Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Algorithmic Transparency, Jian Sun

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

I study the optimal algorithmic disclosure in a lending market where lenders use a predictive algorithm to mitigate adverse selection. The predictive algorithm is unobservable to borrowers and uses a manipulable borrower feature as input. A regulator maximizes market efficiency by disclosing information about the statistical properties of variables embedded in the predictive algorithm to borrowers. Under the optimal disclosure policy, the posterior belief consists of two disjoint regions in which the borrower feature is more relevant and less relevant in predicting borrower quality, respectively. The optimal disclosure policy differentiates posterior lending market equilibria by the equilibrium data manipulation levels. …

A Structural Model Of A Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives And Plan Design, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The paper broadens the focus of empirical research on salesforce management to include multitasking settings with multidimensional incentives, where salespeople have private information about customers. This allows us to ask novel substantive questions around multidimensional incentive design and job design while managing the costs and benefits of private information. To this end, the paper introduces the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce in response to multidimensional incentives. The model also accommodates (i) dynamic intertemporal tradeoffs in effort choice across the tasks and (ii) salesperson’s private information about customers. We apply our model in a rich empirical setting in microfinance …

A Structural Model Of A Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives And Plan Design, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We develop the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce to address questions of job design and incentive compensation design. The model incorporates three novel features: (i) multitasking effort choice given a multidimensional incentive plan; (ii) salesperson’s private information about customers and (iii) dynamic intertemporal tradeoffs in effort choice across the tasks. The empirical application uses data from a micro nance bank where loan officers are jointly responsible and incentivized for both loan acquisition repayment but has broad relevance for salesforce management in CRM settings involving customer acquisition and retention. We extend two-step estimation methods used for unidimensional compensation plans …

The Information In Asset Fire Sales, Sheng Huang, Matthew Ringgenberg, Zhe Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Asset prices remain depressed for several years following mutual fund fire sales. We show that this price pressure is partly due to asymmetric information which leads to an adverse selection problem for arbitrageurs. After a flow shock, fund managers do not scale down their portfolio, rather, they choose to sell a subset of low-quality stocks that subsequently underperform. In other words, fund managers have stock selling ability. Our findings suggest an explanation for the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following fire sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure from negative information.

Non-Exclusive Insurance With Free Entry: A Pedagogical Note, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further secondary insurance at a higher premium. We provide a simple proof of this result (extended to multiple types of consumers) with the hope that it may be pedagogically useful.

Endogenous Beliefs And Institutional Structure In Competitive Equilibrium With Adverse Selection, Gerald David Jaynes

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

I model financial markets that structure decision-making into discrete points separating contract offers, applications, and acceptance/denial decisions. Endogenous beliefs about applicants’ risk types emerge as the institutional process extracts private information allowing uninformed firms to infer risk qualities by comparing applications of many consumers. Endogenous beliefs and low-risk consumer behavior render truthful disclosure of transactions incentive compatible supporting a unique equilibrium robust to cream-skimming and cross-subsidizing deviations, even under Hellwig’s “secret” policy assumption. In equilibrium each type demands low-risk’s optimal pooling policy and high-risk supplement to full coverage at fair-price. Nonpassive consumers’ belief firms are sequentially rational necessary for equilibrium; …

Countering The Winner’S Curse: Optimal Auction Design In A Common Value Model, Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are willing to pay, or advantageous selection, wherein the object is allocated with higher probability to bidders with lower signals. If neutral selection is optimal, then the object is sold with probability one by a deterministic posted price. If advantageous selection is optimal, the object is sold with probability less than one at a random price. …

When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships: Multidimensional Incentives And Private Information, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake, Rodrigo Canales

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

At many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about customers are responsible for CRM. While incentives motivate sales performance, private information can induce moral hazard by salespeople to gain compensation at the expense of the firm. We investigate the sales performance–moral hazard tradeoff in response to multidimensional performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in the presence of private information. Using unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from a microfinance bank, we detect evidence of salesperson private information. Acquisition incentives induce salesperson moral hazard leading to adverse customer selection, but maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople …

Committee Design With Endogenous Participation, Volker Hahn

Volker Hahn

Transparency And Distressed Sales Under Asymmetric Information, William Fuchs, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and correlated values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. In a two-period case all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions we show Pareto-dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a failure to trade by the deadline results in an efficiency loss, public offers can induce a market breakdown before the deadline, while trade never stops with private offers.

The Early Impact Of The Affordable Care Act State-By-State, Amanda E. Kowalski

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

I examine the impact of state policy decisions on the early impact of the ACA using data through the first half of 2014. I focus on the individual health insurance market, which includes plans purchased through exchanges as well as plans purchased directly from insurers. In this market, at least 13.2 million people were covered in the second quarter of 2014, representing an increase of at least 4.2 million beyond pre-ACA state-level trends. I use data on coverage, premiums, and costs and a model developed by Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2013) to calculate changes in selection and markups, which allow …

Is There Adverse Selection In The Life Insurance Market? Evidence From A Representative Sample Of Purchasers, Timothy Harris, Aaron Yelowitz

Aaron Yelowitz

This paper examines issues related to asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that links life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. Unlike earlier work that found mixed results using a narrow age cohort, this analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.

Reviewing The Leverage Cycle, Ana Fostel, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We review the theory of leverage developed in collateral equilibrium models with incomplete markets. We explain how leverage tends to boost asset prices, and create bubbles. We show how leverage can be endogenously determined in equilibrium, and how it depends on volatility. We describe the dynamic feedback properties of leverage, volatility, and asset prices, in what we call the Leverage Cycle. We also describe some cross-sectional implications of multiple leverage cycles, including contagion, flight to collateral, and swings in the issuance volume of the highest quality debt. We explain the differences between the leverage cycle and the credit cycle literature. …

Three Essays On Social Health Insurance In Developing Countries: The Case Study Of Ghana, Stephen Ofori Abrokwah

Dissertations

More than 2 billion people live in developing countries with health systems constrained by inequitable access and inadequate funding. The World Health Organization estimates that more than 150 million of these people suffer financial breakdown every year having to make unexpected out-of-pocket expenditures for emergency care.

To improve health and reduce the financial burden on households, a number of developing countries, including Ghana, Colombia, and Peru, have recently introduced social health insurance programs which are heavily subsidized. The dissertation is a collection of three essays looking at how individual health care choices changed as a result of the availability of …

Health Reform, Health Insurance, And Selection: Estimating Selection Into Health Insurance Using The Massachusetts Health Reform, Martin B. Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad, Amanda E. Kowalski

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.

Risk Classification And Health Insurance, Georges Dionne, Casey G. Rothschild

Economics Faculty Scholarship

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. An efficient risk classification system generates premiums that fully reflect the expected cost associated with each class of risk characteristics. This is known as financial equity. In the health sector, risk classification is also subject to concerns about social equity and potential discrimination. We present different theoretical frameworks that illustrate the potential trade-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual asymmetric information.

Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse …

Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information, Xavier Vives

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A finite number of sellers ( n ) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately revealing and the incentives to acquire information are preserved. Price-cost margins and bid shading are affected by the parameters of the information structure: supply functions are steeper with more noise in the private signals or more correlation among the costs parameters. In fact, for large values of noise or correlation supply functions …

Endogenous Categorization In Insurance, Mattias K. Polborn

Mattias K Polborn

This paper analyzes the welfare properties of equilibrium when insurers use observable actions to classify consumers into different risk categories, and consumers' choice is influenced by the insurance market consequences of their actions. Specifically, we analyze this problem at the example of a car insurance market, in which individual preferences over car types are correlated with risk type and used by insurance firms for ratemaking. Equilibrium premiums for each car are determined by the losses that it generates. Consumers take insurance premiums into account when deciding which car to buy. This creates an incentive to buy the car that is …

The Truth About Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection., Mark V. Pauly

Center for Policy Research

This brief is actually going to have two levels. One level will go with the advertised title, and I’ll tell you my current views on the truth about moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection will serve as somewhat of a handmaid of moral hazard, as you will see. That’s one level. The other level, though, which continues to surprise me, is that these two topics—they’re two buzzwords from insurance theory—have generated an enormous amount of policy interest and, yes, passion. Some people passionately believe some things about moral hazard that others passionately disbelieve. And so as part of this …

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, And Market Breakdown, George J. Mailath, Georg Nöldeke

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an unbounded support. A necessary and sufficient condition for market breakdown is obtained. If the condition fails, then there exists competitive market behavior that converges to positive levels of trade whenever it is first best to have trade. When the condition fails, no feasible (competitive or not) market behavior converges to positive levels of trade.

Essays On Group Lending: Evidence From Jordan, Moh'd Al-Azzam

LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Group lending has received a great attention from economists and policymakers for its successful delivery of credit to poor borrowers and its role in alleviating poverty in the developing countries. The success of group lending in providing credit to poor borrowers has been attributed to its ability to mitigate the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems in credit markets. The ability of group lending institutions to overcome the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems has been theorized to be the driving force behind their outreach to the poor, their sustainability, and their repayment performance. While there is a host of …

Containing The Promise Of Insurance: Adverse Selection And Risk Classification, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Insurance law, risk pools, adverse selection

Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story into our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it doesn’t) and is unique.

Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story into our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it doesn’t) and is unique.

Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story in our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it doesn’t) and is unique.

Insurance Contracts Designed By Competitive Pooling, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We build a model of competitive pooling and show how insurance contracts emerge in equilibrium, designed by the invisible hand of perfect competition. When pools are exclusive, we obtain a unique separating equilibrium. When pools are not exclusive but seniority is recognized, we obtain a different unique equilibrium: the pivotal primary-secondary equilibrium. Here reliable and unreliable households take out a common primary insurance up to its maximum limit, and then unreliable households take out further secondary insurance.

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of moral hazard, adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. We impose a condition on the expected delivery rates for untraded assets that is similar to the trembling hand refinements used in game theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …