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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
"Bad Hombres" And The Bully Pulpit: A Study Of Presidential Rhetoric On Social Media And Behavioral Responses Of The Immigrant Population, Mary Vlamis
Honors Scholar Theses
For years, social scientists have studied the impact of presidential rhetoric on public opinion and consumer behavior. This paper adds to the literature on presidential rhetoric by investigating how presidential statements on social media change public behavior in a reaction to these statements. President Trump's immigration policy tweets are used to examine if there is a relationship between the president's statements and changes in behavior using and Google searches. I find no relationship between the instance of a President Trump’s tweet and changes in searching for related topics among both large immigrant populations and Trump supporters.
Does A Better Running Back Mean More Rushing? Game Theory And The Nfl, Eric Lofquist
Does A Better Running Back Mean More Rushing? Game Theory And The Nfl, Eric Lofquist
Honors Scholar Theses
In this paper I attempt to answer the question of whether or not teams in the National Football League (NFL) rush less with a better running back. This seems counterintuitive, but game theory supposes that this is true. Defenses facing a better running back will generally expect the offense to rush more and therefore defend the run more often. The offense, foreseeing the defense’s actions, will choose to pass more to counteract the run defense. This is the basis of the difference between the strategic effect and the direct effect in mixed strategies. The direct effect is when a player …
The Retirement Strategy Of Supreme Court Justices: An Economic Approach, Kayla M. Joyce
The Retirement Strategy Of Supreme Court Justices: An Economic Approach, Kayla M. Joyce
Honors Scholar Theses
Previous research has identified strategic behavior in the nomination, confirmation, and retirement processes of the Supreme Court, each independently. This paper analyzes the interaction between the justices, the president, and the Senate in these processes. I constructed a game theoretic model to consider the nomination and approval process of Supreme Court justices and the change in dynamics that might result from an impending election. I hypothesize that sitting justices take into account the party affiliations of the president and the Senate when they are deciding whether it is the optimal time to retire to achieve their own strategic objectives. The …