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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Bargaining Under The Illusion Of Transparency, Kristof Madarasz
Bargaining Under The Illusion Of Transparency, Kristof Madarasz
Kristof Madarasz
CEPR Discussion Paper #10327 (r&r, aer)
Projection Equilibrium: Definition And Applications To Social Investment And Persuasion (Old Version), Kristof Madarasz
Projection Equilibrium: Definition And Applications To Social Investment And Persuasion (Old Version), Kristof Madarasz
Kristof Madarasz
2014 Sept Version, " The SelectedWorks of Kristof Madarasz Available at: http://works.bepress.com/kristof_madarasz/35
Projection Equilibrium: Definition And Applications To Social Investment And Persuasion (Longer Older Version With Private Projection And Auctions), Kristof Madarasz
Projection Equilibrium: Definition And Applications To Social Investment And Persuasion (Longer Older Version With Private Projection And Auctions), Kristof Madarasz
Kristof Madarasz
also at http://works.bepress.com/kristof_madarasz/35 or CEPR Discussion Paper 10636 Current Version: http://economics.princeton.edu/sites/economics/files/inp_0.pdf
Biases Of Others: Anticipating Informational Projection In An Agency Setting, Kristof Madarasz, David Danz, Stephanie Wang
Biases Of Others: Anticipating Informational Projection In An Agency Setting, Kristof Madarasz, David Danz, Stephanie Wang
Kristof Madarasz
Evidence shows that people fail to account for informational differences and instead project their information onto others in that they too often act as if others had access to the same information they did. In this study, we find that while people naively project their information onto others, they also anticipate the projection of their differentially informed opponents onto them. Specifically, we find not only that better-informed principals exaggerate the extent to which lesser informed agents should act as if they were better-informed, but that lesser-informed agents anticipate such misperceptions as revealed by their choice of incentive scheme and elicited …