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Behavioral Economics Commons™

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Labor Economics

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2014

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

Wage Bargaining Under The National Labor Relations Act, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen May 2014

Wage Bargaining Under The National Labor Relations Act, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen

Jesse A. Schwartz

Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibit the management of a firm from unilaterally increasing the wage during contract negotiations without the union's approval. We show how the management can strategically increase the wage during negotiations without violating the NLRA. Increasing the wage during negotiations will upset the union's incentive to strike and decrease the union's bargaining power, thereby shrinking the set of equilibrium contracts in the firm's favor. Indeed, as the union becomes more patient, the set of equilibrium wages converges to the best equilibrium outcome to the firm.

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Agency And Compensation: Evidence From The Hotel Industry, Matthew Freedman, Renata Kosova Feb 2014

Agency And Compensation: Evidence From The Hotel Industry, Matthew Freedman, Renata Kosova

Matthew Freedman

We examine how agency problems in the workplace interact with compensation policies by taking advantage of the structure of the hotel industry, in which many chains have both company managed and franchised properties. As residual claimants on their properties’ profits, franchisees have stronger incentives to monitor employees than managers in company managed hotels. Exploiting this variation and using rich, longitudinal data on the hotel industry, we estimate differences in wages and human resource practices across company managed and franchised hotels within chains as well as within individual hotels as they change organizational form. Our results suggest that the timing of …

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