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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
A Capacity Market That Makes Sense, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
A Capacity Market That Makes Sense, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft
Peter Cramton
We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets, and present a design that avoids problems found in the early capacity markets. The proposed market only rewards capacity that contributes to reliability as demonstrated by its performance during hours in which there is a shortage of operating reserves. The capacity price responds to market conditions, increasing when and where capacity is scarce and decreasing to zero when and where it is sufficiently plentiful. Market power in the capacity market is addressed by basing the capacity price on actual capacity, rather than bid capacity, so generators cannot …
Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Review Of The Proposed Reserve Markets In New England, Peter Cramton, Hung-Po Chao, Robert Wilson
Review Of The Proposed Reserve Markets In New England, Peter Cramton, Hung-Po Chao, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by allowing reserve availability bids in the day-ahead market. Doing so greatly increases the complexity of the market without the prospect of more efficient pricing. Rather, offline reserves are most efficiently priced and awarded well in advance, as is done by the improved forward reserve market.