Industrial Organization Commons^™

The Equity Beta Of Telcos Operating In Small Island Nations, Bruno E. Viani

Bruno E. Viani

Analysts often use the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity capital. A key parameter in estimating that cost is the so-called equity beta. Estimates of equity betas for telecommunications firms, or telcos, in small island nations are not readily available, so analysts often rely on estimated equity betas from larger firms in jurisdictions with much larger markets. Doing so may introduce significant errors if the equity risk premium for telcos in large markets differs significantly from those in small markets. In this research note we explore this hypothesis. We find that the equity betas of …

Barreras A La Competencia Y Libre Concurrencia E Insumos Esenciales, Carlos Mena-Labarthe

Carlos Mena-Labarthe

En la Constitución Mexicana y la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica se establecen facultades para que la autoridad de competencia elimine barreras y regule insumos.

Las investigaciones de mercado son una herramienta adicional que permite obtener una perspectiva integral de los mercados para la corrección de fallas conductuales y estructurales.

Se trata de un procedimiento muy riguroso con plazos establecidos para su ejecución.

Las investigaciones de mercado han resultado exitosas en otras jurisdicciones con una sólida tradición en competencia económica.

Patent Assertion Entities & Privateers: Economic Harms To Innovation And Competition, Robert G. Harris

Robert G Harris

This paper addresses the problems of aggressive rent-seeking activities by patent assertion entities (PAEs) and privateers. Section II explains why aggressive patent assertion is especially problematic in patent thick products and systems (such as computers, smartphones and software), and why technological developments have increased the number and “density” of patent thickets. Section III addresses the fundamental differences in the strategic positions and interests of practicing entities and PAEs, and explains why those differences affect the conduct of PAEs and increase the opportunities for, and economic harm caused by, their rent-seeking conduct and efforts to engage in patent hold-up. Section IV …

Patent Assertion Entities & Privateers: Economic Harms To Innovation & Competition, Robert G. Harris

Robert G Harris

This paper addresses the problems of aggressive rent-seeking activities by patent assertion entities (PAEs) and privateers. Section II explains why aggressive patent assertion is especially problematic in patent thick products and systems (such as computers, smartphones and software), and why technological developments have increased the number and “density” of patent thickets. Section III addresses the fundamental differences in the strategic positions and interests of practicing entities and PAEs, and explains why those differences affect the conduct of PAEs and increase the opportunities for, and economic harm caused by, their rent-seeking conduct and efforts to engage in patent hold-up. Section IV …

New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …

Cartel Detection And Collusion Screening: An Empirical Analysis Of The London Metal Exchange, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s law, otherwise known as First-digit law, which has been successfully …

Essays On Economic Analysis Of Competition Law: Theory And Practice (Ph.D. Dissertation Defence), Dr. Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law (XXV cicle), is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics in …

Essays On Economic Analysis Of Competition Law: Theory And Practice, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law (XXV cicle), is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics …

Voice Without Say: Why Capital-Managed Firms Aren’T (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Why are most capitalist enterprises of any size organized as authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuine employee participation that would give the workers real authority? Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all decision-making power in the hands of management. The standard answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less productive and lose out to more traditional competitors. This answer is indefensible. After surveying the history, legal status, and varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-begging the argument that the rarity of genuine …

Reformando Las Telecomunicaciones, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

The Effectiveness Of Competition Policy: An Econometric Assessment In Developed And Developing Countries, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, …

Regulatory Challenges For Mvnos In Latin America, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris

Shaun D. Ledgerwood

In this paper, we describe the development and current status of anti-manipulation rules as they apply to wholesale electricity and natural gas markets in the United States and the European Union, including the institutions that are responsible for overseeing these rules. We then compare and contrast these jurisdictions to discuss similarities, differences, and potential gaps in coverage within and across their internal markets. We note that while the behavior prohibited by the U.S. and EU statutes is remarkably similar, there is in fact no common standard for defining market manipulation. The absence of a common EU/U.S. framework for examining manipulative …

Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath

Shaun D. Ledgerwood

Predatory pricing doctrine is currently a dead area of the law. To proceed beyond summary judgment, a plaintiff must prove the predation created a "dangerous probability" of supracompetitive pricing as the mechanism for recouping the losses “invested” in the predation. This requires proof that the predator sold products below its average variable cost and raised an entry barrier that ultimately enabled the recoupment of profits at some later time. We offer an alternative to this two-phased recoupment model. In this paper we show that a multiproduct retailer can target loss leading behavior in a market segment to punish or eliminate …

La Valutazione Antitrust Degli Sconti Fedeltà Nel Diritto Della Concorrenza Europeo: Alla Ricerca Di Un Approccio Economico E Di Una Teoria Del Danno Per Il Consumatore, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

La valutazione antitrust degli sconti fedeltà nel diritto della concorrenza europeo: alla ricerca di un approccio economico e di una teoria del danno per il consumatore
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:L’articolo si propone di comprendere in base a quali condizioni sconti fedeltà adottati da un’impresa dominante comportino effetti anticoncorrenziali. Gli schemi fidelizzanti, infatti, sebbene estremamente frequenti nelle transazioni di mercato, qualora applicati da un’impresa dominante, rischiano di essere giudicati illeciti per sé, come comprovato dalla casistica giurisprudenziale finora emersa a livello europeo e dal severo scrutinio riservato delle autorità nazionali della …

The Antitrust Treatment Of Loyalty Discounts And Rebates In The Eu Competition Law: In Search Of An Economic Approach And A Theory Of Consumer Harm, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:In the paper, the fundamental question is under what conditions loyalty discounts and rebates adopted by a dominant firm cause anti-competitive effects. Fidelity schemes, although extremely frequent in the market, if applied by a dominant firm, are likely to be judged as illegal per se, as demonstrated by the EU case-law delivered so far and the severe scrutiny reserved by the national …

Merger Control Reform In Brazil, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Margin Squeeze In Mexican Mobile Telecommunications, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

5m3 Interview On "Estratégias Para A Televisão Digital Terrestre", Nicola Matteucci

Nicola Matteucci

O 5M3 lançou três questões autor, no sentido de actualizar o artigo e obter uma visão a posteriori sobre o seu conteúdo. O resultado é o Anexo a este 5M3, no qual mantivemos os comentários no seu detalhe e na língua em que o autor as escreveu. O 5M3 quis saber se o processo de transição para a TDT tem sido demasiado tecnocrático: e o lado dos consumidores? Matteucci concorda. O debate terá sido muito pautado por um enfoque na questão da “convergência tecnológica” em prejuízo de uma maior atenção ao lado da procura. O 5M3 lançou também uma questão …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …

La Reforma De Poder Sustancial De Mercado Conjunto En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Mexicana De Aviación ¿Rescate O Transferencia?, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Competition Law Reform In Mexico: A Note On Joint Dominance, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Complicaciones De La Ley De Competencia, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Los Temas Pendientes En Competencia, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Reforming At A Time Of Crisis: The Mexican Experience 1994-1995 & 2008-2009, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

An Economic Assessment Of Patent Settlements In The Pharmaceutical Industry, Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag, Laura Tyson

Bret Dickey

In recent years, patent settlements between branded and generic manufacturers involving “reverse payments” from branded manufacturers to generic manufacturers have received close antitrust scrutiny, driven by concerns that such settlements harm consumers by delaying the entry of lower-priced generic drugs. It appears that such settlements will be a focus of the Obama Administration’s antitrust enforcement policy. Yet there is a growing consensus among the courts that such settlements are anticompetitive only under narrow sets of circumstances. In this paper, we present an analytical framework for evaluating the competitive effects of patent settlements, including those involving reverse payments, and demonstrate that …

Sanciones Económicas Y Compensación De Daños En El Régimen De Competencia Mexicano, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

On Refusals To Deal In The European Competition Regime, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Crisis Económica Y Política De Competencia En México, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.