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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Gaming And Strategic Opacity In Incentive Provision, Florian Ederer, Richard Holden, Margaret Meyer
Gaming And Strategic Opacity In Incentive Provision, Florian Ederer, Richard Holden, Margaret Meyer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in which the agent is privately informed about which task is less costly for him to work on. We examine two simple classes of incentive scheme that are “opaque” in that they make the agent uncertain ex ante about the values of the incentive coefficients in the linear payment rule. We show that, relative …
Promises And Expectations, Florian Ederer, Alexander Stremitzer
Promises And Expectations, Florian Ederer, Alexander Stremitzer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors’ expectations about promisees’ expectations that the promise will be kept) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide clean evidence that a promisor’s aversion to disappointing a promisee’s expectation leads her to keep her promise. We propose a simple theory of lexicographic promise keeping that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases.
Promises And Expectations, Florian Ederer, Alexander Stremitzer
Promises And Expectations, Florian Ederer, Alexander Stremitzer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors’ expectations about promisees’ expectations) leads to a significant change in promisor behavior. We provide evidence that a promisor’s aversion to disappointing a promisee’s expectation leads her to behave more generously. We propose and estimate a simple model of conditional guilt aversion that is supported by our results and nests the findings of previous contributions as special cases.
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The possibility of default limits available liquidity. If the potential default draws nearer, a liquidity crisis may ensue, causing a crash in asset prices, even if the probability of default barely changes, and even if no defaults subsequently materialize. Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability and shortens the horizon over which a fixed income asset may default, …
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability a fixed income asset may default, its drop in price may be much greater than its objective drop in value because the drop in value reduces the relative wealth of its natural buyers, who disproportiantely own the asset through leveraged purchases. When the information also shortens the horizon over which the …
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Liquidity, Default And Crashes: Endogenous Contracts In General Equilibrium, John Geanakoplos
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of endogenous contracts, including endogenous margin requirements on loans. This in turn allows GE to explain liquidity and liquidity crises in equilibrium. A formal definition of liquidity is presented. When new information raises the probability a fixed income asset may default, its drop in price may be much greater than its objective drop in value because the drop in value reduces the relative wealth of its natural buyers, who disproportiantely own the asset through leveraged purchases. When the information also shortens the horizon over which the …
The Interaction Of Implicit And Explicit Contracts In Repeated Agenc, David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti
The Interaction Of Implicit And Explicit Contracts In Repeated Agenc, David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Traditional agency theory assumes that the principal has no more information about the agent’s actions than the enforcement authorities have. This is unrealistic in many settings, and in repeated models, additional information possessed by the principal changes the nature of the problem. Such information can be used in implicit, self-enforcing contracts between principal and agent, that supplement the usual explicit contracts. This paper studies the way in which the two kinds of contracts are combined in constrained efficient equilibria of the agency supergame. The agent’s compensation is comprised of both guaranteed payments and voluntary bonuses from the principal. We give …