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Industrial Organization Commons

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Law

Antitrust, Industrial Organization, and Competition Policy

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell Dec 2012

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.


The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris Dec 2012

The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.


Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin Jun 2009

Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.


Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin Jan 2007

Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.


The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld May 2005

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

No abstract provided.


The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld May 2005

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.


Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld Sep 2004

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.


Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld Sep 2004

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.


The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell Dec 2003

The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.


Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin Dec 2001

Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Since 1993 when the Supreme Court decided Brooke Group, no predatory pricing plaintiff has prevailed in a final determination in the federal courts. This decision was the ultimate triumph of the Chicago School antitrust scholars and judges like Frank Easterbrook, who have argued that predation is like dragons and that there is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or the courts to take it seriously. This article argues, however, that the Court's reading of the law is unduly narrow and should be revisited. There is no compelling reason to restrict predation cases to below-cost pricing, as above-cost pricing can also …