Behavioral Economics Commons^™

Pay-What-You-Want Pricing: Can It Be Profitable?, Yong Chao, Jose Fernandez, Babu Nahata

Yong Chao

Using a game theoretic framework, we show that not only can pay-what-you-want (PWYW) pricing generate positive profits, but it can also be more profitable than charging a fixed price to all consumers. Further, whenever it is more profitable, it is also Pareto-improving. We derive conditions in terms of two parameters, namely the marginal cost of production and the psychological cost of the consumer for paying too little compared to her reference price.

The paper makes the following contributions to the existing literature. First, we endogenize the choice of pricing strategies—PWYW vs. fixed price. Thus rather than solely focusing on the …

Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …

Agency And Compensation: Evidence From The Hotel Industry, Matthew Freedman, Renata Kosova

Matthew Freedman

The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow

Goldie Chow

Drawing on firm-level data from the district of Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, India, this study explores the role of family ties as a means to counteract potential moral hazard concerns. It is shown that firms will be more likely to employ family relations when faced with a higher hidden context for moral hazard. Specifically, the analysis finds that the presence of family members within the firm is higher when the firm provides general training and that firms that are more likely to do external business with family relations when it is believed that the legal system is not effective. Additionally, …

Pay-What-You-Want Pricing And Competition: Breaking The Bertand Trap, Yong Chao, Jose Fernandez, Babu Nahata

Yong Chao

Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing is a recent participative pricing strategy where a seller offers a good or service for any price consumers want to pay, including zero or some minimum payment. This paper provides a theoretical framework to study strategic effects of the PWYW pricing under duopoly by incorporating behavioral considerations of consumers in making voluntary payments when they could be freeloaders. Without identifying any particular behavioral factor, we assume that consumers feel a sense of guilt when they pay less than their reference points. It is shown that the PWYW pricing can be a profitable marketing strategy than the conventional …

Looking At China’S Great Leap Forward From A Systems Perspective, Brandy Futrell

Brandy Futrell

China’s Great Leap Forward (GLF) campaign of 1958-1961 led by Mao Tse-Tung resulted in a horrendous famine that cost millions of lives. This paper examines the campaign from a systems perspective across the individual, group/societal, and regulatory levels. Looking at each level illustrates errors that explain how the GLF failed.

Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro

Luciano I. de Castro

Forecasting electricity demand for future years is an essential step in resource planning. A common approach is for the system operator to predict future demand from the estimates of individual distribution companies. However, the predictions thus obtained may be of poor quality, since the reporting incentives are unclear. We propose a prediction market as a form of forecasting future demand for electricity. We describe how to implement a simple prediction market for continuous variables, using only contracts based on binary variables. We also discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of such a market.