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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …
Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiple-item auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional items and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in an auction model which allows interdependent values. We also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and efficiency terms. …
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments in support of wireless number portability. For Leap Wireless.
Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.