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Articles 1 - 29 of 29
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Financial Stability, Trade Openness And The Structure Of Banks’ Shareholders, Claudiu T. Albulescu
Financial Stability, Trade Openness And The Structure Of Banks’ Shareholders, Claudiu T. Albulescu
Claudiu T Albulescu
The adverse effect of financial crises upon the world’s economies represented the background for the development of a wide economic literature on financial stability. The assessment of this phenomenon stands for a complex exercise, as many techniques can be used for this purpose. Such a technique is the construction of an aggregate financial stability index which allows for a comparison between financial systems stability. Based on an aggregate index and on a panel of data, we show that, for several Eastern European Countries, the financial stability is largely influenced by the trade openness and by the quality of banks’ shareholders. …
Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to: 1) provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity; 2) protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and 3) offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism. We propose …
Pre-Test Assessment, Thomas D. Berry
Pre-Test Assessment, Thomas D. Berry
Thomas D Berry
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …
Closed End Fund Discounts As Sentiment Indicies, Thomas Berry
Closed End Fund Discounts As Sentiment Indicies, Thomas Berry
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
The Disposition Effect And Individual Investor Decisions: The Role Of Regret And Counterfactual Alternatives, Thomas Berry, Suzanne Fogel
The Disposition Effect And Individual Investor Decisions: The Role Of Regret And Counterfactual Alternatives, Thomas Berry, Suzanne Fogel
Thomas D Berry
Recent studies have documented a strong tendency for individual investors to delay realizing capital losses, while realizing gains prematurely (Odean [1996], Shefrin and Statman [1985], Weber and Camerer [1996]). This tendency has been termed the “disposition effect.” The disposition effect is inconsistent with normative approaches to stock sales, such as those based on tax losses (see, for example, Constantinides [1983]). We surveyed individual investors, and found that more respondents reported regret about holding on to a losing stock too long than about selling a winning stock too soon. This finding suggests that individual investors are consistently engaging in behavior that …
Private Information And Market Movements: New Evidence From The Wednesday Closings Of 1968, Thomas Berry
Private Information And Market Movements: New Evidence From The Wednesday Closings Of 1968, Thomas Berry
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiple-item auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional items and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in an auction model which allows interdependent values. We also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and efficiency terms. …
Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Auctioning Securities, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel
Peter Cramton
Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid (discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction (Ausubel 1996) have important theoretical advantages for sellers. In a setting without private information, these auctions achieve the maximal revenue as a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. In contrast, the pay-your-bid, uniform-price, and standard ascending-bid auction admit a multiplicity of equilibria that yield low revenues for the seller. We show how these results extend to a setting where …
Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton
Auctions And Takeovers, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Under Delaware law (the predominant corporate law in the US), when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's board of directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company." (Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 173). The target's board may not use defensive tactics that destroy the auction process and must attempt to seek higher bids. Similarly, the Williams Act requires takeover bids to remain open for at least 20 business days on the grounds that the delay facilitates auctions. This preference …
Public Information Arrival, Thomas Berry, Keith Howe
Public Information Arrival, Thomas Berry, Keith Howe
Thomas D Berry
The authors develop a measure of public information flow to financial markets and use it to document the patterns of information arrival, with an emphasis on the intraday flows. The measure is the number of news releases by Reuter's News Service per unit of time. The authors find that public information arrival is nonconstant, displaying seasonalities and distinct intraday patterns. Next they relate their measure of public information to aggregate measures of intraday market activity. The authors' results suggest a positive, moderate relationship between public information and trading volume but an insignificant relationship with price volatility. Copyright 1994 by American …
Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Peter Cramton
This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by utilizing "relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been trumpeted on the cover of Business Week, before the Conference on Relational Investing at Columbia University, relatively little legal writing had been published on the subject. For the purposes of this Article, we define relational investing to encompass commitments to buy and hold significant blocks of a corporation's stock. And it is particularly important that the relational …
Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz
Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz
Peter Cramton
This paper focuses on certain mechanisms that govern the sale of corporate assets. Under Delaware law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target’s Board of Directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company.’’ The Delaware courts’ preference for auctions follows from two premises. First, a firm’s managers should maximize the value of their shareholders’ investment in the company. Second, auctions maximize shareholder returns. The two premises together imply that a target’s board should conduct an auction when at least …
A Multi-State Analysis Of The Tjtc, Thomas Berry, Julia Lane
A Multi-State Analysis Of The Tjtc, Thomas Berry, Julia Lane
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
Risk-Return And The Relative Pricing Of Darp, Thomas Berry, John Houston
Risk-Return And The Relative Pricing Of Darp, Thomas Berry, John Houston
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
Some Guidelines For Assessing The Size Of Lack-Of-Marketability Discounts, Thomas Berry, Don Shannon
Some Guidelines For Assessing The Size Of Lack-Of-Marketability Discounts, Thomas Berry, Don Shannon
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
The Leverage Problem In The Valuation Of Privately Held Firms, Thomas D. Berry, John Houston
The Leverage Problem In The Valuation Of Privately Held Firms, Thomas D. Berry, John Houston
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
A Survey Of Introductory Financial Managment Courses, Thomas Berry, Edward Farragher
A Survey Of Introductory Financial Managment Courses, Thomas Berry, Edward Farragher
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
The Relationship Of Corporate Policy Decisions And Financial Leverage: An Empirical Analysis, Thomas Berry, John Houston
The Relationship Of Corporate Policy Decisions And Financial Leverage: An Empirical Analysis, Thomas Berry, John Houston
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
The Impact Of Federal Tax Changes Of The Cost Of Debt For State And Local Governments, Thomas Berry, Edward Farragher
The Impact Of Federal Tax Changes Of The Cost Of Debt For State And Local Governments, Thomas Berry, Edward Farragher
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
Fnma Mortgage Commitments As Put Options: An Empirical Examination, Thomas Berry, Adam Gehr
Fnma Mortgage Commitments As Put Options: An Empirical Examination, Thomas Berry, Adam Gehr
Thomas D Berry
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) auctions commitments to purchase mortgages. An examination of the terms of the commitment contract shows that these commitments are actually put options on mortgages. The contract is unusual, however, in that the price of the commitment is a fixed percentage of the value of the mortgages. In the auction, the dealers effectively bid the exercise price at which they would be willing to pay the fixed commitment price. In this paper, we study the economics of the FNMA auction. We use a two-state approximation to the American put pricing model for interest-dependent securities to …
State Variation In The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Program, Thomas Berry, Julie Lane
State Variation In The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Program, Thomas Berry, Julie Lane
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
A Short-Run Model Of Regional Housing Demand, Thomas Berry
A Short-Run Model Of Regional Housing Demand, Thomas Berry
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
Fnma Auction Results As A Forecaster Of Residential Mortgage Yields, Thomas Berry, Adam Gehr
Fnma Auction Results As A Forecaster Of Residential Mortgage Yields, Thomas Berry, Adam Gehr
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
An Alternative Methodology For Developing Certainty Equivalents, Thomas Berry, Bill Poppie
An Alternative Methodology For Developing Certainty Equivalents, Thomas Berry, Bill Poppie
Thomas D Berry
No abstract provided.
The Choice Of Money Market Fund, Thomas Berry