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Behavioral Economics Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

The Problem Of Rationality: Austrian Economics Between Classical Behaviorism And Behavioral Economics (Uncorrected Proof), Mario J. Rizzo Jan 2015

The Problem Of Rationality: Austrian Economics Between Classical Behaviorism And Behavioral Economics (Uncorrected Proof), Mario J. Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

In Part One we establish the rationale and substance of the Robbinsian middle ground – the psychical or mind-dependent character of economics. To accomplish this we explore three post-Wieserian frameworks for Austrian economics: (1) the phenomenological social science of Alfred Schutz; (2) the structure of mind analyzed by Hayek in The Sensory Order; and (3) the later Wittgenstein’s logical analysis of thought. While there are no doubt differences among these approaches we find that they are broadly consistent way of establishing the essential mind-dependency of economics. In Part Two we directly examine the basic issues involved in the characterization of …


The Problematic Welfare Standards Of Behavioral Paternalism, Douglas Glen Whitman, Mario J. Rizzo Jan 2015

The Problematic Welfare Standards Of Behavioral Paternalism, Douglas Glen Whitman, Mario J. Rizzo

Mario Rizzo

Behavioral paternalism raises deep concerns that do not arise in traditional welfare economics. These concerns stem from behavioral paternalism’s acceptance of the defining axioms of neoclassical rationality for normative purposes, despite having rejected them as positive descriptions of reality. We argue (1) that behavioral paternalists have indeed accepted neoclassical rationality axioms as a welfare standard; (2) that economists historically adopted these axioms not for their normative plausibility, but for their usefulness in formal and theoretical modeling; (3) that broadly rational individuals might fail to satisfy the axioms for various reasons, making them unpersuasive as normative criteria; and (4) that even …