Arts and Humanities Commons^™

Deep Disagreement, Deep Rhetoric, And Cultural Diversity, Jianfeng Wang

OSSA Conference Archive

Taking issue with the current scholarship over the notion of a “rhetorical borderland,” we approach it as a disputable space in cross-cultural argumentation where arguers run into encounters with a composite audience. By drawing upon a few different theoretical resources, we propose a three-dimensional agenda for a new understanding of “rhetorical borderland”: as a discursive construct in the mental horizon; as a conceptual notion with essential uncertainties; and as a disputable space in cross-cultural argumentation.

The End Of Argument, Leo Groarke

OSSA Conference Archive

We tend to see argument as a way to resolve (and in this way end) the disagreements that give rise to it. But there are many real-life situations in which acts of arguing do not resolve disagreement, but instead produce an indefinite (and sometimes unending) series of arguments for and against whatever positions they support. I explore this “prolong” problem and the deep issues it raises for theories of argument.

Deep Disagreements And Some Resolution Strategies That Simply Won't Do, Jason E. Schultchen

OSSA Conference Archive

A deep disagreement is the result of clashing systems of underlying principles. Debate surrounding the possibility of the resolution of deep disagreements is ongoing. I elucidate the notion of deep disagreements by assuming their resolution is not precluded. I consider five disagreement resolution strategies offered by Steven Hales. Though I conclude that these strategies are not viable for resolving a deep disagreement, my examination allows me to identify certain key marks of an adequate solution.

Commentary On Deep Disagreement And Patience As An Argumentative Virtue, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Deep Disagreement And Patience As An Argumentative Virtue, Kathryn Phillips

OSSA Conference Archive

A popular approach to analyzing the concept of evidence is to identify a unique set of normative criteria that delineate the concept. However, disagreements about evidence seem deep, and using this approach raises concerns about the imposition of dominant norms. Such an imposition excludes important sources of knowledge and leads to argumentative vices such as unwillingness to engage.

Virtue argumentation, like its predecessors from ethics and epistemology, focuses on practical applicability through the cultivation of habits and character rather than the articulation of universal principles or consistent theories. While Andrew Aberdein and others have been working to develop taxonomies of …

Deep Disagreement As Intellectual Colonialism, David Hitchcock

OSSA Conference Archive

Robert Fogelin has introduced the concept of a deep disagreement as one that makes rational argumentation impossible. People who think of themselves as enlightened may use this concept to dismiss the positions and arguments of those who seem to them misguided. I argue that there is always a basis for a rational discussion between people who disagree. If there are no external impediments to argumentative discussion, it is a form of intellectual colonialism to abandon argument for non-rational persuasion on the basis of a diagnosis of deep disagreement.

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.

The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare

OSSA Conference Archive

Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse .... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need …

Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo

OSSA Conference Archive

The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.

Argumentation And The Epistemology Of Disagreement, Harvey Siegal

OSSA Conference Archive

When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.

Cognitive Communities And Argument Communities, Manfred Kraus, David Zarefsky

OSSA Conference Archive

Since Toulmin’s discovery of the field-dependency of arguments, and Perelman’s emphasis on audiences, argumentation theorists have developed the notion of “spheres of arguments” or “argument communities”. Since argument communities are communities of discourse guided by the participants’ cog-nitive experiences, they are also cognitive communities. “Cognitive breaks” between different argument communities will produce misunderstanding and futile argument. The paper will investigate “cognitive breaks” and describe in which ways they may obstruct reasonable argumentation between communities.

Deepening Disagreement In Engineering Education, Robert Irish, Brian Macpherson

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper argues that deep disagreements stem from conflicting worldviews. In particular, I examine how recent moves in engineering education contribute to deep disagreement by inculcating stu-dents into valuing the environment as a key stakeholder in engineering design. However, some graduates who value the environment meet resistance from employers who hold a more traditional engineering worldview, which regards the environment as an externality. Clashing worldviews can, as Robert Fogelin posited, render rational resolution to argument impossible. Disputants must consider the emotional and rhetorical as means to move toward productive ground for argument. I offer two moves from classical rhet-oric–making an …