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Articles 691 - 720 of 1911
Full-Text Articles in Psychology
Sentient Animals Do Not Just Live In The Present, John Webster
Sentient Animals Do Not Just Live In The Present, John Webster
Animal Sentience
Sheep are particularly well-equipped with the cognitive and emotional skills appropriate to their phenotype and natural environment. These include spatial memory, the benefits of safety in numbers, and the ability to recognise special individuals in large flocks by sight and by sound. Marino & Merskin’s target article reviews convincing evidence on whether sheep are more or less clever than other mammalian species. Sheep are very good at being sheep. But sentient animals do not just live in the present. Their emotional state is not simply dictated by events of the moment. If they learn, they can cope; if not, they …
Positive Sentience Is Underrated, Teya Brooks Pribac
Positive Sentience Is Underrated, Teya Brooks Pribac
Animal Sentience
My commentary focuses on two aspects of ovine (well-)being considered in the review: the developmental context and (un)fulfilled potentialities.
Sheeple? The Need For More Research On Sheep Cognition, Michael Colombo, Damian Scarf
Sheeple? The Need For More Research On Sheep Cognition, Michael Colombo, Damian Scarf
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (2019) provide a comprehensive review of the cognitive abilities of sheep. If research with other animals is any guide, there may be justification for the view that the abilities of sheep have been underestimated, and their review will likely stimulate more research into sheep cognition.
Sheep In Aesop’S And Phaedrus’S Fables, Matteo Colombo, Chiara Raucea
Sheep In Aesop’S And Phaedrus’S Fables, Matteo Colombo, Chiara Raucea
Animal Sentience
Sheep feature in various animal fables. Marino & Merskin suggest that “we” view sheep as “docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid,” but animal fables do not support this view. In Aesop’s and Phaedrus’s fables, sheep are a primary target of injustice; but they are not passive targets. Sheep endure injustice actively and honestly. They are intelligent, aware and outspoken about their own condition.
Using Sheep Psychology To Guide Sheep Policy, Ralph Adolphs
Using Sheep Psychology To Guide Sheep Policy, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s valuable review of the literature on sheep cognition shows how entrenched common views of these animals’ mental lives are disputed by the research literature. Yet the evidence they muster faces three challenges that their target article does not discuss: (1) the behavioral tasks are strongly anthropocentric; (2) neuroscientific data are absent; and (3) applications are not discussed. I touch on all three of these here.
Why Are Sheep Sheepish? How Perception Affects Animal Stereotyping, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Why Are Sheep Sheepish? How Perception Affects Animal Stereotyping, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin present compelling evidence that many stereotypes of sheep are incorrect. One factor that may play an important role in animal stereotyping is the physical appearance of animals, which can directly lead to stereotyping through automatic mental processes. Sheep have a round and babyish appearance that directly evokes judgments of warmth and docility. Depictions of sheep in art, and especially cartoons, reinforce this stereotype.
Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate
Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s review shows that sheep are intelligent and highly social but their methodology has some shortcomings. I describe five problems with reviewing only the academic and scientific literature and suggest how one might provide an even more compelling case for the complexity of sheep minds.
Cognition, Emotion, Personality And The Conservation And Management Of Wild Ungulates, Rob Found
Cognition, Emotion, Personality And The Conservation And Management Of Wild Ungulates, Rob Found
Animal Sentience
Increasing public understanding of the complexity of wild ungulates can improve animal welfare and advance global conservation efforts of these keystone species. Unfortunately, shaping public opinion on wild species is challenging because personal experience with wildlife is declining, popular education is still biased towards the predator instead of the prey, and scientific research is more difficult to conduct on wild ungulates compared to those on farms, in zoos, or otherwise in captivity. Nevertheless, studies of cognition, individuality, and intelligence of wild ungulates are increasing. I briefly highlight some major results from my own work on complexity in wild elk, illustrating …
What Should We Do About Sheep? The Role Of Intelligence In Welfare Considerations, Heather Browning
What Should We Do About Sheep? The Role Of Intelligence In Welfare Considerations, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (2019) demonstrate that sheep are more cognitively complex than typically thought. We should be cautious in interpreting the implications of these results for welfare considerations to avoid perpetuating mistaken beliefs about the moral value of intelligence as opposed to sentience. There are, however, still important ways in which this work can help improve sheeps’ lives.
Yes, Sheep Are Smart But The Moral Question Is Still “Can They Suffer?”, Clare Palmer, Peter Sandøe
Yes, Sheep Are Smart But The Moral Question Is Still “Can They Suffer?”, Clare Palmer, Peter Sandøe
Animal Sentience
Sheep may be more complex and intelligent than we traditionally believed, but knowing this is unlikely to change human attitudes to sheep significantly; nor is it strongly relevant to their moral status. However, knowing more about what sheep are like could help to improve sheep welfare.
Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt
Time To Vary The Formula, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
In the past few years, Marino and her colleagues have written a series of comprehensive and helpful review articles on the cognitive, emotional, and social complexity of pigs, chickens, cows, and most recently, sheep. These articles are similarly structured, even formulaic, which has benefits but also limitations. Here, I point out the limitations in order to suggest new directions and contributions for the authors in the future.
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s comprehensive review of cognitive complexity in sheep is a laudable and important contribution to comparative psychology. It is also valuable because it shows promising directions for future research on this neglected species. The relatively small number of neurons in the bovid cerebral cortex indicates that sheep cognitive performance on traditional measures of complex learning is limited. Nevertheless, the social and emotional complexity of sheep underscores the importance of further research into domains including personality and psychological well-being.
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Animal Sentience
Is the mirror a reliable indicator of self-awareness for any species, whether sheep or human? Taking a cue from feminist, phenomenological, and cross-cultural philosophy, a relational self rather than a reflective one might better capture what is at stake for the lives of social animals and for science.
A Behaviorist Approach To Sheep Cognition, Intelligence, And Welfare, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behaviorist Approach To Sheep Cognition, Intelligence, And Welfare, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s review sheds light on the complexity of the mind, learning, and cognition of sheep. Readily observable behavior has value in its own right for promoting the well-being of animals. A behavior-analytic approach can add substantially to the understanding of sheep as individuals as well as their learning capacities. The findings can also be applied to arranging their environments to promote their well-being as well as behavioral change in those responsible for their care and management.
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Our Response is centered on five major themes: (1) our presentation of human mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”) as a dimension underlying the way people perceive and treat sheep; (3) whether our review is too anthropocentric or anthropomorphic; (4) animal welfare versus animal rights (abolitionism); and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough to change human attitudes and behavior.
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Just Preservation, Adrian Treves, Francisco J. Santiago-Ávila, William S. Lynn
Animal Sentience
We are failing to protect the biosphere. Novel views of conservation, preservation, and sustainability are surfacing in the wake of consensus about our failures to prevent extinction or slow climate change. We argue that the interests and well-being of non-humans, youth, and future generations of both human and non-human beings (futurity) have too long been ignored in consensus-based, anthropocentric conservation. Consensus-based stakeholder-driven processes disadvantage those absent or without a voice and allow current adult humans and narrow, exploitative interests to dominate decisions about the use of nature over its preservation for futurity of all life. We propose that authentically non-anthropocentric …
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Animal Sentience
Neither human young today nor future human generations nor non-human species have a voice in protecting the biosphere. Treves et al. propose courts and trustees for defending their interests. I describe an analogy with attempts to represent the interests of children and comatose patients in medicine.
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
What Is In An Octopus's Mind?, Jennifer Mather
Animal Sentience
It is difficult to imagine what an animal as different from us as the octopus ‘thinks’, but we can make some progress. In the Umwelt or perceptual world of an octopus, what the lateralized monocular eyes perceive is not color but the plane of polarization of light. Information is processed by a bilateral brain but manipulation is done by a radially symmetrical set of eight arms. Octopuses do not self-monitor by vision. Their skin pattern system, used for excellent camouflage, is open loop. The output of the motor system of the eight arms is organized at several levels — brain, …
Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela
Octopus Umwelt Or Umwelten?, Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience
Even if its intelligent behaviors are the product of decentralized control systems, Mather argues that the octopus has an “Umwelt,” and, thus, a mind. I argue that Umwelt does not provide a conceptual basis for understanding the octopus as having a mind. First, Umwelt does not refer only to an organism’s perceptual abilities. Second, in providing evidence for decentralized control systems that underlie intelligent behaviors, Mather makes a case against an octopus Umwelt. Instead, the octopus is more akin to a collection of systems, or Umwelten, than a single system with an Umwelt.
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Who Needs A Mind When You Have Thousands Of Fingers?, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Mather’s target article aligns with a common tendency of granting the octopus a mind or consciousness. But what is the meaning of an octopus’s mind? Is it part of nature or is it observer-dependent, imputed to satisfy our own psychological needs? In this commentary, I build on my own experience with octopuses to challenge the notion that we can conclusively attribute a mind to an animal; and I question the scientific usefulness of doing so.
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, memory, and behavior. Anyone interested in cephalopod cognition and brain organization will find her target article informative and interesting. In this commentary, I challenge the idea that an individual organism must have an individual mind. Given the structure of the octopus brain and their complex behavior, one must consider the possibility that an octopus is a community of minds rather than a single mind.
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Mather’s work has been fundamental in informing scientists of the relatively mysterious behavior and cognition of an understudied group of animals – the cephalopods. This work helps to fill a gap in the comparative literature that has historically sought evidence for complex behavior only in species that are closely related to humans or share important ecological features such as social complexity.
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
What Is Good For An Octopus?, Heather Browning
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good for an octopus.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Animal Sentience
Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Octopus Minds Must Lead To Octopus Ethics, Barbara J. King, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Mather argues convincingly for the existence of minds in octopuses based largely on laboratory experiments. Many of these experiments are highly invasive and involve mutilation and death. Moreover, octopuses are now being hailed as a “new model” for biological research and are being enthusiastically bred in captivity, both for research and for food. We argue that the compelling evidence for mind in octopuses must be accompanied by intense scrutiny of the ethics that shape how we treat them and that the intrinsic value of their individual lives must be recognized.
‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara
‘Mind’ Is An Ill-Defined Concept: Considerations For Future Cephalopod Research, Alexandra Schnell, Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
Scientific discussions about the ‘mind’ of an octopus are empirically vacuous and should be confined to folk psychology. This form of labelling is unhelpful for science and should be replaced by specific mechanistic accounts of behavior and associated neural structures, which are amenable to rigorous scientific investigation. Mather provides a detailed review of octopus behavior, but rather than making unquantifiable assumptions about what orchestrates octopus behavior, efforts should focus on investigating cognitive mechanisms that can be measured. In this commentary, we outline two lines of research that include quantifiable methods to facilitate a more robust understanding of cephalopod behaviors and …
The Octopus Mind: Implications For Cognitive Science, Sidney Carls-Diamante
The Octopus Mind: Implications For Cognitive Science, Sidney Carls-Diamante
Animal Sentience
Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting point of inquiry from “If octopuses had minds, what would they be like?” to “What is the mind of an octopus like?”.