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Full-Text Articles in International Economics

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Aug 2006

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …


The Dynamic Effects Of European Services Liberalisation, Henk Lm Kox Jul 2006

The Dynamic Effects Of European Services Liberalisation, Henk Lm Kox

Henk LM Kox

#1; A single European market for services? #1; Estimated static effects of liberalisation #1; Dynamic effects of services liberalisation #1; Conclusions and possible policy implications


Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Mar 2006

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …


Economic Impacts Of The 2004 Services Directive, Henk Lm Kox Feb 2006

Economic Impacts Of The 2004 Services Directive, Henk Lm Kox

Henk LM Kox

#1; About CPB #1; Our research on Services Directive #1; Policy differences as market-entry barrier #1; Effects of Services Directive on trade and FDI #1; Macroeconomic effects #1; Role country-of-origin principle #1; The way ahead


Privatizing Public Enterprises In The European Union 1960-2002: Ideological, Pragmatic, Inevitable?, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Francisco Comín Jan 2006

Privatizing Public Enterprises In The European Union 1960-2002: Ideological, Pragmatic, Inevitable?, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Francisco Comín

Judith Clifton

Privatization, recognized as one of the most important economic policy reforms from the 1970s, has attracted significant attention from scholars, and the literature on the topic is now vast. Yet there is little agreement on the reasons why governments privatized. Three dominant paradigms explaining European Union (EU) privatization put forward distinct motivations. The ‘British paradigm’ assumed that market-friendly ideology played a significant role in a path towards a global programme inspired by the UK experience. The ‘multiple logics’ approach observed that the UK was an anomaly, not a leader, and that EU privatization was so diverse that there were few, …


A Short-Run Johansen Industry Model For Common-Pool Resources: Planning A Fishery's Industrial Capacity To Curb Overfishing, Kristiaan Kerstens, Niels Vestergaard, Dale Squires Dec 2005

A Short-Run Johansen Industry Model For Common-Pool Resources: Planning A Fishery's Industrial Capacity To Curb Overfishing, Kristiaan Kerstens, Niels Vestergaard, Dale Squires

Niels Vestergaard

Current methods for assessing capacity and its utilisation in fisheries operate at the firm-level, but neglect industry capacity. Here, we introduce the Johansen-Färe measure of plant capacity of the firm into a multi-output, frontier-based version of the short-run Johansen industry model. The model determines firm capacity utilisation such that current industry outputs are maintained, while minimising the use of fixed inputs at industry level and assuming abundant variable inputs. Policy extensions relevant to combating overfishing include tightening quotas, seasonal closures, linking economic and plant capacity, decommissioning schemes and area closures, implementation issues and equity considerations. The application to the Danish …


The Trade-Induced Effects Of The Services Directive And The Country-Of-Origin Principle, Roland De Bruijn, Henk Lm Kox, Arjan Lejour Dec 2005

The Trade-Induced Effects Of The Services Directive And The Country-Of-Origin Principle, Roland De Bruijn, Henk Lm Kox, Arjan Lejour

Henk LM Kox

The proposed Services Directive by the European Commission could increase intra European trade in commercial services by 30 to 60 percent. This paper analyses the welfare effects of the trade growth using an applied general equilibrium model WorldScan. It shows that GDP could be raised by 0.3 to 0.7 percent and consumption by 0.5 to 1.2 percent in the European Union as a whole. These results could only be realised if the Services Directive is implemented including the country of origin principle. If this principle is excluded from the directive, trade increases only by 20 to 40 percent. The trade-induced …


Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism, Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard, Urs Steiner Brandt Dec 2005

Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism, Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen, Niels Vestergaard, Urs Steiner Brandt

Niels Vestergaard

To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.