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Articles 1 - 19 of 19
Full-Text Articles in Public Policy
The European Central Bank's Securities Markets Programme (Ecb Gfc), Ariel Smith
The European Central Bank's Securities Markets Programme (Ecb Gfc), Ariel Smith
Journal of Financial Crises
The Eurozone struggled during the escalation of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. In order to aid malfunctioning securities markets, restore liquidity, and enable proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the European Central Bank (ECB) instituted the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) on May 9, 2010. This program enabled Eurosystem central banks to purchase securities from entities in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. The program ended on September 6, 2012, and evaluations of its effectiveness are mixed.
The European Central Bank's Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Ecb Gfc), Aidan Lawson
The European Central Bank's Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Ecb Gfc), Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
The announcement of the three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) by the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 8, 2011, signaled the beginning of the largest ECB market liquidity programs to date. Continued and increasing liquidity-related pressures in the form of ballooning financial market credit default swap (CDS) spreads, Euro-area volatility, and interbank lending rates prompted a much more forceful ECB response than what had been done previously. The LTROs, using a repurchase (repo) agreement auction mechanism, allowed any Eurozone financial institution to tap essentially unlimited funding at a fixed rate of just 1%. Because the three-year LTROs were so similar …
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (U.S. Gfc), Rosalind Z. Wiggins
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (U.S. Gfc), Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
In mid-September 2008, prime money market mutual funds (MMMFs) began experiencing run-like redemption requests sparked by one fund that had “broken the buck” because of large exposure to Lehman Brothers commercial paper (CP). As a result, MMMFs, which are significant investors in CP, became reluctant to hold CP. Within a week, outstanding CP had been reduced by roughly $300 billion. The CP market experienced severe shortening of maturities and increased rates, making it difficult for issuers to place new paper. When government efforts to assist the MMMFs did not resolve the stresses in the CP market, the Federal Reserve announced, …
Market Liquidity Programs: Gfc And Before, June Rhee, Greg Feldberg, Ariel Smith, Andrew Metrick
Market Liquidity Programs: Gfc And Before, June Rhee, Greg Feldberg, Ariel Smith, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
The virulence of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) was explained in large part by the increased reliance of the global financial system on market-based funding and the lack of preexisting tools to address a disruption in that type of system. This paper surveys market liquidity programs (MLPs), which we define as government interventions in which the key motivation is to stabilize liquidity in a specific wholesale funding market that is under stress. Most of the MLPs surveyed in this paper were launched during and after the GFC, but two pre-GFC MLPs are included. A subsequent survey on MLPs …
The Sovereignty Solution: A Common Sense Approach To Global Security, Andrew Higgins
The Sovereignty Solution: A Common Sense Approach To Global Security, Andrew Higgins
Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy
The Sovereignty Solution calls for a new grand strategy for the United States. The current security paradigm, the book’s authors hold, has yet to be properly modified from a 20th-century cast of mind. The ad hoc system inherited after the end of the Cold War now fails because it too often applies national power equally to each emerging threat. But security challenges in the 21st century arise so quickly and unexpectedly that continuing in this manner incurs overextension and further, risks strategic defeat. If the United States continues to behave as if it can be in all …
Lessons Learned: A Conversation With Paul A. Volcker, Andrew Metrick, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Lessons Learned: A Conversation With Paul A. Volcker, Andrew Metrick, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
On March 26, 2019, Andrew Metrick, the Janet Yellen Professor of Finance at the Yale School of Management and Founder and Director of the Yale Program on Financial Stabilitysat down with Paul A. Volcker to discuss his perspectives on the Federal Reserve, central banking autonomy, “too big to fail,” and how his perspectives on these topics have changed over the decades.It turned out to be one of the last interviews given by the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve System who passed away on December 8, 2019, at the age of 92.
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises C: U.S. 2009 Stress Test, Chase P. Ross, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises C: U.S. 2009 Stress Test, Chase P. Ross, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
When President Obama took office in 2009, the Treasury focused on restarting bank lending and repairing the ability of the banking system as a whole to perform the role of credit intermediation. In order to do so, the Treasury needed to raise public confidence that banks had sufficient buffers to withstand even a very adverse economic scenario, especially given heightened uncertainty surrounding the outlook of the U.S. economy and potential losses in the banking system. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)—the so-called “stress tests”—sought to rigorously measure the resilience of the largest bank holding companies. Those found to have insufficient …
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
After the mortgage market meltdown in mid-2007 and during the financial crisis in 2008, major financial institutions around the world were on the verge of collapsing one after another. Faced with these troubles, the government had to respond quickly to contain the crisis as efficiently as possible. It was, however, limited in resources, time, and experience. To make matters worse, the complexity and opaqueness of the financial market and these institutions greatly affected the government’s ability to design an efficient and consistent method to contain the crisis. Shortly after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, American International …
Lessons Learned: Edwin (Ted) Truman, Yasemin Sim Esmen
Lessons Learned: Edwin (Ted) Truman, Yasemin Sim Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Insights on fighting financial crises from Ted Truman, an expert in responding to the international dimensions of financial crises. Topics include the initial US response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and the utiltiy of issuing Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
Lessons Learned: Ray Dalio, Andrew Metrick, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Lessons Learned: Ray Dalio, Andrew Metrick, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
Insights from a discussion with Ray Dalio, Founder, Chairman, and Co-Chief Investment Officer of Bridgewater Associates, one of the largest hedge funds in the world. Topics range from monetary policy to communications strategy when responding to a financial crisis.
Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a liquidity standard introduced by Basel III, seeks to promote a better match between the liquidity of a bank’s assets and the manner in which the bank funds those assets. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a minimum amount of funding deemed “stable” by the Basel framework based on the liquidity of the banks’ assets and activities over a one-year timeframe. One of the areas seen as most affected by this development may be bank participation in project finance for infrastructure development. Since the global demand for infrastructure development remains robust, the shadow banking …
Basel Iii F: Callable Commercial Paper, Christian M. Mcnamara, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii F: Callable Commercial Paper, Christian M. Mcnamara, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
One of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s responses to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was to introduce the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a short-term measure that evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected cash outflows during a 30-day stress scenario. One area in which this incentive has already resulted in changed practices is in the market for commercial paper. Banks often provide backup liquidity facilities to the issuers of commercial paper that the issuers can draw upon to repay a maturing issue of commercial paper if they are unable to sell a new issue to …
Basel Iii E: Synthetic Financing By Prime Brokers, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii E: Synthetic Financing By Prime Brokers, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Hedge funds rely on “prime brokerage” units within banks to provide leverage. With the enhanced capital requirements and new liquidity standards introduced by Basel III driving up the cost to banks of engaging in such financing, prime brokers have begun to offer an alternative means of providing hedge fund clients with leveraged exposure to securities. Known as synthetic financing, this alternative requires the prime broker to enter into derivatives contracts with the clients. Under the Basel III framework, the ability of banks to hedge and net such derivative positions results in capital and liquidity costs for synthetic financing that are …
Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …
Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
From the earliest efforts to mandate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators have grappled with how best to accomplish this task. Until the 1980s, regulation had been based largely on discretion and judgment. In the wake of two bank failures, the central bank governors of the G10 countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and in 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system, Basel I. The system represented a triumph of the fixed numerical approach, however, critics worried that it was too blunt an instrument. In 1999, the BCBS issued Basel II, a proposal to …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview, Arwin G. Zeissler, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview, Arwin G. Zeissler, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In December 2011, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JPMorgan Chase (JPM) instructed the bank’s Chief Investment Office to reduce the size of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) during 2012, so that JPM could decrease its Risk-Weighted Assets as the bank prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, the SCP traders were also told to minimize the trading costs incurred to reduce Risk-Weighted Assets, while still maintaining the opportunity to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to balance these competing objectives, head SCP derivatives trader Bruno Iksil suggested in January 2012 …
The Racist Impact Of Redistributive Public Policies: Handout Versus Hand-Up, Mittie Davis Jones
The Racist Impact Of Redistributive Public Policies: Handout Versus Hand-Up, Mittie Davis Jones
Cultural Encounters, Conflicts, and Resolutions
Federal government policies, while benefitting some urban areas, have historically been detrimental to African-American people. Years of welfare and housing policies have placed central city residents, especially African-Americans, at a disadvantage which they have not overcome. Policies that once denied benefits to Black people, such as public welfare and federally-insured mortgages, morphed into stigmatized policies which, when available to Blacks, became obstacles to their advancement. These same policies enabled the majority White population to do what they were initially designed to do – provide a toehold during a period of temporary economic decline after which personal advancement was possible.
The …