Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal Dec 2012

Contracting Over Prices, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal

Research Collection School Of Economics

We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging inefficient, non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. Without requiring that agents have perfect foresight, we show that perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.


Local Government Public Works Standards And Specifications, John Chlarson, Sharon Rollins Aug 2012

Local Government Public Works Standards And Specifications, John Chlarson, Sharon Rollins

MTAS Publications: Full Publications

This document was developed to provide Tennessee cities with guidelines for construction projects. It includes guidelines for construction standards, materials specifications, design criteria, and contract documents to be used for streets, storm sewers, sanitary sewers, and water distribution systems.


Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan May 2012

Wage-Vacancy Contracts And Coordination Frictions, Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan

Research Collection School Of Economics

We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition.


United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr. Jan 2012

United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This chapter adopts the working assumption that it is conceivable that at some time in the future it would be in the interest of the United States to restructure its sovereign debt (i.e., to reduce the principal amount). It addresses in particular U.S. Treasury Securities. The chapter first provides an overview of the intermediated, tiered holding system for book-entry Treasuries. For the first time the chapter then explores whether and how—logistically and legally—such a restructuring could be effected. It posits the sort of dire scenario that might make such a restructuring advantageous. It then outlines a novel scheme …