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Full-Text Articles in International Economics
Principal-Agent Problems In Fisheries, Niels Vestergaard
Principal-Agent Problems In Fisheries, Niels Vestergaard
Niels Vestergaard
No abstract provided.
Asymmetric Information And Uncertainty: The Usefulness Of Logbooks As A Regulation Measure, Niels Vestergaard, Frank Jensen
Asymmetric Information And Uncertainty: The Usefulness Of Logbooks As A Regulation Measure, Niels Vestergaard, Frank Jensen
Niels Vestergaard
In many fisheries managed by quota systems fishermen are required to keep a logbook containing information about catches. No well functioning enforcement system is set up in connection with the logbooks, since the purpose is to assist biologists in making stock assessments. In this paper we consider a case where three market failures (a stock externality problem, a stock uncertainty problem and problems with measuring individual catches) arise simultaneously. It is shown that a stock tax and a tax on voluntary self- reported catches may solve these three problems. By taxing voluntary self-reported catches wemake use of logbook information. It …
Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism, Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard, Urs Steiner Brandt
Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism, Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard, Urs Steiner Brandt
Niels Vestergaard
To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.
Sunk Cost And Entry-Exit Decisions Under Individual Transferable Quotas: Why Industry Restructuring Is Delayed, Niels Vestergaard, Frank Jensen, Henning P. Jørgensen
Sunk Cost And Entry-Exit Decisions Under Individual Transferable Quotas: Why Industry Restructuring Is Delayed, Niels Vestergaard, Frank Jensen, Henning P. Jørgensen
Niels Vestergaard
The paper shows that explicit modelling of sunk cost and a firm's entry-exit decision in a traditional deterministic investment model may give an explanation of the slow transition to the optimal fleet structure following the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The analysis shows that the annual lease unit price of quota may be in a range where the long-run fieet structure will not be attainable at once. Over time, firms with zero gross investment as optimal behavior may leave the industry as the capital decays and over the transition period the optimal fieet structure prevails.
A Principal-Agent Analysis Of Fisheries, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard
A Principal-Agent Analysis Of Fisheries, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard
Niels Vestergaard
Very little principal-agent analysis has been done within the fisheries economic literature. This paper conducts a principal-agent analysis of fisheries. Within a standard principal-agent model, the low-cost agent must be allowed the same level of effort as under complete information. This conclusion does not hold for fisheries, because of a resource restriction and the fact that maximisation takes place over two variables. By means of comparative-static analysis, this paper argues that the low-cost agent must be allowed a larger effort than under complete information.
Management Of Fisheries In Eu: A Principal-Agent Analysis, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard
Management Of Fisheries In Eu: A Principal-Agent Analysis, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard
Niels Vestergaard
In this paper, an EU tax on fishing effort is studied as an alternative to the system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs). The analysis is conducted under imperfect information, and the hypothesis adopted is that the EU lacks information about the costs of individual fishermen. In light of this imperfection, there are at least two reasons for considering an EU tax. First, it can be used to correct part of the market failure associated with fisheries. Second, it can be used to secure correct revelation of fishermen types in light of asymmetric information.