Cognitive Psychology Commons^™

Self-Concept Clarity And The Bodily Self: Malleability Across Modalities, Sonia A. Krol, Rémi Thériault, Jay A. Olson, Amir Raz, Jennifer A. Bartz

Psychology Faculty Articles and Research

The self has fascinated scholars for centuries. Although theory suggests that the self-concept (cognitive self-understanding) and bodily self (pre-reflective awareness of one’s body) are related, little work has examined this notion. To this end, in Study 1, participants reported on self-concept clarity (SCC) and completed the rubber hand illusion (RHI), a paradigm in which synchronous (vs. asynchronous) stimulation between a prosthetic hand and one’s own hand leads one to “embody” the prosthetic hand. Whereas participants were equally susceptible to the RHI during synchronous stroking, low-SCC individuals were more vulnerable to the illusion during asynchronous stroking, when the effect is unwarranted. …

Across Continents And Demographics, Unpredictable Maternal Signals Are Associated With Children's Cognitive Function, Elyssia Poggi Davis, Riikka Korja, Linnea Karlsson, Laura Glynn, Curt A. Sandman, Brian Vegetabile, Eeva-Leena Kataja, Saara Nolvi, Eija Sinervä, Juho Pelto, Hasse Karlsson, Hal S. Stern, Tallie Z. Baram

Psychology Faculty Articles and Research

Background

Early life experiences have persisting influence on brain function throughout life. Maternal signals constitute a primary source of early life experiences, and their quantity and quality during sensitive developmental periods exert enduring effects on cognitive function and emotional and social behaviors. Here we examined if, in addition to established qualitative dimensions of maternal behavior during her interactions with her infant and child, patterns of maternal signals may contribute to the maturation of children's executive functions. We focused primarily on effortful control, a potent predictor of mental health outcomes later in life.

Methods

In two independent prospective cohorts in Turku, …

The Unfolding Argument: Why Iit And Other Causal Structure Theories Cannot Explain Consciousness, Adrian Doerig, Aaron Schurger, Kathryn Hess, Michael H. Herzog

Psychology Faculty Articles and Research

How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many theories have been proposed. Certain theories suggest that consciousness should be explained in terms of brain functions, such as accessing information in a global workspace, applying higher order to lower order representations, or predictive coding. These functions could be realized by a variety of patterns of brain connectivity. Other theories, such as Information Integration Theory (IIT) and Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), identify causal structure with consciousness. For example, according to …

Does It Matter Whether You Or Your Brain Did It? An Empirical Investigation Of The Influence Of The Double Subject Fallacy On Moral Responsibility Judgments, Uri Maoz, Kellienne R. Sita, Jeroen J. A. Van Boxtel, Liad Mudrik

Psychology Faculty Articles and Research

Despite progress in cognitive neuroscience, we are still far from understanding the relations between the brain and the conscious self. We previously suggested that some neuroscientific texts that attempt to clarify these relations may in fact make them more difficult to understand. Such texts—ranging from popular science to high-impact scientific publications—position the brain and the conscious self as two independent, interacting subjects, capable of possessing opposite psychological states. We termed such writing ‘Double Subject Fallacy’ (DSF). We further suggested that such DSF language, besides being conceptually confusing and reflecting dualistic intuitions, might affect people’s conceptions of moral responsibility, lessening the …