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International Economics Commons

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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in International Economics

Applied Monetary Policy And Bank Supervision By The Ecb, Mads Andenas, Lazaros E. Panourgias Jan 2002

Applied Monetary Policy And Bank Supervision By The Ecb, Mads Andenas, Lazaros E. Panourgias

Mads Andenas

Monetary policy and banking supervision are closely related and interdependent concepts. Monetary policy and central banking are not defined in such a manner in the Maastricht Treaty that it precludes the European Central Bank from taking on a wider responsibility for financial stability and the handling of banking crises. The article introduced the term 'macro-prudential supervision', explained as 'supervision with a view to safeguarding systemic stability', in a section with the heading 'Default Supervision of Central Banks'.


Immigration And Social Justice, David Ingram Dec 2001

Immigration And Social Justice, David Ingram

David Ingram

Examines cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches to immigration policy against the backdrop of North/South economic disparities, the oil crisis of the 1970s; the growth of indebtedness in the developing world; and disparities in population growth between developed and undeveloped countries.


A Principal-Agent Analysis Of Fisheries, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard Dec 2001

A Principal-Agent Analysis Of Fisheries, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard

Niels Vestergaard

Very little principal-agent analysis has been done within the fisheries economic literature. This paper conducts a principal-agent analysis of fisheries. Within a standard principal-agent model, the low-cost agent must be allowed the same level of effort as under complete information. This conclusion does not hold for fisheries, because of a resource restriction and the fact that maximisation takes place over two variables. By means of comparative-static analysis, this paper argues that the low-cost agent must be allowed a larger effort than under complete information.