophy and is the intellectual autobiography of Hui Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an Buddhism. In the Platform Sutra, the Sixth Patriarch demonstrates that the spiritual and intellectual problems of consciousness stem from a false adherence to the dualistic standpoint. The Sixth Patriarch utilizes ingenious arguments to demonstrate how one can escape the problems of dualism. An example of a constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy and Searle is to compare and contrast the arguments of Hui Neng with those of …


Malagasy Time Conceptions, Casey Woodling Jan 2017

Malagasy Time Conceptions, Casey Woodling

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper I discuss Øyvind Dahl’s argument (1995,1999) for the conclusion that Malagasy people conceive of the future as coming from behind them and not as being before them as most worldviews do. I argue that we have good reason not to attribute this view to Malagasy people. First, it would mark an inefficient and anomalous way of keeping track of the past and future. Second, the linguistic and testimonial evidence presented by Dahl doesn’t support the conclusion. Even though this specific argument fails, Dahl has many enlightening things to say about Malagasy time conceptions, such as the various …


Between The Internal And The External: Kant’S And Patañjali’S Arguments For The Reality Of Physical Objects And Their Independence From Mind, Ana Laura Funes Maderey Jan 2017

Between The Internal And The External: Kant’S And Patañjali’S Arguments For The Reality Of Physical Objects And Their Independence From Mind, Ana Laura Funes Maderey

Comparative Philosophy

Although coming from two very different paths, both Kant and Patañjali present similar strategies to refute the skeptic argument that denies the real and independent existence of physical objects. This essay examines both strategies through the reconstruction of Kant’s and Patañjali’s twofold refutation of idealism: one based on the perceptual distinction between the real and the illusory, and the other one based on the ontological necessity of a permanent external object to understand change. I argue that the second strategy is philosophically stronger due to its phenomenological recognition of the body as a grounding point, and that this is possible …


Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs Jan 2017

Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs

Comparative Philosophy

I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine (and both their religious and their secular cultural descendants in the West), and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones (and their contemporaries), respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in everyday discourse, but which, …


Editor's Words, Bo Mou Jan 2017

Editor's Words, Bo Mou

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 1 Contents Page Jan 2017

Vol 8 No 1 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 1 Information Page Jan 2017

Vol 8 No 1 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 1 Cover Page Jan 2017

Vol 8 No 1 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 2 Contents Page Jul 2016

Vol 7 No 2 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 2 Information Page Jul 2016

Vol 7 No 2 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 2 Cover Page Jul 2016

Vol 7 No 2 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Sunyata In The West, David Grandy Dec 2015

Sunyata In The West, David Grandy

Comparative Philosophy

I argue that sunyata, or something like it, manifested itself in early Western thought. While Plato and Aristotle resisted emptiness or nothingness, they nevertheless felt themselves obliged to venture close to its edge in order to ground their explanations of changing reality to unchanging principles. These principles (Plato’s receptacle and Aristotle’s prime matter) embody much of the indeterminancy long associated with the Mahayana understanding of sunyata. Although their function was to enable lasting (static) explanations of reality by putting change out of play, they themselves shade off toward a featureless being evocative of non-being. Moving along a somewhat …


The Social Nature Of Individual Self-Identity: Akan And Narrative Conceptions Of Personhood, Corey L. Barnes Dec 2015

The Social Nature Of Individual Self-Identity: Akan And Narrative Conceptions Of Personhood, Corey L. Barnes

Comparative Philosophy

Marya Schechtman has given us reasons to think that there are different questions that compose personal identity. On the one hand, there is the question of reidentification, which concerns what makes a person the same person through different time-slices. On the other hand, there is the question of characterization, which concerns the actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, etc. that we take to be attributable to a person over time. While leaving the former question for another work, Schechtman answers the latter question by proposing what she terms the narrative self-constitution view, whereby Schechtman claims that we account for …


Vol 7 No 1 Contents Page Dec 2015

Vol 7 No 1 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 1 Information Page Dec 2015

Vol 7 No 1 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 1 Cover Page Dec 2015

Vol 7 No 1 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.