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Articles 1591 - 1620 of 2930
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …
Fiscal Policy: Its Macroeconomics In Perspective, James Tobin
Fiscal Policy: Its Macroeconomics In Perspective, James Tobin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
President George W. Bush is preparing a drastic permanent reduction in federal income and estate taxes. He cites as precedents tax cuts by Kennedy-Johnson 1962-64 and Reagan 1981. In those cases, however, the economy was operating well below full employment and needed a “demand-side” stimulus (even though Reagan advertised his tax reduction as “supply-side”). In 2001, however, the economy is very close to full employment, and if it needs a stimulus at all, it is a quick modest temporary one instead of the large permanent one proposed. And why can’t monetary policy do the job of stabilization, as it did …
Bubbles, Human Judgment, And Expert Opinion, Robert J. Shiller
Bubbles, Human Judgment, And Expert Opinion, Robert J. Shiller
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Research in psychology and behavioral finance is surveyed for evidence to what extent experts such as professional investment managers or endowment trustees may behave in such a way as to help perpetuate speculative bubbles in financial markets. This paper discusses scholarly psychological literature on the representativeness heuristic, overconfidence, attentional anomalies, self-esteem, conformity pressures, salience and justification for insights into weaknesses in expert opinion. The role of the prudent person standard and the news media in influencing experts is considered. The relevance of the literature on testing of the efficient markets theory is discussed.
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of moral hazard, adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. We impose a condition on the expected delivery rates for untraded assets that is similar to the trembling hand refinements used in game theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it increases the dimension of …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. In contrast to game-theoretic models of adverse selection, our perfectly competitive framework eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. The …
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …
Signalling And Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Signalling And Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By specializing the default penalties and imposing an exclusivity constraint on asset sales, we obtain a perfectly competitive version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance. In our model their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it doesn’t.
Estimates Of The Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy, Ray C. Fair
Estimates Of The Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy, Ray C. Fair
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper examines various interest rate rules, as well as policies derived by solving optimal control problems, for their ability to dampen economic fluctuations caused by random shocks. A tax rate rule is also considered. A multicountry econometric model is used for the experiments. The results differ sharply from those obtained using recent models in which the coefficient on inflation in the nominal interest rate rule must be greater than one in order for the economy to be stable.
On Modeling The Effects Of Inflation Shocks, Ray C. Fair
On Modeling The Effects Of Inflation Shocks, Ray C. Fair
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A popular model in the literature postulates an interest rate rule, a NAIRU price equation, and an aggregate demand equation in which aggregate demand depends on the real interest rate. In this model a positive inflation shock with the nominal interest rate held constant is explosive because it increases aggregate demand (because the real interest rate is lower), which increases inflation through the price equation, which further increases aggregate demand, and so on. In order for the model to be stable, the nominal interest rate must rise more than inflation, which means that the coefficient on inflation in the interest …
Middle Men Versus Market Makers: A Theory Of Competitive Exchange, John Rust, George J. Hall
Middle Men Versus Market Makers: A Theory Of Competitive Exchange, John Rust, George J. Hall
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
What determines how trade in a commodity is divided between privately negotiated transactions via “middle men” (dealer/brokers) in a telephone or “dealer market” versus transactions via “market makers” (specialists) at publicly observable bid/ask prices? To address this question, we extend Spulber’s (1996a) search model with buyers, sellers, and price setting dealers to include a fourth type of agent, market makers . The result is a model where market microstructure — the division of trade between dealers and market makers — is determined endogenously. In Spulber’s model, dealers are the exclusive avenue of exchange, and prices are private in the sense …
Monotone Preferences Over Information, Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique
Monotone Preferences Over Information, Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.
Valuation Ratios And The Long-Run Stock Market Outlook: An Update, John Y. Campbell, Robert J. Shiller
Valuation Ratios And The Long-Run Stock Market Outlook: An Update, John Y. Campbell, Robert J. Shiller
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The use of price–earnings ratios and dividend-price ratios as forecasting variables for the stock market is examined using aggregate annual US data 1871 to 2000 and aggregate quarterly data for twelve countries since 1970. Various simple efficient-markets models of financial markets imply that these ratios should be useful in forecasting future dividend growth, future earnings growth, or future productivity growth. We conclude that, overall, the ratios do poorly in forecasting any of these. Rather, the ratios appear to be useful primarily in forecasting future stock price changes, contrary to the simple efficient-markets models. This paper is an update of our …
Measurability Is Not About Information, Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique
Measurability Is Not About Information, Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We comment on the relation between models of information based on signals/partitions, and those based on sigma-algebras. We show that more informative signals need not generate finer sigma-algebras, hence that Blackwell’s theorem fails if information is modeled as sigma-algebras. The reason is that the sigma-algebra generated by a partition does not contain all the events that can be known from the information provided by the signal. We also show that there is a non-conventional sigma-algebra that can be associated to a signal which does preserve its information content. Further, expectations and conditional expectations may depend on the choice of sigma-algebra …
The Financing Of Innovation: Learning And Stopping, Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege
The Financing Of Innovation: Learning And Stopping, Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely relationship financing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable, and arm’s length financing, where it is unobservable. We find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes. The rate at which funding is released becomes tighter over time under relationship financing, and looser under arm’s length financing. The trade-off in the choice of financing modes is between lack of commitment …
A Computational Analysis Of The Core Of A Trading Economy With Three Competitive Equilibria And A Finite Number Of Traders, Alok Kumar, Martin Shubik
A Computational Analysis Of The Core Of A Trading Economy With Three Competitive Equilibria And A Finite Number Of Traders, Alok Kumar, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders ( N ) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations in individual initial endowments. Computational results show that the core first splits into two pieces at N = 5 and then splits a second time into three pieces at N = 12. Both of these splits occur not at a point but as a contiguous gap. As N is increased further, the core shrinks by N …
Expected Utility Theory Without The Completeness Axiom, Juan Dubra, Fabio Maccheroni, Efe A. Ok
Expected Utility Theory Without The Completeness Axiom, Juan Dubra, Fabio Maccheroni, Efe A. Ok
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study axiomatically the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admits such a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilities is unique in a well-defined sense.
Weighted Minimum Mean-Square Distance From Independence Estimation, Donald J. Brown, Marten H. Wegkamp
Weighted Minimum Mean-Square Distance From Independence Estimation, Donald J. Brown, Marten H. Wegkamp
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we introduce a family of semi-parametric estimators, suggested by Manski’s minimum mean-square distance from independence estimator. We establish the strong consistency, asymptotic normality and consistency of bootstrap estimates of the sampling distribution and the asymptotic variance of these estimators.
The Uses Of Teaching Games In Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games, Martin Shubik
The Uses Of Teaching Games In Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games, Martin Shubik
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.
The Financing Of Innovation: Learning And Stopping, Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege
The Financing Of Innovation: Learning And Stopping, Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually diminishes with the arrival of addtional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert them. We distinguish between relationship financing, meaning that the entrepreneur’s allocation of the funds is observable, and arm’s length financing, where it is unobservable. We find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes. We characterize the optimal contracts and equilibrium funding decisions. The financial constraints will typically …
Electoral Rules And The Emergence Of New Issue Dimensions, Estelle Cantillon
Electoral Rules And The Emergence Of New Issue Dimensions, Estelle Cantillon
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Different electoral rules provide different incentives for parties competing for votes to adopt emerging issues. As a result, new societal issues will be integrated at different speeds into the political arena, and ultimately, into policy. In order to study this question formally, I propose an extension of the standard spatial model of political competition that allows for issue adoption and more generally, issue prioritizing at the platform level. The paper then compares the outcome of party competition under proportional and plurality rule. Entry is allowed and incumbent parties act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis potential entrants. The analysis highlights the interaction …
Local Polynomial Whittle Estimation, Donald W.K. Andrews, Yixiao Sun
Local Polynomial Whittle Estimation, Donald W.K. Andrews, Yixiao Sun
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The local Whittle (or Gaussian semiparametric) estimator of long range dependence, proposed by Künsch (1987) and analyzed by Robinson (1995a), has a relatively slow rate of convergence and a finite sample bias that can be large. In this paper, we generalize the local Whittle estimator to circumvent those problems. Instead of approximating the short-run component of the spectrum, φ(λ), by a constant in a shrinking neighborhood of frequency zero, we approximate its logarithm by a polynomial. This leads to a “local polynomial Whittle” (LPW) estimator. Following the work of Robinson (1995a), we establish the asymptotic bias, variance, mean-squared error (MSE), …
Multifractal Products Of Cylindrical Pulses, Julien Barral, Benoit Mandelbrot
Multifractal Products Of Cylindrical Pulses, Julien Barral, Benoit Mandelbrot
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A new class of random multiplicative and statistically self-similar measures is defned on IR. It is the limit of measure-valued martingales constructed by multiplying random functions attached to the points of a statistically self-similar Poisson point process in a strip of the plane. Several fundamental problems are solved, including the non-degeneracy and the distribution of the limit measure, mu; the finiteness of the (positive and negative) moments of the total mass of mu restricted to bounded intervals. Compared to the familiar canonical multifractals generated by multiplicative cascades, the new measures and their multifractal analysis exhibit strikingly novel features which are …
Unilateral Deviations With Perfect Information, Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko
Unilateral Deviations With Perfect Information, Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at any iteration, each player unilaterally deviates to a best response to his current conjectures of others’ strategies; and then updates his conjectures in accordance with the induced play of the game. We show that, for generic payoffs, the outcome of the game becomes stationary in finite time, and is consistent with Nash equilibrium. In general, if payoffs have ties or if players observe more of each others’ strategies than is revealed by plays of the game, the same result holds provided a rationality constraint is imposed …
Does Democracy Engender Equality?, John E. Roemer
Does Democracy Engender Equality?, John E. Roemer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Many suppose that democracy is an ethos which includes, inter alia, a degree of economic equality among citizens. In contrast, we conceive of democracy as ruthless political competition between groups of citizens, organized into parties. We inquire whether such competition, which we assume to be concerned with distributive matters, will engender economic equality in the long run. The society consists of an infinite sequence of generations, each comprised of adults and their children. Adults care about household consumption, and the future wages of their children, which are determined by educational policy. A given generation is characterized by the distribution of …
Alternative Methods For Measuring Productivity Growth, William D. Nordhaus
Alternative Methods For Measuring Productivity Growth, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The present study is a contribution to the theory of the measurement of productivity growth. First, it examines the welfare-theoretic basis for measuring productivity growth and shows that the ideal welfare-theoretic measure is a chain index of productivity growth rates of different sectors which uses current output weights. Second, it lays out a technique for decomposing productivity growth which separates aggregate productivity growth into three factors — the pure productivity effect, the effect of changing shares, and the effect of different productivity levels. Finally, it shows how to apply the theoretically correct measure of productivity growth and indicates which of …
Structural Change In Tail Behavior And The Asian Financial Crisis, Carmela E. Quintos, Zhenhong Fan, Peter C.B. Phillips
Structural Change In Tail Behavior And The Asian Financial Crisis, Carmela E. Quintos, Zhenhong Fan, Peter C.B. Phillips
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This paper explores tests of the hypothesis that the tail thickness of a distribution is constant over time. Using Hill’s conditional maximum likelihood estimator for the tail index of a distribution, tests of tail shape constancy are constructed that allow for an unknown breakpoint. The recursive test is shown to be inconsistent in one direction, and only a one-sided test is recommended. Specifically, the test can be used when the alternative hypothesis is that the tail index decreases over time. A rolling and sequential version of the test is consistent in both directions. The methods are illustrated on recent stock …
Productivity Growth And The New Economy, William D. Nordhaus
Productivity Growth And The New Economy, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The present study is the third in a series of three papers devoted to issues in the measurement of productivity and productivity growth. The major findings are as follows. First, this study shows that the new data set used here, which develops data on total output, business sector output, and “well-measured” output, and relying on income-side data, provides a useful supplement to existing data sets. Second, there has clearly been a rebound in labor-productivity growth in recent years. All three sectoral definitions show a major acceleration in labor productivity in the last three years of the period (1996-98) relative to …
New Data And Output Concepts For Understanding Productivity Trends, William D. Nordhaus
New Data And Output Concepts For Understanding Productivity Trends, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The present study is the second is a series of three papers devoted to issues in the measurement of productivity and productivity growth. The contributions of the present paper are three. First, it introduces a new approach to measuring industrial productivity based on income-side data that are published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data are internally consistent in that both inputs and outputs are income-side measures of value added, whereas the usual productivity measures combine expenditure-side output measures with income-side input measures. Second, because of interest in the “new economy,” we have also constructed a set of …
A Graphical Analysis Of Some Basic Results In Social Choice, Estelle Cantillon, Antonio Rangel
A Graphical Analysis Of Some Basic Results In Social Choice, Estelle Cantillon, Antonio Rangel
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May’s Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May’s Theorem, and a new version of Maskin’s Theorem.