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Articles 91 - 120 of 494
Full-Text Articles in Psychology
Insect Sentience And The Rise Of A New Inclusive Ethics, David Baracchi, Luigi Baciadonna
Insect Sentience And The Rise Of A New Inclusive Ethics, David Baracchi, Luigi Baciadonna
Animal Sentience
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and capable of feeling whereas invertebrates are not. We agree with Mikhalevich & Powell that the exclusion of small-brained invertebrates from bioethics is not warranted by the current state of the scientific evidence. The choice to promote protection for certain invertebrates should be based on the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP). This principle should not prevent us from conducting experimental research with non-human animals to advance knowledge. However, we believe that it is important to outline practical guidelines to manage the wellbeing of invertebrates, while accumulating further …
Is Anthropocentrism Really The Problem?, Chelsea Batavia
Is Anthropocentrism Really The Problem?, Chelsea Batavia
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) highlight what they consider soft forms of anthropocentrism in the practice and philosophy of conservation, e.g., when even professed non-anthropocentrists assert the precedence of human over nonhuman interests. I consider a few philosophical cases for maintaining human precedence, but ultimately offer a more psychological explanation: our explanations for why humans take precedence serve to reduce dissonance and discomfort, which arise because the norms and institutions of society often compel us to act in ways that violate our moral responsibilities to nonhuman beings.
Rewilding Or Reviewing: Conservation And The Elephant-Based Tourism Industry, Ingrid Suter
Rewilding Or Reviewing: Conservation And The Elephant-Based Tourism Industry, Ingrid Suter
Animal Sentience
Baker & Winkler (2020) provide a detailed examination of elephants in captivity, from an historical perspective to modern-day concerns. Concerns include the poor level of mahout skills and subsequent captive elephant welfare issues in the Thai elephant tourism industry. Rewilding is proposed as a method of rehabilitation and a way to include mahouts in the conservation process. This commentary argues that the tourism industry is making positive changes and mahout skills can be utilised successfully without the arduous task of rewilding. Animal rights groups and the transfer of misinformation surrounding captive elephant welfare are also examined, as these typically fail …
Human-Controlled Survival Of Nonhumans, Donelson E. Dulany
Human-Controlled Survival Of Nonhumans, Donelson E. Dulany
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. are right about the need for morally just preservation of nonhumans. Their suggestions can move us in that direction. But isn’t what only humans are capable of doing in analyzing and solving these problems, in its broadest sense, “anthropocentrism”?
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Commentators Washington (2019) and Tiffin (2019) point out that the individual vs. collective dichotomy is much more complex than what is considered in the target article. This commentary will focus on why individuals are more important than collectives. Species differences in cognition and emotional processes and individuals’ feelings and experiences need to be taken into account.
Conventional Science Will Not Do Justice To Nonhuman Interests: A Fresh Approach Is Required, Becca Franks, Christine Webb, Monica Gagliano, Barbara Smuts
Conventional Science Will Not Do Justice To Nonhuman Interests: A Fresh Approach Is Required, Becca Franks, Christine Webb, Monica Gagliano, Barbara Smuts
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) make a convincing case that conservation efforts need to go beyond an anthropocentric worldview. Implementing that vision, however, will require human advocates to represent nonhuman interests. Where will the knowledge of those interests come from? How can humans know what is in the best interest of another animal, a plant, or an ecosystem? We discuss how the values embedded in current scientific practices may be ill-suited to representing nonhuman interests and we offer some ideas for correcting these shortcomings.
Toward A Non-Anthropocentric View On The Environment And Animal Welfare: Possible Psychological Interventions, Sarah Gradidge, Magdalena Zawisza
Toward A Non-Anthropocentric View On The Environment And Animal Welfare: Possible Psychological Interventions, Sarah Gradidge, Magdalena Zawisza
Animal Sentience
Treves, Santiago-Avila, and Lynn (2019) argue for adopting a non-anthropocentric worldview to prevent further environmental damage and lack of consideration for animals. We discuss psychological interventions that might help achieve this.
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.
It Does Not Cost The Earth To Be Kind, Svetlana Feigin
It Does Not Cost The Earth To Be Kind, Svetlana Feigin
Animal Sentience
The COVID-19 crisis is a wake-up call on a global scale. What lessons we learn from this crisis will determine our survival as a species. The global health crisis calls for individual and collective changes in our agricultural practices and our consumption habits. Most important, it is a call for us as a species to move towards an empathic way of living and interacting with nature.
Be Wary Of Simple Solutions To Complex Problems, Jesse Robbins
Be Wary Of Simple Solutions To Complex Problems, Jesse Robbins
Animal Sentience
Wiebers & Feigin purport to show that the current Covid-19 outbreak provides evidence to support a variety of public policy recommendations. Closer examination of their argument reveals a number of flaws, including a failure to adequately define terms, acknowledge counterevidence, identify value-driven trade-offs and acknowledge the logical implications of their reasoning. Scientists should attempt to address these concerns when offering public policy advice.
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides a rich overview of the elements underlying octopus cognition and behavioral flexibility. Recently, two remarkable natural history films, My Octopus Teacher and The Octopus in My House have explored intimate human-octopus relationships with a wild (Octopus vulgaris) and a captive octopus (Octopus cyanea) respectively. Both films show rare behaviors that offer observations to test new hypotheses as well as a novel perspective on our own human relationships and place within the natural world. An interview with filmmaker Craig Foster from My Octopus Teacher reveals the profound and transformative power of forming a trusting …
Cognition, Movement And Morality, Thomas R. Zentall
Cognition, Movement And Morality, Thomas R. Zentall
Animal Sentience
Each of the criteria for determining which should be given moral standing has its shortcomings. The criterion of cognitive is especially weak. That research on comparative cognition may default to the simplest account is not grounds for abandoning this scientific practice. Instead, we should dissociate scientific evidence of cognitive ability from moral obligation. In addition to the criteria suggested by Mikhalevich & Powell for including species in welfare protections, I would suggest a very old one — the ability to physically move.
Selling Just Preservation, Scott W. Danielson, Andrew J. Vonasch
Selling Just Preservation, Scott W. Danielson, Andrew J. Vonasch
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. argue for better representation of voiceless groups in current policy decisions. We agree with the argument but believe it will be challenging to convince enough people of its importance to change policy — especially those political groups who are not predisposed to agreeing with these kinds of arguments. We draw on the social psychology literature to recommend three principles for increasing the persuasiveness of the argument to the public: pre-suasion, framing, and tailoring for the audience. We apply these principles to make concrete recommendations for framing the argument to persuade the American political right.
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Animal Sentience
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an …
Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara
Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
Studies on invertebrate minds suggest that the neural machinery for basic cognition is cheap, and that bigger brains are probably associated with greater memory storage rather than more advanced cognition. Sentience may be linked to feedforward mechanisms (Reafferenzprinzip) that allow organisms with active movement to distinguish active and passive sensing. Invertebrates may offer special opportunities for testing these hypotheses.
It Might Not Matter Very Much Whether Insects Are Conscious, Neil Levy
It Might Not Matter Very Much Whether Insects Are Conscious, Neil Levy
Animal Sentience
In common with most other authors, Mikhalevich & Powell assume that phenomenal consciousness is a “precondition” of moral standing. Although the evidence they present makes it much more likely than usually thought that arthropods are phenomenally conscious, scepticism in the face of this evidence remains intellectually respectable. I suggest that we best make progress here by rejecting the notion that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing. Mental states that may lack phenomenal properties can do a lot of work in grounding moral standing, and there is less room for scepticism about these mental states than about phenomenal consciousness.
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm.
Sentience In Evolutionary Context, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Sentience In Evolutionary Context, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but we differ on some of their definitions and terms. Affects (emotional feelings) should be part of sentience. Although the evidence presented for insect sentience is strong, we list some of the counterevidence that should be considered. Our own research supports M&P’s choice of arthropods, cephalopods, and vertebrates as the only sentient organisms with moral status.
The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
The Wholeness Of Nature, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
The target article outlines various positions on conservation and preservation but ignores practical considerations of management since there is no wild habitat left. Population controls, either human or nonhuman mammals, are not discussed. The suggestions for legal changes are vague and will require much more thinking about how to integrate animal welfare with wildlife conservation concerns. “Freedoms” as outlined in the human bill of rights might help with decision making for improving animal welfare. Other commentators have made anthropocentric judgements concerning animal welfare, ignoring the importance of developing other ways of seeing and understanding the “multiplicity within unity,” combining empirical …
Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez
Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
It is very important that we clarify what we owe to nonhuman animals. To that end, we need a better understanding of animal cognition and emotion. Marino & Merskin’s target article is a welcome contribution to this project. Sheep, like most other animals, are sentient beings with interests of their own. It is wrong to discriminate against them based on species-membership or cognitive sophistication. We are morally required not to harm them, and to help them have the best possible lives, just as we would be in the case of human beings with similar interests. We must become the good …
Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch
Developmental Aspects Of Capacities, Karen Bartsch
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman suggest that judgments of human superiority underlie our cruelty to animals. It might be useful to examine how such judgments operate within the human community. Children arguably have a potential for developing “superior” capacities but are outperformed on many tasks by animals. There is a continuum of development in children’s capacities. Perhaps there are interspecies evolutionary continua too. This highlights the complexity of reasoning about humans, animals, and moral inclusion.
Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Anthropomorphism Is The First Step, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
Individuals have intentions, beliefs and choices. This sense of “personhood” has been known and used for centuries by those who have dealt professionally with any nonhuman mammal. All mammals have a lot in common physically and mentally. The first step toward understand another species’ point of view is anthropomorphism.
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Animal Sentience
Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.
Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew
Humans Have Always Been Unique!, William C. Mcgrew
Animal Sentience
Arguments about human uniqueness apply not only to extant species but also to extinct ones, that is, the hominin predecessors of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Thus, unique and superior are doubly relative terms, in past and present. The scope for empirical comparison faces a spectrum of difficulty, from material (e.g., artefacts) to non-material (e.g., concepts) phenomena.
Sharing Emotions Builds Bridges Between Individuals And Between Species, Elisabetta Palagi
Sharing Emotions Builds Bridges Between Individuals And Between Species, Elisabetta Palagi
Animal Sentience
Many animal species express, perceive and share emotions. These abilities have been favoured by natural selection because they allow subjects to respond to various situations in an appropriate way, thus facilitating survival and increasing fitness. The same-face/same-emotion phenomenon is at the basis of sharing feelings and emotions. Recent studies show that this capacity is not unique to humans and that it plays an important role in creating cohesive societies in many different species.
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.
Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk
Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin review evidence of the complexity of sheep cognition, concluding that researchers ought to feel sheepish about misrepresenting ovine cognitive capacities. However, the failure to situate the data in critical context risks pulling the wool over readers’ eyes.
Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso
Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso
Animal Sentience
Marino and Merskin (2019) list a number of tasks that sheep can perform well. As comparative psychologists, we are not surprised by these results. Indeed, many domesticated animal species show similar abilities.
Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer
Just Policy Paralysis?, Clare Palmer, Bob Fischer
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that policy making should include the interests and well-being of present and future generations of humans and nonhumans. There are deep and abiding conflicts of interest both between and within these groups. Trying to factor in so many considerations is likely to generate political gridlock. The authors need to explain how to avoid this.