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Articles 451 - 480 of 869
Full-Text Articles in Psychology
Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey
Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?
Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Animal Sentience
A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.
Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude
Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of mental life from the orthodox definition but argues that implicit unity of mind is sufficient for conferring personhood. This allows more or all animals to be considered persons. Implicit unity of mind may be a bridge too far for those who endorse the orthodox account of personhood, and for good reasons. More fundamentally, who gets to decide what personhood entails or that personhood per se matters to such other issues as who receives legal or moral status and consideration? Perhaps we should worry less about definitions …
Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye
Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye
Animal Sentience
I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron have nothing to say.
Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo
Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo
Animal Sentience
King’s How animals grieve beautifully describes several ways in which animals and humans show a similar capacity for grief. Yet this book does not sufficiently emphasise the language-empowered capacity to objectify thinking and sentiments about death, which makes human mourning unique. Here I put this capacity into focus and relate it to the social-normative aspect of human mourning that seems to be missing in other animals.
Insects Join The Consciousness Fray, Bjorn H. Merker
Insects Join The Consciousness Fray, Bjorn H. Merker
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron's review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect behavior is orchestrated without the benefit of central integrative mechanisms. Given their existence, the authors go on to ask whether these central mechanisms also feature the kind of integrative operations that support sentience, and propose that they do. Along the way they raise a number of conceptual and evidentiary issues of fundamental importance for the neuroscience of consciousness, allowing me to comment favorably on a number of them. I conclude by pointing to ways in which the conception of insect sentience they outline might be tested …
Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding, J. H. Van Hateren
Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding, J. H. Van Hateren
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) argue that insects have sentience because of functional similarities between the insect brain and vertebrate midbrain. Based on a recent theory of agency and consciousness, I argue that the functional similarities merely point to an advanced form of agency. Insects presumably lack the capacity for social bonding that may be required for subjective experiencing.
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Animal Sentience
Insects might have been the first invertebrates to evolve sentience, but cephalopods were the first invertebrates to gain scientific recognition for it.
Caterpillars, Consciousness And The Origins Of Mind, Arthur S. Reber
Caterpillars, Consciousness And The Origins Of Mind, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as "mind" and "consciousness," are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual and empirical virtues, among them: (a) it (re)solves the problem of how minds are created by brains ─ also known as the "Hard Problem" (Chalmers 1995) ─ by revealing that the apparent difficulty results from a category error, (b) it …
Why Animals Are Persons, Tony Cheng
Why Animals Are Persons, Tony Cheng
Animal Sentience
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre-reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.
"Beyond Words," Yes, But Also Beyond Numbers, Fred L. Bookstein
"Beyond Words," Yes, But Also Beyond Numbers, Fred L. Bookstein
Animal Sentience
Safina’s fascinating series of fifty separate feuilletons tries to bridge a painful Methodenstreit in contemporary ethology mainly by an accumulation of anecdotes. Some deal with his own dogs, but most derive from reading or conversing with observers of a wider range of social mammals including elephants, wolves, apes, and whales. In spite of the many interruptions by travesties of the academic lifestyle and its literature, there is a point to be made, concerning the centrality of evidence about cooperative behavior styles, especially aspects of child-rearing, for the understanding of “what animals think and feel.” But Safina’s argument would be a …
Animals Are Agents, Linda A.W. Brakel
Animals Are Agents, Linda A.W. Brakel
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands’s (2016) target article invites us to consider individuals in a broad subset of the non-human animal world as genuine persons. His account features animals reacting to salient environmental stimuli as Gibsonian affordances, which is indicative of “pre-reflective self-awareness.” He holds that such pre-reflective self-awareness is both “immune to error through misidentification” (Shoemaker, 1968) and a necessary precursor to reflective consciousness and personhood. I agree. In this commentary I hope to extend Rowlands’s work with a view in which agency is an even more fundamental precursor and one can (and should) consider individuals throughout the entire animal kingdom as …
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person” is restricted to self-aware creatures: humans (above a certain age) and possibly some of the great apes and cetaceans. I argue that this orthodoxy should be rejected, because it rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. Replacing this with a sense of self-awareness that is relevant requires us to accept that personhood is much more widely distributed through the animal kingdom.
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
To what degree are non-human animals conscious? We propose that the most meaningful way to approach this question is from the perspective of functional neurobiology. Here we focus on subjective experience, which is a basic awareness of the world without further reflection on that awareness. This is considered the most basic form of consciousness. Tellingly, this capacity is supported by the integrated midbrain and basal ganglia structures, which are among the oldest and most highly conserved brain systems in vertebrates. A reasonable inference is that the capacity for subjective experience is both widespread and evolutionarily old within the vertebrate lineage. …
Cross-Species Mind-Reading, Stevan Harnad
Cross-Species Mind-Reading, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
We can never be sure anyone else is sentient. But we can be sure enough in the case of other people, nonhuman primates, mammals, birds, fish, lower vertebrates and invertebrates as to make scepticism academic and otiose (not to mention monumentally cruel). The only genuinely uncertain kinds of cases are jellyfish, microbes and plants. The rest is not about whether but what they are feeling.
My Orgasms Cannot Be Traded Off Against Others’ Agony, Stevan Harnad
My Orgasms Cannot Be Traded Off Against Others’ Agony, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
Only I can calculate my own welfare as net pleasure minus pain. No one else can do that calculation for me – nor for a population, and especially not averaging across some individuals’ pleasure and other individuals’ pain. Pain and pleasure are incommensurable and only pain matters morally. To maximize welfare is to minimize pain.
In Praise Of Fishes: Précis Of What A Fish Knows (Balcombe 2016), Jonathan Balcombe
In Praise Of Fishes: Précis Of What A Fish Knows (Balcombe 2016), Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
Our relationship to fishes in the modern era is deeply problematic. We kill and consume more of them than any other group of vertebrates. At the same time, advances in our knowledge of fishes and their capabilities are gaining speed. Fish species diversity exceeds that of all other vertebrates combined, with a wide range of sensory adaptations, some of them (e.g., geomagnetism, water pressure and movement detection, and communication via electricity) alien to our own sensory experience. The evidence for pain in fishes (despite persistent detractors) is strongly supported by anatomical, physiological and behavioral studies. It is likely that fishes …
Sentience As Moral Consideration And Disvalue In Nature, Daniel Dorado
Sentience As Moral Consideration And Disvalue In Nature, Daniel Dorado
Animal Sentience
In recent work Ng assumes that it is good to engage in activities aimed at promoting ecosystem conservation. The only way Ng can derive this from the axiology he assumes (the view that wellbeing is the only intrinsically valuable or disvaluable thing) would be to assume that ecosystem conservation would benefit the individuals involved. This can be so as long as value prevails over disvalue in the target environments. Ng seems to assume this is indeed the case, but he does not explain why, and it is a claim that goes against the conclusions he has argued for previously (Ng …
The Grounds For Animal Subjectivity And Intersubjectivity, Timothy P. Racine
The Grounds For Animal Subjectivity And Intersubjectivity, Timothy P. Racine
Animal Sentience
Harnad (2016) presents an engaging and persuasive argument that stakes out the aims and domain of the fledgling journal, Animal Sentience. As an inaugural editorial, it does this job masterfully, but it does so from a perspective that tends to treat mental states in an overly general manner and that makes hard distinctions between mental and behavioral phenomena. I argue that when it comes to animal minds, it might be more helpful to think of mental concepts in a more piecemeal way that also retains the intrinsic relation between mind and behavior.
Changing Attitudes Towards Animals In The Wild And Speciesism, Oscar Horta
Changing Attitudes Towards Animals In The Wild And Speciesism, Oscar Horta
Animal Sentience
I argue that despite Ng’s claim that we should postpone the defense of those animals that live in the wild, we do have reasons to start spreading concern for them now. We can do it by (i) changing public attitude by heightening awareness of speciesism, by which we will also challenge animal exploitation; and (ii) by disseminating information about the situation of animals in the wild.
On-Farm Qualitative Behaviour Assessment Of Dairy Goats In Different Housing Conditions, Lilia Grosso, Monica Battini, Françoise Wemelsfelder, Sara Barbieri, Michela Minero, Emanuela Dalla Costa, Silvana Mattiello
On-Farm Qualitative Behaviour Assessment Of Dairy Goats In Different Housing Conditions, Lilia Grosso, Monica Battini, Françoise Wemelsfelder, Sara Barbieri, Michela Minero, Emanuela Dalla Costa, Silvana Mattiello
Sentience Collection
This study reports the results of the first investigation on the use of Qualitative Behaviour Assessment (QBA) in dairy goats, using a fixed-list of descriptors specifically developed for this species. It aimed to verify whether QBA can be reliably used by observers with different backgrounds to differentiate between the emotional states of goats kept under different environmental conditions. Two trained observers simultaneously assessed 16 dairy goat farms (8 “Housed” (H) farms, where animals were observed in free stall pens, and 8 “Pasture” (P) farms, where animals were observed in open ranges), using a list of 16 QBA descriptors that were …
Goats Display Audience-Dependent Human-Directed Gazing Behaviour In A Problem-Solving Task, Christian Nawroth, Jemma M. Brett, Alan G. Mcelligott
Goats Display Audience-Dependent Human-Directed Gazing Behaviour In A Problem-Solving Task, Christian Nawroth, Jemma M. Brett, Alan G. Mcelligott
Social Cognition Collection
Domestication is an important factor driving changes in animal cognition and behaviour. In particular, the capacity of dogs to communicate in a referential and intentional way with humans is considered a key outcome of how domestication as a companion animal shaped the canid brain. However, the lack of comparison with other domestic animals makes general conclusions about how domestication has affected these important cognitive features difficult. We investigated human-directed behaviour in an ‘unsolvable problem’ task in a domestic, but non-companion species: goats. During the test, goats experienced a forward facing or an away facing person. They gazed towards the forward …
Marine Mammal Behavior: A Review Of Conservation Implications, Philippa Brakes, Sasha R. X. Dall
Marine Mammal Behavior: A Review Of Conservation Implications, Philippa Brakes, Sasha R. X. Dall
Social Behavior Collection
The three orders which comprise the extant marine mammals exhibit a wide range of behaviors, varying social structures, and differences in social information use. Human impacts on marine mammals and their environments are ubiquitous; from chemical and noise pollution, to marine debris, prey depletion, and ocean acidification. As a result, no marine mammal populations remain entirely unaffected by human activities. Conservation may be hindered by an inadequate understanding of the behavioral ecology of some of these species. As a result of social structure, social information use, culture, and even behavioral syndromes, marine mammal social groups, and populations can be behaviorally …
Laterality Strength Is Linked To Stress Reactivity In Port Jackson Sharks (Heterodontus Portusjacksoni), Evan E. Byrnes, Catarina Vila Pouca, Culum Brown
Laterality Strength Is Linked To Stress Reactivity In Port Jackson Sharks (Heterodontus Portusjacksoni), Evan E. Byrnes, Catarina Vila Pouca, Culum Brown
Laterality Collection
Cerebral lateralization is an evolutionarily deep-rooted trait, ubiquitous among the vertebrates and present even in some invertebrates. Despite the advantages of cerebral lateralization in enhancing cognition and facilitating greater social cohesion, large within population laterality variation exists in many animal species. It is proposed that this variation is maintained due links with inter-individual personality trait differences. Here we explored for lateralization in Port Jackson sharks (Heterodontus portusjacksoni) using T-maze turn and rotational swimming tasks. Additionally, we explored for a link between personality traits, boldness and stress reactivity, and cerebral lateralization. Sharks demonstrated large individual and sex biased laterality …
Efficiency Of The Male Effect With Photostimulated Bucks Does Not Depend On Their Familiarity With Goats, A. L. Muñoz, M. Bedos, R. M. Aroña, J. A. Flores, H. Hernández, C. Moussu, Elodie F. Briefer, P. Chemineau, M. Keller, J. A. Delgadillo
Efficiency Of The Male Effect With Photostimulated Bucks Does Not Depend On Their Familiarity With Goats, A. L. Muñoz, M. Bedos, R. M. Aroña, J. A. Flores, H. Hernández, C. Moussu, Elodie F. Briefer, P. Chemineau, M. Keller, J. A. Delgadillo
Reproductive Behavior Collection
In ewes, the ovulatory response of females exposed to familiar rams is lower than the response of those exposed to novel ones. In goats, males rendered sexually active by exposure to long days are more efficient to induce ovulation in seasonal anestrous females than untreated males. Two experiments were conducted to determine 1) whether male goats remain familiar to females after 45 days of separation; and 2) whether photostimulated males are able to stimulate the sexual activity of females, independently of their familiarity with them. In Experiment 1, three groups of goats (n = 10 goats per group) were put …
Are Domestic Pigs (Sus Scrofa Domestica) Able To Use Complex Human-Given Cues To Find A Hidden Reward?, Christian Nawroth, Mirjam Ebersbach, Eberhard Von Borell
Are Domestic Pigs (Sus Scrofa Domestica) Able To Use Complex Human-Given Cues To Find A Hidden Reward?, Christian Nawroth, Mirjam Ebersbach, Eberhard Von Borell
Social Cognition Collection
Understanding human-animal interactions in livestock production systems is crucial for improving animal welfare. It is therefore of general interest to investigate how livestock animals obtain information from humans. By using an object-choice paradigm, we investigated whether domestic pigs (n = 4) are able to use a variety of human-given cues, such as different pointing gestures, to find a hidden food reward. In Experiment 1, an experimenter pointed towards a baited location in front of the pig while the extent of the protrusion of his hand from the upper body was varied. Pigs had problems using pointing gestures that did not …
Annotated Bibliography: Altruism, Empathy, And Prosocial Behavior (2014-2015), Erich Yahner
Annotated Bibliography: Altruism, Empathy, And Prosocial Behavior (2014-2015), Erich Yahner
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
No abstract provided.
Mother--Offspring Recognition Via Contact Calls In Cattle, Bos Taurus, Mónica Padilla De La Torre, Elodie F. Briefer, Brad M. Ochocki, Alan G. Mcelligott, Tom Reader
Mother--Offspring Recognition Via Contact Calls In Cattle, Bos Taurus, Mónica Padilla De La Torre, Elodie F. Briefer, Brad M. Ochocki, Alan G. Mcelligott, Tom Reader
Sentience Collection
Individual recognition in gregarious species is fundamental in order to avoid misdirected parental investment. In ungulates, two very different parental care strategies have been identified: ‘hider’ offspring usually lie concealed in vegetation whereas offspring of ‘follower’ species remain with their mothers while they forage. These two strategies have been suggested to impact on mother--offspring vocal recognition, with unidirectional recognition of the mother by offspring occurring in hiders and bidirectional recognition in followers. In domestic cattle, Bos taurus, a facultative hider species, vocal communication and recognition have not been studied in detail under free-ranging conditions, where cows and calves can graze …
The Line Drawn On Pain Still Holds, Bjorn H. Merker
The Line Drawn On Pain Still Holds, Bjorn H. Merker
Animal Sentience
The many substantive criticisms raised against Key by me and by many of the other commentators will not disappear by ignoring or waving them aside with meta-discourse about anthropomorphism, just-so stories, or celestial teapots. The conceptual edifice Key inhabits and defends with such gusto may look like an impregnable fortress from the inside – and Key behaves as if it were. From the outside, however, it looks more like a ramshackle structure gaping with holes and pieced together from imperfectly understood neuroscience and often faulty literature citations.
Slavery, Welfare And The Sixth Extinction, Stephen R. Clark
Slavery, Welfare And The Sixth Extinction, Stephen R. Clark
Animal Sentience
Ng’s laudable concern for animal welfare would be welcome to any sensible slave-owner wishing to preserve his investment. What welfarism – for slave-owners and animal husbandmen – fails to call into question is whether we have the right to breed, hold captive and kill animals at all: If it matters, as the widely recognized slogan of ‘Five Freedoms’ suggests, that animals have the chance to live a ‘normal’ life, then more matters than keeping them ‘happy’ in subjection. Their lives – and also the lives of wild things – also deserve respect.