Political Economy Commons^™

Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Phillip Swagel was Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the U.S. Treasury between 2006 and 2009. During this time, he advised Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as his chief economist, served as a member of the TARP Investment Committee, and played an important part in the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Swagel.

Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …

European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, Dexia Group, SA, the world’s largest provider of public finance, experienced a sudden liquidity crisis. In response, the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg provided the company a capital infusion and credit support. In February 2010, the company adopted a European Union (EU)-approved restructuring plan that required it to scale back its businesses and cease proprietary trading. In June 2011, Dexia withdrew from the government-sponsored credit support program before its expiration date, and in July, the company announced that it had passed an EU stress test. However, just three months later, Dexia wrote down its substantial position …

European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution–Fortis Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In August 2007, Fortis Group, Belgium’s largest bank, acquired the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO, becoming the fifth largest bank in Europe. Despite its size and its significant operations in the Benelux countries, Fortis struggled to integrate ABN AMRO. Fortis’s situation worsened with the crash of the US subprime market, which impacted its subprime mortgage portfolio. By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, its stock had lost 70% of its value, and it was on the verge of collapse due to a severe liquidity crisis. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands quickly came together and agreed to …

European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

The options available to European governments to respond to a multinational bank in financial trouble have been severely limited since each country has its own unique laws and authority applicable to banks operating within its borders. The Bank Recovery & Resolution Directive (BRRD), which was adopted in 2013 and scheduled to go into effect January 2015, harmonizes rules across EU countries for how to restructure and resolve failing banks. However, the directive would maintain the existing system of individual national resolution authorities and resolution funds. To better secure the Eurozone banks and to compliment the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which was …

European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in fall 2008, each of the 27 member states in the European Union (EU) set many of its own banking rules and had its own bank regulators and supervisors. The crisis made the shortcomings of this decentralized approach obvious, and since its formation in January 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been developing a “Single Rulebook” that will harmonize banking rules across the EU countries. In June 2012, European leaders went even further, committing to a banking union that would better coordinate supervision of banks in the then 18-country Eurozone. A …

European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions B: Asset Purchase Programs, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Beginning in August 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) used standard and non-standard monetary policies as the global financial markets progressed from initial turmoil to a widespread sovereign debt crisis. This case describes the key features of the ECB’s asset purchase programs throughout the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. These programs include the Covered Bond Purchase Programs (CBPP1, CBPP2, CBPP3), Securities Markets Program (SMP), Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), Asset-backed Securities Purchase Program (ABSPP) and the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP).

In combating the crises, the ECB designed various innovative programs which it successively employed as the …

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis D: Similarities And Differences, Arwin G. Zeissler, Daisuke Ikeda, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

On September 29, 2008—two weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers—the government of Ireland took the bold step of guaranteeing almost all liabilities of the country’s major banks. The total amount guaranteed by the government was more than double Ireland’s gross domestic product, but none of the banks were immediately nationalized. The Icelandic banking system also collapsed in 2008, just one week after the Irish government issued its comprehensive guarantee. In contrast to the Irish response, the Icelandic government did not guarantee all bank debt. Instead, the Icelandic government controversially split each of the three major banks into a new …

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Ireland went from being the poorest member of the European Economic Community in 1973 to enjoying the second highest per-capita income among European countries by 2007. Healthy growth in the 1990s eventually gave way to a concentrated boom in property-related lending in the 2000s. The growth in the aggregate loan balances of Ireland’s six major banks greatly exceeded the growth in gross domestic product (GDP); as a result, bank loan balances grew from 1.1 times GDP in 2000 to over 2.0 times GDP by 2007. Given the small size of the domestic retail depositor base, the Irish banks increasingly funded …