Political Economy Commons^™

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Ben Henken, Adam Kulam, Daniel Thompson, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, as the financial crisis that had begun the previous year escalated, the US government appointed a conservator for two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), that dominated the secondary mortgage market and were among the largest participants in the global capital markets. The conservatorships were the hallmark of a multipart rescue plan intended to save the firms from insolvency and a disorderly collapse and required the combined and coordinated efforts of several government agencies and instrumentalities. Ultimately, the government invested $191.5 billion into the …

Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The 10-member bipartisan commission, charged with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, and the public. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mr.Borzekowski.

Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as the commission’s director of investigations. The 10-member bipartisan commission wascharged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a662-page report that attempted to explain why the crisis came about and the roles of government and private enterprises in the crisis.This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer.

Lessons Learned: Gary Cohen, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Gary Cohen joined the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in December 2009 to serve as its general counsel at the request of commission chairman Phil Angelides. The FCIC was a 10-member bipartisan group convened by Congress to investigate the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Cohen had a wide-ranging and ad hoc position that included advising commissioners and staffers on administrative matters and protocols. In addition, he assisted in document requests and compelling witnesses to testify and, on occasion, in conducting interviews and public hearings. He played an instrumental role in editing the commission’s final report. This “Lessons …

Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Wendy Edelberg served initially as Director of Research at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) before eventually being named Executive Director. Established in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the FCIC was a bipartisan panel of six Democrats and four Republicans charged with determining the causes of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Edelberg built the organization from the ground up, hiring staff, instituting operating procedures, establishing guidelines, managing communications, and reporting to the commissioners. This "Lesson Learned" is based on an interview with Ms. Edelberg.

Lessons Learned: Phil Angelides, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Phil Angelides chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) established by Congress in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with the purpose of understanding what precipitated the crisis so that any future crises might be averted. The 10-member bipartisan commission, known as the “Angelides Commission” after its chair, convened in September 2010. Meeting in a span of 15 months and holding 19 public hearings and interviewing more than 700 people, the commission submitted its findings in January 2011. The commission concluded that the crisis was avoidable, the “result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments.” The report included …

Lessons Learned: Lorie Logan, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Lorie Logan is executive vice president in the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the System Open Market Account (SOMA) manager pro tem for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), and head of Market Operations, Monitoring, and Analysis (MOMA).

The United Kingdom's Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme (U.K. Gfc), June Rhee

Journal of Financial Crises

The key structures of housing finance in the UK in the years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 consisted of retail deposits, secondary market funding and wholesale interbank lending. Although retail deposits were the major funder of UK mortgages, secondary market funding, which included covered bonds and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), accounted for 31% of UK mortgage lending in 2006. In 2007, the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market triggered a financial shock, and the shock quickly traveled beyond national borders. Regardless of differences in the UK mortgage market, investors’ concern over the prospects of the …

French Liquidity Support Through The Société De Financement De L’Economie (Sfef) (France Gfc), Everest Fang

Journal of Financial Crises

After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial panic and uncertainty intensified in Europe. In France, banks faced a widespread confidence crisis driven by fear that they were exposed to the US subprime market. In response, on October 13, 2008, the French government passed the “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de I'économie.” This provided for the establishment of the Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), a special purpose vehicle (SPV) jointly owned by the State and a group of banks and responsible for refinancing major French credit institutions. The SFEF raised funds on the …

Denmark's Guarantee Scheme (Denmark Gfc), Keni Sabath

Journal of Financial Crises

The international financial system had been experiencing challenges for almost a year before the crisis truly manifested in Denmark during the Summer of 2008 with the sudden demise of Roskilde Bank, Denmark’s eighth largest bank. As more Danish banks became distressed in the fall of 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the government determined that it was necessary to intervene in the banking sector through actions such as taking over and winding up distressed banks, giving guarantees to back up the sector, and providing capital injections and liquidity support. This paper focuses on the two different types of guarantee …

The Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility (Canada Gfc), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a meeting of Group of Seven leaders in October 2008, the Canadian Minister of Finance announced the creation of a new Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility (CLAF). The facility enabled federally regulated deposit-taking financial institutions to access government insurance of up to three years on newly issued senior unsecured wholesale debt. This mirrored similar programs in other countries to ensure that Canadian financial institutions were not competitively disadvantaged in the wholesale debt market at a time when most developed countries were guaranteeing their banks’ debt. This competitive disadvantage never materialized, and the facility was allowed to expire on December 31, …

The Belgian Credit Guarantee Scheme (Belgium Gfc), Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

Much like other developed economies during the global financial crisis, Belgium faced substantial systemic stress to its large and heavily concentrated financial system. To combat these mounting pressures, the Belgian government launched a wide-ranging, opt-in state debt guarantee program in a concerted effort to instill confidence and stymie the fear of runs in its financial sector. The debt guarantee scheme, pursuant to which eligible institutions could issue government-guaranteed debt, was originally put into place on October 15, 2008, and retroactively covered liabilities entered into from October 9, 2008, to October 31, 2009, with a maximum maturity of three years. It …

Incorporating Macroprudential Financial Regulation Into Monetary Policy, Aaron Klein

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper proposes two insights into financial regulation and monetary policy. The first enhances understanding the relationship between them, building on the automobile metaphor that describes monetary policy: when to accelerate or brake for curves miles ahead. Enhancing the metaphor, financial markets are the transmission. In a financial crisis, markets cease to function, equivalent to a transmission shifting into neutral. This explains both monetary policy’s diminished effectiveness in stimulating the economy and why the financial crisis shock to real economic output greatly exceeded central bank forecasts.

The second insight is that both excess leverage and fundamental mispricing of asset values …