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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
First Price Auctions, Lotteries, And Risk Preferences Across Institutions, Russell P. Engel
First Price Auctions, Lotteries, And Risk Preferences Across Institutions, Russell P. Engel
WCBT Faculty Publications
There is an unsettled debate in experimental economics literature regarding the consistency of individuals' risk preferences in varying institutions. Much of this debate stems from observations of subjects' bids in sealed-bid auctions and the implications of those bids. In this paper, I have subjects participate in a sealed-bid auction experiment and then examine if the ostensible risk parameter that one can back out from subjects' bids matches up with their elicited risk preference from a separate task in the experiment. I find that subjects do exhibit consistent risk preferences. The aggregate measure of the subjects' risk parameter is stable across …
Inequality, Communication And The Avoidance Of Disastrous Climate Change In A Public Goods Game, Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis, Andreas Loeschel
Inequality, Communication And The Avoidance Of Disastrous Climate Change In A Public Goods Game, Alessandro Tavoni, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis, Andreas Loeschel
Alessandro Tavoni
International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. In some treatments we give players the option to communicate intended contributions. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target, but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to …
Taking, Giving And Taking To Give: Experimental Evidence Of Preferences Over Actions, Andrew Hayashi
Taking, Giving And Taking To Give: Experimental Evidence Of Preferences Over Actions, Andrew Hayashi
Andrew Hayashi
The desirability of an outcome often depends on the action that must be taken to bring it about. Using a within-subject design that permits the identification of individual preferences, I report experimental evidence from disinterested dictator games suggesting that preferences over income distributions depend on whether implementing those distributions requires the allocation of gains, the imposition of losses or the redistribution of pre-existing endowments. Subjects exhibit a stronger preference for equality when the action required to implement it involves the unequal allocation of income or redistribution of wealth than when it requires the unequal imposition of losses, an effect that …