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Articles 2341 - 2370 of 2930

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

The Adequacy Of Savings, Laurence Kotlikoff, Avia Spivak, Lawrence H. Summers Dec 1980

The Adequacy Of Savings, Laurence Kotlikoff, Avia Spivak, Lawrence H. Summers

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


National Savings, Economic Welfare, And The Structure Of Taxation, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff Dec 1980

National Savings, Economic Welfare, And The Structure Of Taxation, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


On The Consistency Of Non-Linear Fiml, John J. Beggs Dec 1980

On The Consistency Of Non-Linear Fiml, John J. Beggs

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Person Game, Ludo Van Der Heyden Dec 1980

Person Game, Ludo Van Der Heyden

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Additively Decompable Quasiconvex Functions, Gerard Debreu, Tjalling C. Koopmans Dec 1980

Additively Decompable Quasiconvex Functions, Gerard Debreu, Tjalling C. Koopmans

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Housing Market With Indivisibility, Mamoru Kaneko Dec 1980

Housing Market With Indivisibility, Mamoru Kaneko

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In this paper we present a model of rental housing market in which houses are treated as indivisible commodities. We provide a recursive equation which determines a competitive equilibrium and argue that we can regard the competitive equilibrium as a representative of the set of all competitive equilibria. Using this representative equilibrium, we provide several propositions on comparative statics, that is, we consider how the competitive rents change when certain parameters of the model change.


A Necessary And Sufficient Condition For The Nonemptiness Of The Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko Nov 1980

A Necessary And Sufficient Condition For The Nonemptiness Of The Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Let N be a finite set of players and let ρ be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and without sidepayments such that only the coalitions in pi play essential roles but not the others. For an arbitrary ρ, we get the class of all such games. The purpose of this note is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition with respect to pi for the nonemptiness of the cores of all games in the class.


The Central Assignment Game And The Assignment Markets, Mamoru Kaneko Oct 1980

The Central Assignment Game And The Assignment Markets, Mamoru Kaneko

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a central assignment game. Next, we provide a market model with indivisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption. Applying the first result to the market model, we prove the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we provide a generalization of the market model and also show the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.


Solution And Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Dynamic Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models, Ray C. Fair, John B. Taylor Oct 1980

Solution And Maximum Likelihood Estimation Of Dynamic Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models, Ray C. Fair, John B. Taylor

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Thinking About Carbon Dioxide: Theoretical And Empirical Aspects Of Optimal Control Strategies, William D. Nordhaus Oct 1980

Thinking About Carbon Dioxide: Theoretical And Empirical Aspects Of Optimal Control Strategies, William D. Nordhaus

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The scientific and policy discussion about the CO2 problem can be divided into three different parts: (a) understanding the carbon cycle and climatic effects of CO2 elevation; (b) understanding the economic and social impacts of CO2 and estimating abatement strategies; and (c) weighing the costs and benefits in (a) and (b) to set appropriate policies. Up to now, almost all scientific work has gone into (a); a handful of papers discusses (b); but there have been no attempts to pursue (c), that is to weigh scientific and economic evidence so as to give guidance on national or global policies. The …


Distribution, Peter C.B. Phillips Sep 1980

Distribution, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Formulae that are given in the literature for the characteristic function of the F distribution are incorrect and imply that the distribution has finite moments of all orders. Correct formulae are derived and the asymptotic behavior of the characteristic function in the neighborhood of the origin is characterized.


Best Uniform Approximation To Probability Densities In Econometrics, Peter C.B. Phillips Sep 1980

Best Uniform Approximation To Probability Densities In Econometrics, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A new method of approximating the probability density function (pdf’s) of econometric estimators and test statistics is developed. It is shown that best uniform approximants to a general class of pdf’s exist in the form of rational functions. A procedure for extracting approximants is devised and is based on modifying multiple-point Pade approximants to the distribution. The new approximation technique is very general and should be widely applicable in mathematical statistics and econometrics. It has the advantage, unlike the Edgeworth and saddlepoint approximations, of readily incorporating extraneous information on the distribution, even qualitative information. The new procedure is applied to …


On A Lemma Of Amemiya, Peter C.B. Phillips Sep 1980

On A Lemma Of Amemiya, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Perfect Or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search For The Philosophers Stone?, Martin Shubik Aug 1980

Perfect Or Robust Noncooperative Equilibrium: A Search For The Philosophers Stone?, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Heterogeneous Information And The Theory Of The Business Cycle, Sanford Grossman, Laurence Weiss Aug 1980

Heterogeneous Information And The Theory Of The Business Cycle, Sanford Grossman, Laurence Weiss

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Intergenerational Political Economy (A Game Theoretic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik Jul 1980

Intergenerational Political Economy (A Game Theoretic Model Of How To Glue The Generations Together), Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Extension Of A Dynamical Model Of Political Equilibrium, Gerald H. Kramer Jul 1980

Extension Of A Dynamical Model Of Political Equilibrium, Gerald H. Kramer

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Policy Responses To The Productivity Slowdown, William D. Nordhaus Jun 1980

Policy Responses To The Productivity Slowdown, William D. Nordhaus

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


A Model Of Output, Employment, Capital Formation And Inflation, R. W. Bailey, Viv B. Hall, Peter C.B. Phillips May 1980

A Model Of Output, Employment, Capital Formation And Inflation, R. W. Bailey, Viv B. Hall, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Linear Complementarity And The Degree Of Mappings, Roger Howe Apr 1980

Linear Complementarity And The Degree Of Mappings, Roger Howe

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Incentive Arbitration And Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne Apr 1980

Incentive Arbitration And Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In the context of the Nash Bargaining Problem an arbitrator is supposed to choose a solution point on the basis of ‘fairness’ requirements. By introducing time-related costs to the parties’ utility functions, a new class of arbitration changes the rules of the negotiations, and particularly the parties’ payoffs, and lets the parties negotiate. The changes are such that one or both parties are reimbursed by the arbitrator for their bargaining costs. A procedure in which only the party who makes the final concession is compensated, leads (in the case of complete information) to single dominating equilibrium strategies and to a …


An Extension Of The Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne Apr 1980

An Extension Of The Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs, Zvi A. Livne

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The Nash Bargaining is reformulated by introducing time-related costs into the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of the parties. A set of mathematical requirements on the solution is satisfied uniquely by a function called the Extended Raiffa Solution. The properties of this function are investigated. It is shown to coincide with the Nash Cooperative Solution (of a related Bargaining Problem) when the parties have identical discount rates. An interpretation of the solution and of the formal requirements is detailed. In this model the ‘bargaining power’ of the parties is determined by the bargaining costs related to the duration of the negotiations.


The Welfare Cost Of Capital Income Taxation In A Growing Economy, Christophe Chamley Apr 1980

The Welfare Cost Of Capital Income Taxation In A Growing Economy, Christophe Chamley

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Optimal Intertemporal Taxation And The Public Debt, Christophe Chamley Apr 1980

Optimal Intertemporal Taxation And The Public Debt, Christophe Chamley

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The optimal taxation problem is analyzed in a general equilibrium model of optimal growth. The private sector is represented by a single competitive household endowed with perfect foresight, and an infinite life. This household maximizes an intertemporal stationary utility function. Public consumption is financed by taxes on consumption, labor income and capital income (or wealth), or by borrowing. Different policies (first-best and second-best), are analyzed for various subsets of instruments. The problem of the optimal level of the public debt is also considered. The general conclusion supports the relative efficiency of the consumption tax with respect to the other instruments.


Output Supply, Employment, And Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion, Philip H. Dybvig, Gerald David Jaynes Mar 1980

Output Supply, Employment, And Intra-Industry Wage Dispersion, Philip H. Dybvig, Gerald David Jaynes

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria In A Local Public Goods Economy With Perfect Consumer Mobility, Donald K. Richter Mar 1980

Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria In A Local Public Goods Economy With Perfect Consumer Mobility, Donald K. Richter

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


A Model Of U.S. Financial And Nonfinancial Economic Behavior, David Backus James Tobin, William C. Brainard, Gary Smith, James Tobin Mar 1980

A Model Of U.S. Financial And Nonfinancial Economic Behavior, David Backus James Tobin, William C. Brainard, Gary Smith, James Tobin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.


An Application Of The Khachianshor Algorithm To A Class Of Linear Complementary Problems, Ilan Adler, Richard P. Mclean, J. Scott Provan Mar 1980

An Application Of The Khachianshor Algorithm To A Class Of Linear Complementary Problems, Ilan Adler, Richard P. Mclean, J. Scott Provan

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The recent ellipsoidal method for solving linear programs due to Khachian and Shor is shown to process linear complementarity problems with positive semidefinite matrix. Suitable modifications of all lemmas are presented and it is shown that the algorithm operates in polynomial time of the same order as that required for linear programming. Thus quadratic programming problems are solvable in polynomial time.


Rawlsian Justice As The Core Of A Game, John E. Roemer, Roger Howe Feb 1980

Rawlsian Justice As The Core Of A Game, John E. Roemer, Roger Howe

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

It is suggested that the ethical notion of social contract can be formally modeled using the well-studied concept of the core of a game. This provides a mathematical technique for studying social contracts and theories of justice. The idea is applied to Rawlsian justice here.


Exploitation And Class: Part Ii, Capitalist Economy, John E. Roemer Feb 1980

Exploitation And Class: Part Ii, Capitalist Economy, John E. Roemer

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.