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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Teoría Prospectiva, Efecto Marco Y Los Mensajes De Disuasión De Consumo De Tabaco En Colombia, Daniel Monroy
Teoría Prospectiva, Efecto Marco Y Los Mensajes De Disuasión De Consumo De Tabaco En Colombia, Daniel Monroy
Daniel A Monroy C
The main target of this reflex paper is to explain some ideas about behavioral economics, such as the Prospect Theory and the framing effect, as well as its possible implications for the law, especially in the context of tobacco control law in Colombia and the current package warning labels. The paper concludes that these warnings have the potential to reduce the tobacco consumption. However the effectiveness of these messages could be increased if the information is reframed in an alternative way.
This paper is based in other one called: "ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO-CONDUCTUAL DE LA REGULACIÓN ANTITABACO EN COLOMBIA: El efecto marco …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …