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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Affidavit arguing that HQ manipulated the NYISO TCC and day-ahead energy markets. On behalf of DC Energy, LLC.
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Ex parte communication on various auction rules for the AWS auction.
Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Uniform Pricing Or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma For California And Beyond, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors
Peter Cramton
Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Summary of review of reserves and operable capability markets. For ISO New England.
Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson
Auction Design For Standard Offer Service, Peter Cramton, Andrew Parece, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
During the transition to a competitive electricity market, when a consumer does not select an electricity provider, who provides service to the customer and at what price? An auction for this "standard offer service" is a market-based way to assign the service responsibility and to determine its price. We explore the design issues in establishing rules for such an auction.
Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz
Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation, Peter Cramton, Alan Schwartz
Peter Cramton
This paper focuses on certain mechanisms that govern the sale of corporate assets. Under Delaware law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target’s Board of Directors is required to act as would "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company.’’ The Delaware courts’ preference for auctions follows from two premises. First, a firm’s managers should maximize the value of their shareholders’ investment in the company. Second, auctions maximize shareholder returns. The two premises together imply that a target’s board should conduct an auction when at least …
Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel
Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel
Peter Cramton
Models of HIV transmission and the AIDS epidemic generally assume random mixing among those infected with HIV and those who are not. For sexually transmitted HIV, this implies that individuals select sex partners without regard to attributes such as familiarity, attractiveness, or risk of infection. This paper formulates a model for examining the impact of nonrandom mixing on HIV transmission. We present threshold conditions that determine when HIV epidemics can occur within the framework of this model. Nonrandom mixing is introduced by assuming that sexually active individuals select sex partners to minimize the risk of infection. In addition to variability …