Behavioral Economics Commons^™

Willingness To Pay For Flood And Ecological Risk Reduction In An Urban Watershed, David Clark, Diane Novotny, Robert Griffin, Douglas Booth, Alena Bartosova, M Hutchinson

Robert Griffin

Urban watershed managers frequently must address alternative policy goals; flood control and ecological risk reduction. This study combines hydrologic models of flood control and biotic models of ecologic risk with economic models of willingness-to-pay and psychological models of risk processing and planned behavior to evaluate these two alternative policy objectives. The findings reveal that flood risk exposure, especially for those individuals who would remain outside the 100 year flood plain if the project were enacted, does influence the financial support that local residents would be willing to make to a flood control project. Other important determinants include demographic factors such …

The Relation Between Variance And Information Rents In Auctions, Brett Katzman, Julian Reif, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

This paper examines the conventional wisdom, expressed in McAfee and McMillan's (1987) widely cited survey paper on auctions, that links increased variance of bidder values to increased information rent. We find that although the conventional wisdom does indeed hold in their (1986) model of a linear contract auction, this relationship is an artifact of that particular model and cannot be generalized. Using Samuelson's (1987) model, which is similar but allows for unobservable costs, we show that increased variance does not always imply increased information rent. Finally, we give the appropriate measure of dispersion (different from variance) that provides the link …

Wage Bargaining Under The National Labor Relations Act, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen

Jesse A. Schwartz

Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibit the management of a firm from unilaterally increasing the wage during contract negotiations without the union's approval. We show how the management can strategically increase the wage during negotiations without violating the NLRA. Increasing the wage during negotiations will upset the union's incentive to strike and decrease the union's bargaining power, thereby shrinking the set of equilibrium contracts in the firm's favor. Indeed, as the union becomes more patient, the set of equilibrium wages converges to the best equilibrium outcome to the firm.

Purchasing Nonprescription Contraceptives: The Underlying Structure Of A Multi-Item Scale, Chris Manolis, Robert Winsor, Sheb True

Robert D. Winsor

The authors develop a multi-item scale measuring attitudes associated with purchasing nonprescription contraceptives. Although contraceptives represent a common as well as consequential purchase for many people, published research has not addressed measures of attitudes associated with this purchase decision. A scale development method is presented measuring both male and female consumer attitudes toward purchasing contraceptives. Ultimately, a multi-item scale demonstrating a high degree of invariance across 2 samples (men and women) is developed.

Agency And Compensation: Evidence From The Hotel Industry, Matthew Freedman, Renata Kosova

Matthew Freedman