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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

First Price Auctions, Lotteries, And Risk Preferences Across Institutions, Russell P. Engel Nov 2011

First Price Auctions, Lotteries, And Risk Preferences Across Institutions, Russell P. Engel

WCBT Faculty Publications

There is an unsettled debate in experimental economics literature regarding the consistency of individuals' risk preferences in varying institutions. Much of this debate stems from observations of subjects' bids in sealed-bid auctions and the implications of those bids. In this paper, I have subjects participate in a sealed-bid auction experiment and then examine if the ostensible risk parameter that one can back out from subjects' bids matches up with their elicited risk preference from a separate task in the experiment. I find that subjects do exhibit consistent risk preferences. The aggregate measure of the subjects' risk parameter is stable across …


A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton Sep 2008

A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.


A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton Sep 2008

A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.


An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Dec 2007

An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman Apr 2007

Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman

Peter Cramton

We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and …


Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Jan 2006

Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …