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Behavioral Economics Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer Jan 1987

Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer

Peter Cramton

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …


The Leverage Problem In The Valuation Of Privately Held Firms, Thomas D. Berry, John Houston Dec 1986

The Leverage Problem In The Valuation Of Privately Held Firms, Thomas D. Berry, John Houston

Thomas D Berry

No abstract provided.