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Articles 2281 - 2310 of 2930
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Don't Bet On It, John Geanakoplos, James K. Sebenius
Don't Bet On It, John Geanakoplos, James K. Sebenius
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
If two people have different probability assessments about the realization of an uncertain event, they can design a contingent agreement such as a bet or gamble that offers each of them positive expected value. Yet, in the process of formulating this kind of agreement, information about the basis for each person’s probabilities may be indirectly revealed to the other. The very willingness to accept a proposed bet conveys information. This paper models a process by which private, asymmetrically-held information is progressively unveiled as a possible contingent agreement is discussed. If the two parties share priors and their information partitions are …
Integral Polyhedra In Three Space, Herbert E. Scarf
Integral Polyhedra In Three Space, Herbert E. Scarf
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A Bookmaker Or Market Type Test For Specification In Discrete Choice Models, John J. Beggs
A Bookmaker Or Market Type Test For Specification In Discrete Choice Models, John J. Beggs
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper suggests that the predicted probabilities of outcomes given by an estimated discrete choice model by thought of as prices (or bookmaker odds) associated with those outcomes. By buying or selling contracts (gambling) at those prices (odds) it should not be possible to, on average, make a profit if the model is well specified and is generating “correct” prices. This notion then forms the basis of a model specification test.
Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria In A Private Goods Economy, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski
Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria In A Private Goods Economy, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Stochastic Games Ii: The Minmax Theorem, Curt Alfred Monash
Stochastic Games Ii: The Minmax Theorem, Curt Alfred Monash
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Equilibria For A Three-Person Location Problem, Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik
Equilibria For A Three-Person Location Problem, Martin J. Osborne, Carolyn Pitchik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We find all the mixed strategy equilibria, within a certain class, of the simplified three-firm location model of Hotelling (in which the price variable is ignored).
Information About Moves In Extensive Games: Ii, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko
Information About Moves In Extensive Games: Ii, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Stochastic Games I: Foundations, Curt Alfred Monash
Stochastic Games I: Foundations, Curt Alfred Monash
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
On The Exact Distribution Of Liml, Peter C.B. Phillips
On The Exact Distribution Of Liml, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is shown that the exact distribution of the LIML estimator in a general and leading single equation case is multivariate Cauchy. The corresponding result for the IV estimator is a form of multivariate t density where the degrees of freedom depend on the number of instruments.
Naval Procurement Problems: Theory And Practice, Zvi A. Livne, Martin Shubik
Naval Procurement Problems: Theory And Practice, Zvi A. Livne, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Exact Small Sample Theory In The Simultaneous Equations Model, Peter C.B. Phillips
Exact Small Sample Theory In The Simultaneous Equations Model, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria: I, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski
Inefficiency Of Nash Equilibria: I, Pradeep Dubey, J. D. Rogawski
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Information About Moves In Extensive Games: I, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko
Information About Moves In Extensive Games: I, Pradeep Dubey, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, And Approximate Cores, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies. Part I: Replica Games, Externalities, And Approximate Cores, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Sufficient conditions are demonstrated for the non-emptiness of asymptotic cores of sequences of replica games, i.e., for all sufficiently large replications, the games have non-empty approximate cores and the approximation can be made arbitrarily “good”. The conditions are simply that the games are superadditive and satisfy a very non-restrictive “per-capita” boundedness assumption (these properties are satisfied by games derived from well-known models of replica economies). It is argued that the results can be applied to a broad class of games derived from economic models, including ones with external economies and diseconomies, indivisibilities and non-convexities. To support this claim, in Part …
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies: Part Ii. Set-Up Costs And Firm Formation In Coalition Production Economies, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Approximate Cores Of A General Class Of Economies: Part Ii. Set-Up Costs And Firm Formation In Coalition Production Economies, Martin Shubik, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A general model of a coalition production economy allowing set-up costs, indivisibilities, and non-convexities is developed. It is shown that for all sufficiently large replications, approximate cores of the economy are non-empty.
Macroeconomics And Fiscal Policy: Paul A. Samuelson And Modern Economics, James Tobin
Macroeconomics And Fiscal Policy: Paul A. Samuelson And Modern Economics, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Small Sample Distribution Theory In Econometric Models Of Simultaneous Equations, Peter C.B. Phillips
Small Sample Distribution Theory In Econometric Models Of Simultaneous Equations, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cores Of Partitioning Games, Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given subset pi of coalitions of N and only coalitions in pi play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the cores of all games with essential coalitions pi are developed. These conditions appear extremely restrictive. However, when N is “large,” there are relatively few “types” of players, and members of pi are “small” and defined in terms of numbers of players of each type contained in subsets, then approximate cores are non-empty.
The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: The Application To Monopoly And Oligopoly, Mamoru Kaneko
The Conventionally Stable Sets In Noncooperative Games With Limited Observations: The Application To Monopoly And Oligopoly, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper applies the theory of the conventionally stable set to monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. A market model with a finite number of producers and a continuum of buyers is presented and then is formulated as a strategic game in which the producers’ strategies are prices and the buyers’ strategies are demands for commodities. It is shown that a conventionally stable set in this game corresponds to a conventionally stable one in a game where the producers are only players but the buyers are treated as a certain kind of demand function. Furthermore, it is shown that the theory of …
How Fast Should We Graze The Global Commons?, William D. Nordhaus
How Fast Should We Graze The Global Commons?, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Unlike the vast preponderance of planets, earth has been bequeathed a hospitable environment in which to thrive. Up to now, man’s activities have affected this environment negligibly. Scientists are becoming convinced, however, that release of carbon dioxide (CO2) from combustion of fossil fuels will lead to a significant modification of the global climate (see Woodwell). How should we think about such a destruction of our heritage? Should it be treated as anathema, like bondage? Or should the pace and extent of use of our global commons be subject to the same reasoned balancing of costs and benefits as other economic …
Entrepreneurial Abilities And Liabilities In A Model Of Self-Selection, Christophe Chamley
Entrepreneurial Abilities And Liabilities In A Model Of Self-Selection, Christophe Chamley
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
The Epsilon Core Of A Large Game, Myrna Holtz Wooders
The Epsilon Core Of A Large Game, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Sufficient conditions are given for large replica games without side payments to have non-empty approximate cores for all sufficiently large replications. No “balancedness” assumptions are required. The conditions are superadditivity, a very weak boundedness condition, and convexity of the payoff sets. An example is provided to show that under these conditions, the (exact) core well may be empty.
Payoffs In Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman
Payoffs In Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach, Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Money And Finance In The Macro-Economic Process, James Tobin
Money And Finance In The Macro-Economic Process, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Lecture presented December 8, 1981 at the Stockholm School of Economics in connection with the 1981 Prize for Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
Macroconfusion: The Dilemmas Of Economic Policy, William D. Nordhaus
Macroconfusion: The Dilemmas Of Economic Policy, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
Some Remarks On The Folk Theorem In Game Theory, Mamoru Kaneko
Some Remarks On The Folk Theorem In Game Theory, Mamoru Kaneko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.
Game Theory: The Language Of Strategy?, Martin Shubik
Game Theory: The Language Of Strategy?, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.
A New Approach To Small Sample Theory, Peter C.B. Phillips
A New Approach To Small Sample Theory, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is argued that an integral part of the process by which the results of small sample theory can be transmitted to the applied econometrician will in the future be played by reliable direct approximation to the sampling and posterior distributions that are of interest in the precise setting of the model and the data set with which the investigator is working. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new technique of approximating distributions which is sufficiently general to be widely used and is developed in very general terms and should be widely applicable in mathematical statistics and …
Marginal Densities Of Instrumental Variable Estimators In The General Single Equation Case, Peter C.B. Phillips
Marginal Densities Of Instrumental Variable Estimators In The General Single Equation Case, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A method of extracting marginal density approximations using the multivariate version of the Laplace formula is given and applied to instrumental variable estimators. Some leading exact distributions are derived for the general single equation case which lead to computable formulae and generalize all known results for marginal densities. These results are related to earlier work by Basmann (1963), Kabe (1964) and Phillips (1980b). Some general issues bearing on the current development of small sample theory and its application in empirical work are discussed in the introduction to the paper.
Economic Policy In The Face Of Declining Productivity Growth, William D. Nordhaus
Economic Policy In The Face Of Declining Productivity Growth, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
No abstract provided.