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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Cognitive Psychology
The Reviewing Of Object Files: Object-Specific Integration Of Information, Daniel Kahneman, Anne Treisman, Brian Gibbs
The Reviewing Of Object Files: Object-Specific Integration Of Information, Daniel Kahneman, Anne Treisman, Brian Gibbs
Brian J. Gibbs
A series of experiments explored a form of object-specific priming. In all experiments a preview field containing two or more letters is followed by a target letter that is to be named. The displays are designed to produce a perceptual interpretation of the target as a new state of an object that reviously contained one of the primes. The link is produced in different experiments by a shared location, by a shared relative position in a moving pattern, or by successive appearance in the same moving frame. An object-specific advantage is consistently observed: naming is facilitated by a preview of …
A Capacity Theory Of Comprehension: Individual Differences In Working Memory, Marcel Just, Patricia Carpenter
A Capacity Theory Of Comprehension: Individual Differences In Working Memory, Marcel Just, Patricia Carpenter
Marcel Adam Just
No abstract provided.
Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz
Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
Philosophers have argued that on the prevailing theory of mind, functionalism, the fact that mental states are multiply realizable or can be instantiated in a variety of different physical forms, at least in principle, shows that materialism or physical is probably false. A similar argument rejects the relevance to psychology of connectionism, which holds that mental states are embodied and and constituted by connectionist neural networks. These arguments, I argue, fall before reductios ad absurdam, proving too much -- they apply as well to genes, which are multiply realizable, but the reduction of which to DNA is one the core …