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Full-Text Articles in Political Economy
An Implementable Institutional Reform That Transfers Control Of Government Spending Levels From Politicians To Voters, Philip E. Graves
An Implementable Institutional Reform That Transfers Control Of Government Spending Levels From Politicians To Voters, Philip E. Graves
PHILIP E GRAVES
Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to non-optimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary rules are seen as necessary to constrain politicians' tax and spending behavior. Popular among such constraints are various Balanced Budget Amendment proposals. These approaches, however, are shown here to have serious limitations, including failure to address the central concern of spending level. An alternative approach is advanced here that relies on a Coase-like mechanism that transfers control of government …
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
PHILIP E GRAVES
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.
Speed Variance, Enforcement, And The Optimal Speed Limit, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
Speed Variance, Enforcement, And The Optimal Speed Limit, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
PHILIP E GRAVES
A model of the optimal speed limit is developed which explicitly recognizes the roles of average speed, speed variance, and the level of enforcement. An unusual result emerges, namely that a higher speed limit may be optimal when reducing the variance in highway speeds reduces accident externalities.
A Note On Drinking, Driving, And Enforcement Costs, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
A Note On Drinking, Driving, And Enforcement Costs, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
PHILIP E GRAVES
There was no abstract for this brief note.
Statutes Versus Enforcement: The Case Of The Optimal Speed Limit, Philip E. Graves, Dwight R. Lee, Robert L. Sexton
Statutes Versus Enforcement: The Case Of The Optimal Speed Limit, Philip E. Graves, Dwight R. Lee, Robert L. Sexton
PHILIP E GRAVES
There was no abstract for this paper.