Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- Artificial intelligence (1)
- Civil Rights (1)
- Class Analysis (1)
- Cognitive Science (1)
- Cognitive science (1)
-
- Connectionism (1)
- Constitutional Law (1)
- Domination (1)
- Economics (1)
- Empirical Tests of Moral Theory (1)
- Functionalism (1)
- GOFAI. instantiation (1)
- General Law (1)
- History (1)
- Human Rights Law (1)
- Jurisprudence (1)
- Justice (1)
- Law and Economics (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Legal Objectivity (1)
- Marxism (1)
- Materialism (1)
- Milton Fisk (1)
- Moral Objectivity (1)
- Moral Progress (1)
- OIppressiuon (1)
- Opiginal Position (1)
- Philosophy of Mind (1)
- Philosophy of psycholohy (1)
- Physicalism (1)
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Cognitive Psychology
Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz
Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS.
The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is overwhelming: there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into …
Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz
Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
Philosophers have argued that on the prevailing theory of mind, functionalism, the fact that mental states are multiply realizable or can be instantiated in a variety of different physical forms, at least in principle, shows that materialism or physical is probably false. A similar argument rejects the relevance to psychology of connectionism, which holds that mental states are embodied and and constituted by connectionist neural networks. These arguments, I argue, fall before reductios ad absurdam, proving too much -- they apply as well to genes, which are multiply realizable, but the reduction of which to DNA is one the core …