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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Demand For Breach, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Demand For Breach, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
All Faculty Scholarship
These studies elicit behavioral evidence for how people weigh monetary and non-monetary incentives in efficient breach. Study 1 is an experimental game designed to capture the salient features of the efficient breach decision. Subjects in a behavioral lab were offered different amounts of money to break the deal they had made with a partner. 18.6% of participants indicated willingness to break a deal for any amount of profit, 27.9% were unwilling to breach for the highest payout, and the remaining subjects identified a break-point in between. Study 2 is an online questionnaire asking subjects to take the perspectives of buyers …
Gaming And Strategic Opacity In Incentive Provision, Florian Ederer, Richard Holden, Margaret Meyer
Gaming And Strategic Opacity In Incentive Provision, Florian Ederer, Richard Holden, Margaret Meyer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in which the agent is privately informed about which task is less costly for him to work on. We examine two simple classes of incentive scheme that are “opaque” in that they make the agent uncertain ex ante about the values of the incentive coefficients in the linear payment rule. We show that, relative …
From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The question of whether, and to what extent, markets price contract terms in government bond issues has been one of considerable debate in the literature. We use a natural experiment thrown up by the Euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 to test whether a particular set of contract terms – ones that gave an advantage to sovereign guaranteed bonds over garden variety sovereign bonds – was priced. These contract terms turned out to be important for the holders of guaranteed bonds during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, where they helped the holders of guaranteed bonds escape the haircut …
Copyright’S Private Ordering And The 'Next Great Copyright Act', Jennifer E. Rothman
Copyright’S Private Ordering And The 'Next Great Copyright Act', Jennifer E. Rothman
All Faculty Scholarship
Private ordering plays a significant role in the application of intellectual property laws, especially in the context of copyright law. In this Article, I highlight some of the dominant modes of private ordering and consider what formal copyright law should do, if anything, to engage with private ordering in the copyright space. I conclude that there is not one single approach that copyright law should take with regard to private ordering, but instead several different approaches. In some instances, the best option is for the law to get out of the way and simply continue to provide room for various …