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Full-Text Articles in Political Economy
Elections And Economic Turbulence In Brazil: Candidates, Voters, And Investors, Tony Petros Spanakos, Lucio R. Renno
Elections And Economic Turbulence In Brazil: Candidates, Voters, And Investors, Tony Petros Spanakos, Lucio R. Renno
Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
The relation between elections and the economy in Latin America might be understood by considering the agency of candidates and the issue of policy preference congruence between investors and voters. The preference congruence model proposed in this article highlights political risk in emerging markets. Certain risk features increase the role of candidate campaign rhetoric and investor preferences in elections. When politicians propose policies that can appease voters and investors, elections may have a limited effect on economic indicators, such as inflation. But when voter and investor priorities differ significantly, deterioration of economic indicators is more likely. Moreover, voter and investor …
Reviewed Work: Understanding Institutional Diversity By Elinor Ostrom, Jonathan G.S. Koppell
Reviewed Work: Understanding Institutional Diversity By Elinor Ostrom, Jonathan G.S. Koppell
Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell
No abstract provided.
The Challenge Of Administration By Regulation: Preliminary Findings Regarding The U.S. Government's Venture Capital Funds, Jonathan G.S. Koppell
The Challenge Of Administration By Regulation: Preliminary Findings Regarding The U.S. Government's Venture Capital Funds, Jonathan G.S. Koppell
Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell
This article assesses the ability of elected officials to control public policy as implemented by public/private hybrid organizations, specifically, government venture capital funds. The study reveals greater control over OPIC investment funds than Enterprise Funds despite the existence of more traditional administrative tools of control for Enterprise Funds. This finding suggests that the regulatory infrastructure for hybrid organizations is more determinative of control than the existence (or lack) of traditional administrative control tools. Thus the challenge of hybrid government centers on the development of regulation as a substitute for administration.