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Behavioral Economics Commons

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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha Jun 2012

Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.


Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha Jun 2012

Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.


What Is The Optimal Subsidy For Exercise? Informing Health Insurance Companies' Fitness Reimbursement Programs, Molly E. Frean May 2012

What Is The Optimal Subsidy For Exercise? Informing Health Insurance Companies' Fitness Reimbursement Programs, Molly E. Frean

Economics Honors Projects

Health care costs account for 17% of US GDP and many programs and policies seek to reduce these costs. This paper focuses on exercise as preventive care due to its immense physiological benefits. I model the profit-maximizing choice of health insurance companies to subsidize exercise and the utility-maximizing choice of individuals to engage in exercise using a traditional principal-agent framework. I then use principles from behavioral economics and psychology to critique these models and provide further insight into understanding our underconsumption of such preventive services. I end with an evaluation of current programs and suggestions for improvement using empirical findings.


The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow May 2012

The Role Of Family Ties In Mitigating Moral Hazard: Firm-Level Evidence From Tamil Nadu, India, Goldie Chow

Master's Theses

Drawing on firm-level data from the district of Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, India, this study explores the role of family ties as a means to counteract potential moral hazard concerns. It is shown that firms will be more likely to employ family relations when faced with a higher hidden context for moral hazard. Specifically, the analysis finds that the presence of family members within the firm is higher when the firm provides general training and that firms that are more likely to do external business with family relations when it is believed that the legal system is not effective. Additionally, …