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Full-Text Articles in Political Economy

Avanzando En La Integración De América Latina: Elementos Jurídico - Económicos Para La Construcción De Una Propuesta En Materia De Convergencia, Iván A. Rojas V Jun 2011

Avanzando En La Integración De América Latina: Elementos Jurídico - Económicos Para La Construcción De Una Propuesta En Materia De Convergencia, Iván A. Rojas V

Iván Rojas V

En un escenario comercial caracterizado por el auge de Acuerdos de Libre Comercio (ALC) en América Latina y el mundo – conocido como Spaghetti Bowl – la búsqueda de alternativas para la reducción de la complejidad jurídica y económica que implica la proliferación de ALC, es en la actualidad uno de los temas relevantes en el contexto académico y político regional.
Existen algunos estudios, iniciativas y propuestas preliminares para abordar el tema de la convergencia en América Latina y el Caribe, como discusiones y aportes teóricos de expertos y entidades locales y regionales que son un insumo fundamental para la …


Business Cycle Program, Howard J. Sherman Dec 2010

Business Cycle Program, Howard J. Sherman

HOWARD J SHERMAN

No abstract provided.


Evolving Influence: Resolving Extreme Conflicts Of Interest In Advisory Relationships, Raphael Boleslavsky, Tracy Lewis Dec 2010

Evolving Influence: Resolving Extreme Conflicts Of Interest In Advisory Relationships, Raphael Boleslavsky, Tracy Lewis

Raphael Boleslavsky

An advocate for a special interest provides advice to an uninformed planner for her to consider in making a sequence of decisions. Although the advocate may have valuable information for the planner, it is also known that the advocate is interested only in advancing his cause and will distort his advice in order to influence the planner's decision. Each time she repeats the problem, however, the planner learns about the accuracy of the advocate's recommendation, mitigating some of the advocate's incentive to act in a self-serving manner. We propose a theory to explain why planners do sometimes rely on information …


Fiscal Federalism In Chinese Taxation, Wei Cui Dec 2010

Fiscal Federalism In Chinese Taxation, Wei Cui

Wei Cui

The legal debate about the decentralization of taxing power in China has mainly centered around a directive issued by the State Council at the end of 1993, which directive, at the same time as launching the well-known and widely-discussed tax reform of 1994, announced that legislative power regarding taxation would be reserved exclusively for the central government. This directive has no constitutional basis, and its subsequent statutory incarnations are all either incomplete or ambiguous. Moreover, in the adoption of tax regulations for many types of taxes, there have been numerous deviations from this principle of centralization, and the bearing of …


Dynamic Regulation Design Without Payments: The Importance Of Timing, Raphael Boleslavsky, David L. Kelly Dec 2010

Dynamic Regulation Design Without Payments: The Importance Of Timing, Raphael Boleslavsky, David L. Kelly

Raphael Boleslavsky

We consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a firm subject to marginal compliance cost shocks. The regulator faces an asymmetric information problem: the firm knows current compliance costs, but the regulator does not. Both the regulator and the firm are uncertain about future costs. In our basic framework, the regulator may not offer payments to the firm; we show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation over time to induce the firm to reveal its costs and increase welfare. In the optimal mechanism, the regulator offers stronger (weaker) regulation in the first period and weaker …