Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

From Appraisal To Emotion: Differences Among Unpleasant Feelings, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Craig A. Smith

Articles

Recent research has indicated strong relations between people's appraisals of their circumstances and their emotional states. The present study examined these relations across a range of unpleasant situations in which subjects experienced complex emotional blends. Subjects recalled unpleasant experiences from their pasts that were associated with particular appraisals and described their appraisals and emotions during these experiences. Situations defined by particular appraisals along the human agency or situational control dimensions were reliably associated with different levels of anger, sadness, and guilt, as predicted. However, predicted differences in emotion were not observed for situations selected for appraisals along the certainty or …

Making Sense Of Modern Jurisprudence: The Paradox Of Positivism And The Challenge For Natural Law, Philip E. Soper

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Karl Llewellyn once said, referring to Roscoe Pound's work m jurisprudence, that it was difficult to tell on what level the writing proceeded: sometimes it seemed to be little more than bedtime stones for a tired bar; at other tunes it appeared to be on the level of the after-dinner speech or a thought provoking essay, neither of which were quite the "considered and buttressed scholarly discussion" that one expected to find. Llewellyn's complaint serves as a warning, though a somewhat ambiguous one, to those who give lectures on jurisprudence.

On the one hand, I do not plan to present …

How To Argue About Health Care, Don Herzog

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Despite the aggressive title of this article, my goals are modest. I begin by explaining briefly what should at any rate be obvious: that health care policies inescapably raise moral and political difficulties, difficulties that no technical fix could resolve. I move on to puzzle over the connections between some of the more abstract issues of moral and political theory and medical policy: here I urge that we develop a more sustained taste for exploring the moral conflicts embedded in our current practices. Finally, I suggest a strategy for making nitty-gritty facts-from the concrete world of third-party payment, expensive technology, …

Some Questions For Republicans, Don Herzog

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Even a sleepy historiographer of political theory of some future day will notice the most dramatic revision of the last 25 years or so. I refer of course to the discovery-and celebration-of civic humanism. The devilish Machiavelli of Elizabethan times has been gently set aside for "the divine Machiavel," the one who writes, "I love my native city more than my soul." And historians of political thought have lovingly traced the transmission of civic humanism from Florence to England and America, giving us a brand new past. America, we now know, was not the unthinkingly Lockean land served up by …

In Step With The Times: Law Library Keeps Up With Changes In Legal Research, Margaret A. Leary

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Change is constant in legal research. Plucknett's work describes, for example, the modem textbook replacing published case reports as the most important form of legal literature. More recently, A.B.W. Simpson has argued that the law review article has displaced the treatise. Apart from these changes, the law itself has continued to embrace concepts from other disciplines and deal with facts and methodologies of an increasingly technological society.

Alternative Methodologies In Contemporary Jurisprudence: Comments On Dworkin, Philip E. Soper

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I have two brief points to make. Both involve recent developments in jurisprudence, by which I mean by and large the subject that Ronald Dworkin has just been discussing. Indeed, the first point is little more than an acknowledgement of the debt that is owed to Dworkin, not only for his specific contributions to this field, but for the implications of his work for law teaching generally.

Legal Theory And The Obligation To Obey, Philip E. Soper

Articles

Contributions to this symposium will undoubtedly share, with other recent discussions of the issue, the assumption that one does not need to decide what law is before deciding whether there is an obligation to obey it. More precisely, the assumption seems to be that our ordinary, pre-analytic understanding of "law" provides a completely adequate base for discussions about law's moral authority. The more refined disputes about the nature of law that dominate analytical jurisprudence can thus be ignored.