Behavioral Economics Commons^™

Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.

Dynamic Learning In A Two-Person Experimental Game, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips

Charles F Mason

No abstract provided.

Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comment on modifications to installed capability market. For ISO New England.

Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Wt Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration Of Peter Cramton,", Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.

Bargaining With Incomplete Information, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere

Peter Cramton

A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information. The chapter begins with an analysis of bargaining within a mechanism design framework. A modern development is provided of the classic result that, given two parties with independent private valuations, ex post efficiency is attainable if and only if it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist. The classic problems of efficient trade with one-sided incomplete information …

Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on the impact of fronts in the C and F Block Broadband PCS auction.

The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction; and (2) the seller can commit to not sell the withheld goods after the auction. We examine how the optimal auction problem changes when these assumptions are relaxed. In sharp contrast to the no resale assumption, we assume perfect resale: all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. In a multiple object model with independent signals, we …

Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.

Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Exploring Gender And Economic Development In Appalachia, Melissa Latimer, Ann M. Oberhauser

Ann Oberhauser