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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Political Economy
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
Starting in mid-2007, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing collateral calls from counterparties looking to protect their positions in credit default swap (CDS) contracts that AIG had written on residential and commercial collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (US COP 2010, 28-30). Per these agreements, the AIG parent company was responsible for insuring the value of the CDOs against the risk of a negative credit event, such as default (GAO 2011, 5; US COP 2010, 29-30). AIG’s immediate need for liquidity on September 16, largely driven by a securities lending program and those collateral calls, prompted the Federal Reserve to lend the …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis
The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2008, American International Group (AIG) was among the largest insurance corporations in the world and maintained a profitable securities lending program. However, AIG invested much of the cash collateral received from counterparties in residential mortgage-backed securities, whose value began to collapse rapidly and unexpectedly, creating liquidity strain for AIG when borrowers returned their securities. Because of these strains, credit downgrades, and losses, in September, the company sought assistance from the Federal Reserve which, on October 6, 2008, approved the establishment of the Securities Borrowing Facility by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The FRBNY agreed to loan …
Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg, Sandra Ward, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Greg Feldberg was a senior supervisory financial analyst at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve experienced in regulating large banks when he was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) where he worked from 2010-11, becoming its Director of Research. The FCIC was a bipartisan commission charged with investigating the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Feldberg shared thoughts about some of the challenges faced by the commission and why its report is important. This "Lessons Learned" is based on an interview with Mr. Feldberg.
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as the commission’s director of investigations. The 10-member bipartisan commission wascharged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a662-page report that attempted to explain why the crisis came about and the roles of government and private enterprises in the crisis.This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer.
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …