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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Reasons For Reason-Giving In Unplanned Discourse, Martha Sylvia Cheng May 1999

Reasons For Reason-Giving In Unplanned Discourse, Martha Sylvia Cheng

OSSA Conference Archive

Most studies of reason-giving have focussed on formal, planned situations rather than on how reason-giving functions in relatively unplanned discourse. This study looks at reason-giving by respondents to an anonymous telephone public-opinion survey, e xploring the relationship between fact, policy, and value claims and the types of reasons used to support those claims. The results resonate with two important areas in argumentation theory: argument fields and critical thinking. Further, I suggest that reason-giving can serve as a method for individuals to present themselves as human and thoughtfully reasonable.


Critical Thinking, Charity And Care: Reason And Goodness Both, Jacqueline M. Davies May 1999

Critical Thinking, Charity And Care: Reason And Goodness Both, Jacqueline M. Davies

OSSA Conference Archive

Care reasoning is valuable not because its nicer or kinder. Rather, it is the most reasonable way to come to terms with moral phenomena. Interpreting arguments requires making sense of the relationship between statements. Making sense of moral pheno mena requires making sense of relationships between (inherently indeterminate) moral subjects. Thus, the best reconstructions of moral problems will be realized in a medium (such as narrative) where meaningfulness is not undermined by indeterminacy. Fur ther, the rationality of care reasoning, which Gilligan calls narrative, can be appreciated by analogy with the rationale for the principle of charity in the interpretation …


Agreement, Michael Anthony Gilbert May 1999

Agreement, Michael Anthony Gilbert

OSSA Conference Archive

Classically an argument terminates when the parties involved agree to the truth of a proposition known as the claim. On Gilbert's model of multi-model argumentation this approach is inadequate since a "claim" as such does not exist except as a logical artifact or abbreviation. In its place one must consider a "position," an object that contains within it much more information than can be found in an individual statement. While this adds a greater amount of complexity, it has the advantage of more ac curately describing the workings of marketplace argumentation.


The Truth About Truth As A Condition Of Premise Adequacy, James B. Freeman May 1999

The Truth About Truth As A Condition Of Premise Adequacy, James B. Freeman

OSSA Conference Archive

Is truth a condition of premise adequacy? We may distinguish objective and subjective argument correctness. Objective correctness means true premises rendering the conclusion true or probable. Subjective correctness means acceptable pr emises rendering the conclusion acceptable. Acceptability depends on evidence available and so is internalist. Objective and subjective correctness of the premises is ordinarily distinct. For connection adequacy, objective rightness and subjective righ tness coincide. We recognize entailment or rendering probably a priori. Logic is thus internalist. Logic needs an internalist notion of acceptability for premise evaluation to fall within its purview, although it need not deny the objective sens …


Cicero's Authority, Jean Goodwin May 1999

Cicero's Authority, Jean Goodwin

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper I propose to continue the analysis of the appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam) begun at the last OSSA conference. I proceed by examining the well-documented use of the appeal made by the ancient Roman advocate, Cicero. The fact that Cicero expressed his opinion was expectably sufficient to give his auditors--responsible citizens all--reason to do as he desired. But why? The resolution of this puzzle points to a strong sense in which arguments can be called rhetorical , for the rational force of Cicero's authority depends necessarily on what he says.


Are Economists Rational Or Just Different?, Tammy James, Lewis Saroka, John Benjafield May 1999

Are Economists Rational Or Just Different?, Tammy James, Lewis Saroka, John Benjafield

OSSA Conference Archive

Economics students are more likely than others to act self-interestedly and less likely to behave cooperatively, behaviour which is rational from the viewpoint of many economic theories. Students in other disciplines may have another conception of wha t is "rational." The latter may be more likely to behave cooperatively and less likely to behave self-interestedly. We have been comparing the behaviour of students from different disciplines in simple ultimatum bargaining and prisoner's dilemma games. Our paper discusses some of the ways in which different academic disciplines both reinforce and elaborate upon student's conceptions of rationality.


Persuasive Stories, Michael Kagan May 1999

Persuasive Stories, Michael Kagan

OSSA Conference Archive

Since some important and effective forms of persuasion are stories, a task for those interested in argumentation, informal logic and critical thinking, is to consider stories as arguments. In this essay, I discuss three: Plato's "Myth of the Cave," Ay n Rand's Atlas Shrugged, and Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye. I suggest some responses to persuasive stories, including criticizing the plausibility of the story as story, developing counter stories, and considering the stories premises as g rounds for its conclusion. By doing so, I tentatively take steps towards a theory of story argument validity.


Prejudice, Prudence And Fairness, Jean-Pierre Schachter May 1999

Prejudice, Prudence And Fairness, Jean-Pierre Schachter

OSSA Conference Archive

There exists reasoning popularly characterized as "prejudiced" that may nevertheless be both sound and prudential, and this reasoning involves the application of exactly the same inductive correlational strategies applied without moral objection in non -human cases. While such reasoning may be rationally unobjectionable, it may yet be morally objectionable because its methods inherently entail a risk of unfairness to others. This raises the interesting philosophical possibility that arguments may be a ppraised and found wanting on other than rational grounds, that arguments may be subject to moral defects in addition to defects of rationality.


Theoretic Bondage: Coalescent Argumentation And Higher-Order Goals, Denise Tayler May 1999

Theoretic Bondage: Coalescent Argumentation And Higher-Order Goals, Denise Tayler

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper will critically evaluate Pragma-Dialectics and Michael Gilbert's coalescent view of argumentation from a feminist-emancipatory perspective. Pragma-Dialecticians hold to higher-order goals such as the equality of arguers, and assume that the ir ideal model will function well under these conditions. But by not directly addressing arguments in situations of power imbalance, the pragma-dialectical model overlooks the possibility that it reinforces inequality and restricts expression. Gilbert's work on alternative argumentation modes diffuses the oppressive tendencies of the Pragma-Dialectical model, and may further higher-order ideals.


Speaking Of South Park, Christina Slade May 1999

Speaking Of South Park, Christina Slade

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper deals with the new cult cartoon series, "South Park". While reviled as vulgar and likely to lead children astray, it is in fact a fertile field of ethical and logical argumentation. The paper analyses in detail the argumentation of one epi sode, entitled "An elephant makes love to a pig" and shows how it can be used to teach reasoning skills.


Does Informal Logic Have Anything To Learn From Fuzzy Logic?, John Woods May 1999

Does Informal Logic Have Anything To Learn From Fuzzy Logic?, John Woods

OSSA Conference Archive

Probability theory is the arithmetic of the real line constrained by special aleatory axioms. Fuzzy logic is also a kind of probability theory, but of considerably more mathematical and axiomatic complexity than the standard account. Fuzzy logic purp orts to model the human capacity for reasoning with inexact concepts. It does this by exploring the assumption that when we argue in inexact terms and draw inferences in imprecise vocabularies, we actually make computations about the embedded imprecision s. I argue that this is in fact the last thing that we do, and indeed that we do the opposite.


Commentary On Benjafield, James & Saroka, Robert C. Pinto May 1999

Commentary On Benjafield, James & Saroka, Robert C. Pinto

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Campolo, John Hoaglund May 1999

Commentary On Campolo, John Hoaglund

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Cheng, Fred Kauffeld May 1999

Commentary On Cheng, Fred Kauffeld

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Cohen & Rosenwald, Trudy Govier May 1999

Commentary On Cohen & Rosenwald, Trudy Govier

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Davies, William Abbott May 1999

Commentary On Davies, William Abbott

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Freeman, Derek Allen May 1999

Commentary On Freeman, Derek Allen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Godden, Christina Slade May 1999

Commentary On Godden, Christina Slade

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Groarke, Richard Fulkerson May 1999

Commentary On Groarke, Richard Fulkerson

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Johnson, Erik C W Krabe May 1999

Commentary On Johnson, Erik C W Krabe

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Slob, Wayne Grennan May 1999

Commentary On Slob, Wayne Grennan

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Vorster & Botha, Farrell May 1999

Commentary On Vorster & Botha, Farrell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


What Is Acknowledgement And Why Is It Important?, Trudy Govier May 1999

What Is Acknowledgement And Why Is It Important?, Trudy Govier

OSSA Conference Archive

In the context of redressing wrongs of the past, the importance of acknowledgement is often urged. It figures significantly, for instance, in the final report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in the 1996 Canadian Royal Commiss ion Report on Aboriginal Peoples. In both documents a central theme is that acknowledging wrongs of the past is a key first step towards healing and reconciliation. Several recent statements about public apology also urge that moral apologies are signif icant because of the ways in which they acknowledge wrongdoing and responsibility. However, there seem to be few explanations of what, …


Lessons From Ten Years Of Research On Argument, Richard Andrews May 1999

Lessons From Ten Years Of Research On Argument, Richard Andrews

OSSA Conference Archive

From PhD research on argumentation in the writing of 11 and 12 year olds in the late 1980s through to three research projects in the 1990s on argument in schools, colleges and universities, I have been pursuing questions as to how to improve students' argumentation. This paper looks at some of the key issues, including the place of argument in the curriculum, its role in the relation to citizenship and some of the ways for improving the quality of argument. In the discussion, questions on the nature of argument itself will be addressed.


Truth And Reconciliation: Comments On Coalescence, Sharon Bailin May 1999

Truth And Reconciliation: Comments On Coalescence, Sharon Bailin

OSSA Conference Archive

In Coalescent Argumentation, Michael Gilbert criticizes the "Critical-Logical Model" (C-L) which he claims focuses on truth and treats arguments a-contextually; he proposes an alternative theory of coalescent argumentation which focuses on cont ent and consensus. I shall examine the dispute between the C-L and the coalescent models using the coalescent approach, thereby attempting to find which points of contention are real disagreements and which are only peripheral or apparent. Finally, I sh all examine the extent to which this examination, undertaken using the coalescent model, differs from what would have been done using a C-L model.


Aristotle: An Ancient Mathematical Logician, George Boger May 1999

Aristotle: An Ancient Mathematical Logician, George Boger

OSSA Conference Archive

We can now recognize Aristotle's many accomplishments in logical theory, not the least of which is treating the deduction process itself as a subject matter and thus establishing the science of logic. Aristotle took logic to be that part of epistemolo gy used to establish knowledge of logical consequence. Prior Analytics is a metalogical treatise on his syllogistic system in which Aristotle modelled his deduction system to demonstrate certain logical relationships among its rules. Aristotle's n otion of substitution distinguishes logical syntax from semantics and enabled him to distinguish validity from deducibility sufficiently to note the completeness of his logic.


A Theory Of Normative Reasoning Schemes, J Anthony Blair May 1999

A Theory Of Normative Reasoning Schemes, J Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

Even with Kientpointer's and Walton's valuable work, we do not yet have a complete theory of argument schemes. A complete theory of argument schemes should contain at least the following: its theoretical motivation, the denotation of "argument" or "ar gumentation" used in the theory, an analysis of the concept of an argument scheme, a theory of classification of argument schemes, a solution to the problem of identifying which scheme is correct, and an account of the grounds of the normativity or normat ive argument schemes. The paper will supply these elements, worked out as fully as space permits.


Fallacies And The Preconditions Of Argumentation, Chris Campolo May 1999

Fallacies And The Preconditions Of Argumentation, Chris Campolo

OSSA Conference Archive

If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis (investigations have to be formal, rhetorical and pragmatic). Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies (which might focus on context more than conduct). Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory (we might further clarify preconditions of argument as required by discourse ethics).


What Are We Do About Traditional Logic?, Jesse Bohl May 1999

What Are We Do About Traditional Logic?, Jesse Bohl

OSSA Conference Archive

A commonplace of modern logic is that traditional logic, because it accepted the supposedly mistaken inference from general to particular propositions, perceived as valid a good number of invalid inference patterns. Yet many people find the allegedly invalid inference patterns intuitively valid. Four arguments that might be used to justify modern logic's judgment fail to provide good reason to provide modern logic pride of place. Of the three responses to failure of the arguments for preferring mode rn to traditional logic considered, the most radical is recommended.


Justification, Commonplaces And Evidence, Emmanuelle Danblon May 1999

Justification, Commonplaces And Evidence, Emmanuelle Danblon

OSSA Conference Archive

Justification is a basic component of reasoning because it provides us with the warrant which should ground the acceptability of the whole argument. Indeed, justifying an argument consists in providing some principle which is seen as reasonable. In t his perspective, the set of possible justifications may be regarded as the set of those commonplaces that are admitted by a human community and are grounded on the values that are commonly endorsed by the community. I will try to show how the lack of dis cussion about those values that are regarded as obvious may lead to paradoxical conclusions.