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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner
A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner
Computational and Data Sciences (PhD) Dissertations
In 2016, the Federal Communications Commission debuted a new auction mechanism, the Incentive Auction, with the intention of obtaining high frequency television broadcasting spectrum, repurposing it for cellular use, and reselling these licenses at profitable prices. In designing this process, the traditional mechanism used for spectrum auctions, the Simulta- neous Multiple Round Auction (SMR), was modified in order to speed the process. This new mechanism, the Incentive Forward Auction (IFA), intended to reduce the number of rounds per auction by lumping similar spectrum licenses together. However, the IFA discourages straightforward bidding strategies and can result in bidders committing more in …