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Articles 1861 - 1890 of 2991
Full-Text Articles in Psychology
Consciousness: Where We Are At, Imants Barušs
Consciousness: Where We Are At, Imants Barušs
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
It is useful every couple of years to take a bird’s eye view of consciousness studies and reflect on what we see. When I look, I still see two streams, one of which is the social and political framework for the study of consciousness, and the other of which is the substance of what we know about consciousness. The former is still largely defined by the extent to which the scientific study of consciousness has been freed from a materialist agenda. The latter includes recent research into the clarity of cognitive functioning in the absence of sufficient neurological support for …
Why Consciousness Matters: Insights From A New Generation, Kathleen Noble
Why Consciousness Matters: Insights From A New Generation, Kathleen Noble
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
The University of Washington-Bothell is home to a transdisciplinary and integral minor in consciousness that is the first and only such program at a public research university. This study reports a content analysis of reflection essays submitted by 122 students who completed at least four of the five courses that comprise the minor between 2012 and 2016. Results indicate that students derived significant benefits from this approach to the study of consciousness, including a deep appreciation for the depth and breadth of the mind and the need to release their understanding of consciousness from the constraints of scientific materialism. They …
Commentaries On Deepak Chopra And Menas Kafatos’ Book, “You Are The Universe”; 2017, Harmony Books., Stanley Krippner
Commentaries On Deepak Chopra And Menas Kafatos’ Book, “You Are The Universe”; 2017, Harmony Books., Stanley Krippner
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
No abstract provided.
Commentaries On Deepak Chopra And Menas Kafatos’ Book, “You Are The Universe”; 2017, Harmony Books., Joe Subbiondo
Commentaries On Deepak Chopra And Menas Kafatos’ Book, “You Are The Universe”; 2017, Harmony Books., Joe Subbiondo
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
No abstract provided.
Commentaries On Deepak Chopra And Menas Kafatos’ Book, “You Are The Universe”; 2017, Harmony Books., Simon Senzon
Commentaries On Deepak Chopra And Menas Kafatos’ Book, “You Are The Universe”; 2017, Harmony Books., Simon Senzon
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
No abstract provided.
Evolutionary Continuity Of Personhood, Anne Benvenuti
Evolutionary Continuity Of Personhood, Anne Benvenuti
Animal Sentience
Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhood — mental life and unity — to animals as potential persons. Especially valuable in this context is his descriptive phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness as a fundamental form of mental life that necessarily entails unity. Rowland describes certain fundamentals of mental experience that exist across species boundaries, challenging assumptions of early modern philosophers regarding the definition of human personhood and affirming the principle of evolutionary continuity. This opens the door to a broader and deeper set of questions, related to whether we should continue to attempt to apply to …
Darwin’S Empirical Evidence, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Darwin’S Empirical Evidence, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Animal Sentience
Darwin’s extensive writings may seem antiquated to current thinkers with their predilections for cognitive science, neuroscience, and analytic branches of philosophy. He showed that morphologies are not simply taxonomic distinctions that allow classification into species. They describe living animals, hence morphologies-in-motion: animate forms of life engaged in synergies of meaningful movement, all of which are testimony to animal sentience.
Animal Personhood Is An Evolutionary Issue, James E. King
Animal Personhood Is An Evolutionary Issue, James E. King
Animal Sentience
The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical argument, that personhood can be applied to many species beyond a few nonhuman primates. The problem with this argument is that personhood has an open-ended list of defining attributes and can, at best only be partially applied to nonhuman species. Therefore, a dichotomous distinction cannot be made between qualifying and non-qualifying species. Instead, between-species comparisons must be based on observational and experimental procedures to demonstrate the extent to which human mental attributes are shared with other species. This would allow a more informed view about the appropriateness of …
Ptsd From Childhood Trauma As A Precursor To Attachment Issues, Christy Owen
Ptsd From Childhood Trauma As A Precursor To Attachment Issues, Christy Owen
Fidei et Veritatis: The Liberty University Journal of Graduate Research
The past 20 years have been turbulent regarding Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD), with conflicting research about its causes, effects, treatment, and prognosis. The current diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 fails to adequately address this disorder. A number of deviant and maladaptive behaviors common amongst children with RAD are not even mentioned in the diagnostic criteria. As such, the diagnostic definition is almost unidentifiable or incompatible with real-life conduct manifestations of the disorder. Rather, this author contends that RAD is foundationally a unique and extreme form of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from Early Childhood Trauma. The child endured unspeakable neglect and/or …
How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans
How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans
Animal Sentience
The sudden appearance of consciousness that Reber posits in creatures with flexible cell walls and motility rather than non-flexible cells walls and no motility involves an evolutionary discontinuity. This kind of “miracle” is required by all “discontinuity” theories of consciousness. To avoid miraculous emergence, one may need to consider continuity theories, which accept that different forms of consciousness and material functioning co-evolve but assume the existence of consciousness to be primal in the way that matter and energy are assumed to be primal in physics.
“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key
“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Reber (2016) attempts to resuscitate an obscure and outdated hypothesis referred to as the “cellular basis of consciousness” that was originally formulated by the author nearly twenty years ago. This hypothesis proposes that any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds, and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness. Reber seeks to reduce consciousness to a fundamental property inherent to individual cells rather than to centralised nervous systems. This commentary shows how this hypothesis is based on supposition, false premises and a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. The cellular basis of consciousness …
The Person And The Self As Social Accomplishment, Leslie Irvine
The Person And The Self As Social Accomplishment, Leslie Irvine
Animal Sentience
Rowlands (2016) presents a compelling argument for extending personhood to nonhuman animals. Sociological conceptions of the person also do not require that animals meet the elusive standard of self-awareness. Sociological ideas on selfhood support the claims about pre-reflective awareness and extend the requisite experiences to animals.
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological phenomenon of consciousness.
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the …
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory …
From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
Animal Sentience
I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals as Social Selves. It does so because it departs from the orthodox conception of self-awareness, which is both egocentric and logocentric. Instead, its focus is on the relation between consciousness and a person’s lived body, her actions and goals. Characterizing persons as pre-reflectively self-aware beings in Rowlands’s sense offers a much more useful conceptual tool to interpret social behaviour in animals.
What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
Animal Sentience
Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of animal personhood bears a moral dimension (Monsó, 2016). His definition of pre-reflective self-awareness has a focus on sentience and on the lived body of a person as well as on her implicit awareness of her own goals. Interestingly, these also play a key role in animal welfare science, as well as in animal rights theories that value the interests of animals. Thus, Rowlands’s concept shows connectivity with both major fields of animal ethics. His metaphysical arguments might indeed contain a strong answer to the question of …
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Animal Sentience
Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.
Consciousness As Integrated Perception, Motivation, Cognition, And Action, Murray Shanahan
Consciousness As Integrated Perception, Motivation, Cognition, And Action, Murray Shanahan
Animal Sentience
This commentary has two aims: first to clarify the behavioural grounds for the ascription of consciousness to non-human animals (including insects), and second to show how Klein & Barron’s views can be reconciled with the core claims of global workspace theory.
The Moral Dimension Of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness, Susana Monsó
The Moral Dimension Of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness, Susana Monsó
Animal Sentience
Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
Animal Sentience
Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.
Exploring Masculinity For A Healthy Campus Culture, Jason M. Gant
Exploring Masculinity For A Healthy Campus Culture, Jason M. Gant
Master's Projects and Capstones
1 in 5 female students is and will be sexually assaulted in college. This is a public health issue as defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Sexual violence (SV) is a significant problem in the United States. SV refers to sexual activity when consent is not obtained or not given freely. Anyone can experience SV, but most victims are female. The person responsible for the violence is typically male and usually someone the victim is familiar with. The person can be, but is not limited to, a friend, coworker, neighbor, family member and even classmate. Boys …
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.